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The water industry in the UK and worldwide has a pressing need to better 
manage interruptions to water supply caused by various failure events, such as 
pipe bursts, equipment failures or water treatment work shutdowns. One way of 
doing this is by making use of the increasingly available real-time sensor data 
collected in water distribution systems, as well as by using hydraulic models in 
real-time. Currently, real-time sensor data and real-time hydraulic modelling are 
not used much in a water utility’s control room, especially when it comes to 
identifying a suitable strategy to respond to failure events in near real-time. 
This PhD project aims to develop, test/validate and demonstrate a new response 
methodology to support decisions made by control room operators when dealing 
with various failure events in a water distribution system. An integral part of this 
work is to develop an interactive decision-support tool, which will guide/support 
operators in identifying an effective response solution in near real-time (i.e. 
usually required up to 1 hour after the event detection/localisation if unforeseen 
events in the field are not considered). The tool will be used in this thesis to test 
and validate the response methodology. The proposed response methodology 
considers: (i) structured yet flexible approach supporting and guiding the operator 
throughout the entire response process to water network failure events, whilst 
allowing the operator to have a final say; (ii) novel interaction with the operator in 
near real-time via the proposed tool (e.g. allowing operators to propose different 
‘what-if’ scenarios without being hydraulic experts); (iii) provision of automatically 
generated advices (e.g. near optimal response solutions via a novel heuristic 
algorithm and assessed end-impacts); and (iv) improved impact assessment. An 
integral part of the response methodology is the development of a novel method 
to identify near optimal response to failures in water distribution networks. The 
response problem is formulated as a two-objective optimisation problem with 
objectives being the minimisation of failure impacts and related operational costs. 
The heuristic-based method is developed and used to solve this problem. For the 
first objective (i.e. impact assessment), a new impact assessment method is 
developed, using realistic impact indicators that cover different aspects of the 
event - which are consistently calculated for every proposed response solution 





The response methodology was tested, validated and demonstrated on a semi-
real case study. The implementation of the response methodology via the tool 
enabled operators to identify a response solution better (i.e. with lower end-
impact and cost) than the solution based on the current response practice of 
utilities. The results obtained from this case study, demonstrate that the response 
methodology works well and that it has a potential to improve water utilities’ 
current practice. The heuristic optimisation method that is integral part of the 
response methodology was validated and demonstrated on two semi-real case 
studies. Based on the results obtained it can be concluded that the heuristic-
based method works well (i.e. it is reliable and robust) and is able to identify near 
optimal response solutions in a computationally fast manner. This, in turn, 
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1.1 Motivation and background 
Water provision in cities is critical for our everyday lives. However, most of water 
supply and distribution systems in the western world are now over hundred years 
old and deteriorating. Under such circumstances, they are unfit to meet the new 
challenges of climate change, urban growth and changing population 
demographics in the next hundred years. Radical replacement of the current 
ubiquitous infrastructure is unrealistic, unreasonable and cost inefficient. The 
solution is to better manage these systems in a more pro-active, i.e. smarter way. 
It is therefore no surprise that the worldwide investment in the smart water 
infrastructure is expected to reach a number billion pounds in the next few years.  
More specifically, the water industry in the UK and abroad has a pressing need 
to better manage interruptions to water supply caused by various failures such 
as pipe bursts, equipment failures or Water Treatment Work (WTW) shutdowns. 
One way of doing this is by making use of the increasingly available real-time 
sensor data collected in Water Distribution Systems (WDS), as well as by using 
hydraulic models in real-time. However, nowadays real-time sensor data and real-
time hydraulic modelling are not used much in a water utility’s control room, 
especially when it comes to identifying a suitable strategy to respond to failure 
events in near real-time. Relevant academic work has not adequately addressed 
this challenge mainly due to the focus on specific stages (i.e. isolation, impact 
assessment or intervention) rather than the overall response process. 
Past collaborative work between the University of Exeter and Untitled Utilities has 
developed an award winning technology that makes use of this data to detect and 
locate failure events in a timely and reliable manner. What is currently lacking is 
the methodology for effective response to these events.  
Furthermore, for an effective near real-time response there is still a need to 
develop: 1) improved impact assessment methods that are based on realistic 
metrics used in the water industry and that are also used in a consistent manner 
to facilitate easy comparison between different response solutions, 2) more 
realistic selection of response interventions to be implemented (e.g. based on 
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operational costs, availability of different types of interventions, etc.) and 3) 
effective interaction with the control room operators that takes into account their 
expert judgement, preferences and experience. 
 
1.2 Aims and objectives 
The Centre for Water Systems at the University of Exeter has a long history of 
research into water systems modelling and management. This PhD project, which 
is funded by the EPSRC via the WISE Centre for Doctoral Training, aims to 
develop, test/validate and demonstrate a new response methodology to support 
decisions made by control room operators when dealing with various failure 
events in a WDS. As an integral part of this work, an interactive decision-support 
tool was developed, entitled the Interactive Response Planning Tool (IRPT). The 
IRPT is implemented in the programming environment of MATLAB and links to 
EPANET for the execution of the hydraulic simulations. Also, it links to the 
Quantum Geographic Information System (QGIS) software to visualise the 
hydraulic simulation outcome on a map. The IRPT aims to guide/support 
operators in identifying an effective response solution in near real-time, i.e. 
usually required up to 1 hour after the event detection/localisation. It is stressed 
that the target of 1 hour in this thesis is more feasible if unforeseen events in the 
field, such as non-operable valves, etc., are not considered. The IRPT will be 
used in this thesis to test and validate the proposed response methodology. 
The thesis focuses on answering the following key research questions: 
 What is the best way to respond to various events that may occur in a 
WDS? How can optimal operational interventions be identified and in a 
timely and automated way? What company data and resources (systems 
and people) need to be used in the process and how?  
 How should the identified response strategy be presented to the control 
room operator so that he/she can make an effective ultimate decision on 





 What are the likely benefits and costs of new technology? How will the 
technology be effectively delivered in to the control room (people, 
processes and systems)? 
The above research questions are addressed via the following thesis objectives: 
1. To develop an overall decision support framework for effective near real-
time management of events with focus on the response stage; 
2. To develop improved methods for impact assessment in the context of 
real-time response. This includes developing models that are able to (a) 
better quantify the reduced water consumption in event affected parts of 
the network; 
3. To consider the discoloration potential into the impact assessment 
process;  
4. To develop improved methods for more realistic selection of operational 
interventions that (a) are driven by actual intervention costs rather than 
surrogate measures; 
5. To develop improved optimisation method in the context of real-time 
response; 
6. To develop methodology that can support effective exploration of operator 
preferred responses (i.e. manually created responses), in addition to the 
more automated ones. This involves identification and development of 
different ‘what-if’ type scenarios and related modelling support. 
1.3 Thesis assumptions 
In the present thesis some assumptions have been considered for the 
simplification of the work required. These are the following: 
1. The proposed response methodology (implemented via the IRPT) can be 
applied for certain types of failure, due to simplification of the programming 
code. Through the IRPT only events, or failures, related to pipe network 
inadequacy, such as pipe bursts, pipe (planned or unplanned) isolation 
and WTW shutdowns due to burst can be tested. Additionally, IRPT is able 
to simulate one single event at each run. 
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2. The response methodology proposed here identifies response solutions, 
assuming that the detection and localisation of the failure event have 
already been conducted. This said, operators implement the response 
stage after they have successfully detected the event and are also aware 
of its location. The location of the event (i.e. location of failure pipe in the 
analysed network) and time of detection are used as input in the 
programming code for the subsequent identification of the response 
solution. 
3. In the IRPT, changes due to pre-detection phase have not been 
considered in the impact assessment. The impact assessment of a 
proposed response strategy starts here from the time that the event was 
detected in the field. 
4. The hydraulic models used here for the validation of the proposed 
response methodology are not calibrated due to time limitation. 
 
1.4 Thesis structure 
This thesis is divided into six chapters including this introduction. 
Chapter 2 addresses the first specific objective. In this chapter, a review of 
relevant literature review is conducted and results presented. Initially, the 
procedure of Emergency management in different sectors such as the water 
systems (including the procedure followed by UU), urban security and oil & gas 
industry is discussed. Subsequently, the Event management procedure, i.e. the 
management of failures in the water systems, is described. Finally, the gaps in 
knowledge of response to failures are identified. 
Chapter 3 addresses the second specific objective. In this chapter, the response 
methodology for near real-time response to WDS failure events is described. 
First, the interactive framework of the response methodology (including the 
current practice response methodology in UU and other water industries) is 
presented. Then the impact assessment method used in the response 
methodology is described. Later the proposed optimisation method used in the 





discussed. Finally the implementation of the proposed response methodology 
through the IRPT developed here is illustrated.  
Chapter 4 addresses the third specific objective. In this chapter, the proposed 
response methodology is demonstrated and validated on a semi-real case study. 
Initially the semi-real case study is described. Then the proposed response 
methodology’s steps are implemented for the case study’s event in order to 
identify the ‘New methodology response’. The ‘New methodology response’ is 
ultimately compared to the ‘Current practice response’ (i.e. response solution 
based on existing practices of water utilities) in order to demonstrate the benefit 
resulting from the operator’s interaction with the decision-support tool. 
Chapter 5 addresses the fourth specific objective. In this chapter, the reliability 
and robustness of the heuristic-based method for near optimal response to water 
network failures in near real-time is investigated. The reliability/accuracy of the 
proposed optimisation method is validated on the C-Town and P-Town case 
studies. This involves comparison of the heuristic-based solutions with the 
solutions of a more advanced/accurate optimisation method. A sensitivity analysis 
is also conducted to validate the robustness of the method. 
Chapter 6 addresses the fifth specific objective. In this chapter, the key findings 
of this thesis are summarised and relevant conclusions are drawn. The novel 
aspects introduced in this thesis are highlighted, followed by possible directions 
of future research to enhance and extend the methodologies presented. 
 
 




2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
Uninterrupted water supply and high water quality are of vital importance for the 
human life and key priorities in modern civilisations. WDSs is the water 
infrastructure that secures the above services and hence, should remain under 
normal operation conditions, despite the several challenges it may have to cope 
with due to natural or human causes, such as ageing infrastructure, accidents, 
earthquakes and power failures. 
Although today the WDSs are being monitored in near real-time by contemporary 
telemetry systems, such as Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
systems, the data generated by these systems is large in quantity and hence 
cannot be easily managed by the operators. However, the industry has a pressing 
need to use this data to improve response to the failures in pipe networks (e.g. 
pipe bursts or equipment failures). Hence, the SCADA systems data should be 
combined with the real-time use of hydraulic models of the WDSs for an effective 
emergency planning and response in water utilities (Walski 2015). 
This literature review aims at identifying previous work and related gaps in 
knowledge for the response to the failures. Studies on the detection and 
localisation of failures are also reviewed for completeness. In addition, the 
integrated management practices/strategies for response to the failures used by 
United Utilities (UU) are also reviewed, as these will form the basis for the 
development of the proposed response methodology. 
In the context of this project, the terms event, incident and emergency are 
distinguished. All these terms refer to failures in the water networks with different 
impact/severity. To avoid misunderstandings, in the present section of 
Introduction, the general term failures was utilised instead. The above terms are 
furtherly described in the next sections. 
The literature review is organised as follows. Initially, in section 2.2 the procedure 
of Emergency management is defined. In the context of this section, partial 
emergency management procedures applied in different, real-life sectors are 




described. These sectors include the water systems, where the UU emergency 
management policy is thoroughly described, and other infrastructure systems, 
such as urban security and oil & gas industry. Subsequently, in section 2.3 the 
Event management procedure is described. This section reviews academic work 
related to the management of failures in the water systems, meaning that some 
of the outcomes are still on a theoretical basis. In section 2.4, the gaps in 
knowledge of response to failures are identified. Finally, in the last section, all the 
above are summarised and some conclusions are drawn. 
 
2.2 Emergency management 
Emergency is defined as a spectrum of disasters, such as natural disasters, 
technological disasters or possible attacks (Godschalk & Brower 1985). 
Emergency management is a sequence of activities (both administrative and 
informal) undertaken in a coordinated way in order to control emergencies before, 
during and after they occur (Tveiten et al. 2012). Hence an adequate emergency 
management procedure includes the following components: mitigation, 
preparedness, response and recovery (McLoughlin 1985). The mitigation 
component includes the actions undertaken before the emergency in order to 
reduce the long-term risk to human life and property (e.g. building codes or 
disaster insurance). The preparedness component regards the operational 
development before the emergency in order to respond to it (e.g. emergency 
operations plans or warning systems). The response component involves the 
actions immediately before, during and right after the emergency that save lives 
and minimises property damage (e.g. emergency plan activation, etc.). Finally, 
the recovery component contains short-term and long-term activities after the 
emergency to return life back to normal. The emergency management 
components are shown in the corresponding wheel in Figure 2-1. The strategy 
for an integrated emergency management is stated in detail at Godschalk & 
Brower (1985) and McLoughlin (1985). 
 





Figure 2-1: Emergency management wheel (Godschalk & Brower 1985, 
McLoughlin 1985) 
 
The main objective of emergency management is the protection of human life 
and the mitigation of the impact, economic, environmental or material, especially 
during natural and man-made disasters (Giordani & Archetti 2017). Natural 
disasters include extreme weather events (e.g. floods, hurricanes, tornados and 
tsunamis), earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, landslides, etc., while man-made 
disasters refer to criminal events, terrorist attacks or accidents (e.g. during the 
repairing of an element of the urban infrastructure). The impact of these disasters 
depend on the magnitude of the affected population, the losses of human life, the 
population's time to recover, the level of infrastructure resilience and other similar 
factors. 
 
2.2.1 Emergency management in water systems 
In the water industry, emergency is denoted as an event or incident. Events or 
incidents are any failures that disrupt provision of the regular water service. An 
event is a failure that affects one single property and only a few consumer 




contacts may follow it. An incident, on the opposite hand, is a severe event, 
whose risk to public health is much greater. Usually, the incident affects groups 
of properties, causes great public risk and there are plenty of consumer contacts 
after its occurrence. To this end, throughout section 2.2, these two terms will be 
used in order to distinguish failures in water systems of different severity. 
Early work on the water systems emergency management relates to the 
preparedness component, and more specifically to the development of warning 
systems in WDSs. Kumar et al. (1999) suggested a methodology to identify the 
likely source of accidental contamination in a WDS, as well as to identify the best 
location/nodes to install monitoring stations. The authors suggested the “t-hr level 
of service” instead of “q-volume level of service”, for simplification reasons. Based 
on this suggestion, the time (i.e. t hours) from the contaminant intrusion moment 
at least one node (i.e. monitoring station) until the detection time is considered in 
their calculations. Then, by using techniques such as the shortest path and 
minimum travel time between the nodes in the water network, they managed to 
effectively identify the contaminant sources. 
Nowadays, the management of water systems emergencies, such as pipe bursts 
or other equipment failures, is carried out by water companies using state-of-the-
art hydraulic sensors and SCADA systems. The existing SCADA systems usually 
make use of control room software that simply displays data received and 
sometimes offers limited analysis of this data (e.g. trend analysis of pressure/flow 
signals or similar). What is currently lacking is a more intelligent software that is 
able to mine the signal data more effectively thus extracting more complex and 
useful information (e.g. helping answer the question such as is the data received 
detecting an event in the water system or not, etc.). The latest developments in 
hydraulic sensors have enabled water utilities to deploy increased numbers of 
sensors over their networks at moderate cost. In this way, an improved monitoring 
of the WDS is accomplished and a near real-time detection can be achieved. 
The use of the above SCADA system information, as well as a range of other 
features, have been incorporated in modern, commercial water network software 
for improved response to water system emergencies. A well-known example of 
such a commercial software is the Bentley WaterGems (Walski and Parrod 2018). 
The Bentley WaterGems makes use of an integrated water system model. The 




integrated water system model not only simulates the current system condition 
(based on SCADA system information), but it can also simulate different response 
strategies to a range of emergencies to identify the optimum response. 
The Bentley WaterGems can simulate different response alternatives to 
emergencies, such as shutdowns (planned or unplanned), power outages, fire 
and contamination events. More specifically, in the case of shutdowns the 
software provides the capability to identify and properly visualise the isolated 
segment (i.e. part of network) due to the shutdown. When the isolated segment 
is identified, users can simulate different measures, such as valve status 
modifications and others to minimise negative impact to customers. In the case 
of power outages, the Bentley WaterGems can estimate the time supply will run 
out after the event and which customers will be affected first. Additionally, in the 
power outages, the users can simulate different response solutions to identify the 
optimum one. These solutions include the modification in the operations of pump 
stations, turning on backup wells, moving in portable generators, or opening 
interconnections with neighbouring utilities. In fire events, the software provides 
a range of different measures to simulate in order to identify the optimum 
response. These measures include turning on additional pumps, opening 
connections with neighbouring District Metered Areas (DMAs) or pressure zones, 
closing of Pressure Reduction Valves (PRVs) to lower zones, etc., depending on 
the severity of the fire event and its location. Finally, in the contamination events 
the software enables users to visualise the path contaminated water may follow 
in the water system and assess this spread from various sources. Then it allows 
users to simulate different measures, such as opening appropriate hydrants for 
system flushing, to minimise contamination impacts. It is also able to identify the 
location of these appropriate hydrants based on the initial position of the 
contamination plume in the model. 
 
2.2.2 Emergency management in United Utilities (UU) 
It was earlier stated that in water industry emergencies are denoted as events or 
incidents. Emergencies in UU are furtherly classified into events, type 1 incidents, 
type 2 incidents and crisis-type incidents. Hence, emergencies in UU range from 
more common, minor type events such as pipe bursts and equipment failure to 




moderate (i.e. type 1) and larger scale (i.e. type 2) incidents (such as e.g. larger 
scale discoloration events) and ultimately crisis-type incidents caused by virtually 
uncontrollable natural and man-made disasters. 
An incident in UU not only refers to operational incidents (i.e. regarding the 
disruption of customer service), such as supply interruption or contamination, but 
also refers to any abnormal situation in the workplace of UU that directly affects 
the UU system operation and/or the life of employees, such as accidents, power 
loss or Information and Communications Technology (ICT) system 
malfunctioning (i.e. security incidents). Operational incidents consist of, for 
instance, contamination of supply, loss of supply, treatment disruption, network 
disruption, environmental pollution, fire or explosion, flooding and release of toxic 
gases. 
The incidents in UU are classified into two classes: type 1 and type 2. This 
classification is based on three factors: magnitude, severity and impact assessed. 
Type 2 incidents are of a larger scale, more severe and have a greater impact 
than type 1 incidents. The incident classes, the classification factors and some 
examples of incidents are shown in Table 2-1. The management of the incidents 
in UU is as follows (also shown in a flowchart in Figure 2-2): When alarm is raised 
(or event/incident is reported by the customer), the Duty Manager is the first one 
activated regardless of whether the alarm is correct or erroneous. The Duty 
Manager will then formally declare the event or incident, if the alarm is correct. If 
he/she concludes that an event (and not an incident) has taken place, “business 
as usual” procedures are followed. If an incident has occurred, then it is first 
classified based on Table 2-1. The security incidents (i.e. incidents that breach 
the operational systems of UU or threaten the life of employees) are handled in 
a separate way requiring the Duty Manager to contact the Police. Afterwards, the 
Duty Manager will establish a team consisting of the Duty Manager, the Security 
Manager, the Senior Wholesale Manager, the Public Health Scientist, the 
Emergency Planning & Response Manager and the Corporate Affairs 
representative to manage the security incident. 
As far as the management of operational incidents is concerned, three key roles 
are activated, once an alarm is raised: the Duty Manager (who is the first one to 
be activated, as stated earlier), the Incident Manager and the Forward Incident 




Controller (FIC). The Incident Manager and the FIC are roles taken by different 
UU Managers/Directors depending on the class of incident. The three roles are 
subsequently described. 
During the first step of Incident management, the employees have the 
responsibility to report the potential incident to the Duty Manager. To report the 
potential incident they should follow a series of responsibilities, thoroughly 
described at the relevant UU manuals. It is then Duty Manager’s responsibility to 
assess for incident potential. If the incident is type 1, the Duty Manager takes the 
responsibility of its management and the role of Incident Manager. If the accident 
is type 2, it is the responsibility of Area Business Manager, the Regional 
Managers, the Level 3 manager and the Director to manage the incident, taking 
the role of Incident Manager. The above four Managers/Directors are informed to 
manage the incident by the Duty Manager who calls them for the first incident 
meeting. 
The Incident Manager of each incident type has predefined responsibilities (well-
defined in UU manuals), such as securing the health and safety of UU employees 
(in case of security incidents), establishing an Incident Team and other Task 
Teams, satisfying customers’ and regulators’ expectations, protecting UU’s 
assets and reputation, ensuring recovery is planned from the beginning of the 
incident and carrying out an effective post-incident review including the learning 
outcomes. 
The FIC is the leader of the onsite response activities. For the type 1 incidents, 
FIC become the Network Team Leader, the Process Controller and the Network 
or Process managers. For the type 2 incidents, the role of FIC take the Area 
Business Manager, the Regional Managers, the Level 3 manager and the 
Network or Process managers. FIC may be the leader of response activities at 
the location of the incident, however they are still under the guidance of Incident 
Manager. 
Task Teams established by the Incident Manager take over several 
responsibilities under the guidance of Incident Manager directly after the incident 
is identified, such as communications across all stakeholders, Affected Area 
Assessment  and visualisation for decision-making, Alternative supplies & 




Emergency Plan, Compensation and Legal responsibilities, Emergency Planning 
Liaison and Laboratory Sampling. 
It was earlier mentioned that as soon as the Duty Manager concludes that the 
alarm corresponds to an incident, an incident meeting is immediately arranged 
(initial incident meeting). If the incident is type 1, the meeting is virtual, making 
use of teleconferencing facilities. If type 2 incident takes place, the key 
participants should physically be present at the meeting (the FIC will dial in). After 
the end of the incident, the Final/Closure incident meeting is called by the Incident 
Team, where the incident is officially closed. It should be stressed that the 
incident is still considered ongoing until the time that Duty Manager issues an 
Incident Closure Notice. 
It was stated earlier that right after the incident identification, among the 
responsibilities of the Incident Manager is to ensure a recovery plan. This has to 
be carried out the earliest the possible during the incident. During the recovery 
plan, the data that have to be collected for the post-incident investigation are 
collected and sent to the Ofwat, Environment Agency (EA) and Drinking Water 
Inspectorate (DWI). Additionally, the resources required to restore the UU’s 
reputation are found. 
Apart from the above real-time emergency management actions, an integrated 
Incident management comprises of other “offline” tasks, too. The Alarm 
Management Centre (AMC) is responsible for the proactive monitoring of 
telemetry systems in coordination with the Integrated Control Centre (ICC). UU 
is also a member of Water Industry Mutual Aid Scheme, which enables inter-
company borrowing of emergency equipment. 
UU makes use of the commercial software Synergi for the hydraulic and water 
quality modelling of failure events and the simulation of different response 
strategies. UU is able to simulate via Synergi changes in water quality 
parameters, such as water age and substance concentration throughout a water 
network. This functionality is useful when assessing turnover or storage time in 
service reservoirs or when dealing with water quality complaints or incidents. 
Water age is a major factor in water quality deterioration within the distribution 
system. The two main mechanisms for water quality deterioration are interactions 
between the pipe wall and the water, and reactions within the bulk water itself. 




Pipe material and water composition therefore have some influence. As the bulk 
water travels through the distribution system, it undergoes various chemical, 
physical and aesthetic transformations, impacting water quality. Depending on 
the water flow rate, finished water quality, pipe materials and deposited materials 
(i.e. sand, iron, manganese), these transformations will proceed to a greater or 
lesser extent. UU have developed proper water quality models in Synergi in order 
to run water quality analyses and calculate water age. It is also useful to 
determine the travel time of water through the network for water quality incidents. 
UU models travel times in Synergi using the water quality analysis tools. 
In the case of planned or unplanned shutdowns UU is also able to test different 
valve closures through Synergi in order to identify the isolated area. Additionally, 
if rezones and mains rehabilitation are required as response measures, they are 
able via Synergi to find an alternative supply for an area. In cases where there is 
no alternative supply, UU is able to model in Synergi an alternative supply vehicle, 
or ASV, and test if new demand is satisfied. 




Table 2-1: UU incident classes and classification factors (UU Operational 
Incident Management Procedure) 
 





Figure 2-2: Emergency management flowchart applied (before response stage) 
in UU 




2.2.3 Emergency management in other infrastructure systems 
Urban security 
The pressing need of citizens to feel safe against emergency events, such as 
terrorist attacks, has motivated defence and security agencies. To this end, multi-
sensory technologies are increasingly being developed nowadays in order to 
more effectively detect, analyse and visualise the emergency events. However, 
such technologies are associated with a number of challenges, such as 
manipulation of massive data, widely-dispersed components across the network 
or heterogeneity of the components. 
Recent advances in the multi-sensory technologies not only have addressed the 
above challenges, but also have enabled related agencies to effectively cope with 
real-time data (Petris et al. 2014). Another type of technology that has enabled 
the effective management of the emergency events is the Internet-of-Things (IoT) 
paradigm. Through IoT methodology the various and different internet-connected 
components of a system are coordinated. More information about the IoT can be 
found in Petris et al. (2014). 
Giordani & Archetti (2017) in their paper are referred to the emergency 
management in urban security with particular focus on terrorist attacks as 
emergency events. They provide a comprehensive review of work related to 
emergency management in several domains, such as urban security, 
meteorological events or earthquakes, as well as methods of data analysis in 
emergency situations when data are collected by sensors deployed over wide 
areas. They claim that a proactive emergency management on urban security 
attacks can be accomplished. 
Recent advances in methods for early detection of terrorist threats include 
historical data analysis and statistical learning and allow near real-time prediction 
of terrorist actions. In the context of this analysis, long-term data (i.e. strategic 
terroristic behavior) are processed providing a short-term (i.e. operational) activity 
pattern. The data are generated either by physical devices (e.g. common 
surveillance cameras) or by virtual sensors (e.g. police officers, citizens). The 
data are then transformed into symbolic events creating generic scenario-
agnostic semantics, or terrorist indicators, as found in the related literature. 




Finally, the data are processed through reasoning and fusion techniques 
providing a real-time presentation of the emergency situation. 
Data fusion is the technique through which information from different sources are 
combined to provide robust and complete description of a process of interest 
(Azimirad & Haddadnia 2015). Data fusion is particularly necessary in cases 
where massive data need to be collected and suitably processed (i.e. fused and 
distilled) in order to provide the related users with comprehensible information for 
decision-making. Joint Directors of Laboratories (JDL) is a well-established data 
fusion model (Hall & Llinas 2001; Klein 2004), developed by the US Department 
of Defense to serve military data fusion systems. The model’s basic principle is 
the combination of real-time information flow (from sensing devices to the final 
user through multi-layers) with an offline layer. 
The online multi-layer part consists of four distinct layers (from Level 0 to Level 
3), as shown in Figure 2-3. In brief, Level 0 contains the filtering of the raw data. 
At Level 1 the model entities (i.e. objects) and the observations of the objects (i.e. 
states of objects) are defined. Level 2 is in charge of generating situations in a 
micro-scenario. Situations reflect a representation of a set of observations of the 
object(s) by fusing the states of the objects. The micro-scenario defines the 
spatial reference system. In the context of Level 3, threat levels are assigned to 
the situations and presented to the final users. The offline layer (i.e. Level 4) 
generates, trains and tunes the fusion models and is responsible for the long-
term refinement of the model’s processes. 
 





Figure 2-3: JDL layers (Giordani & Archetti 2017) 
 
Oil & Gas 
Nowadays, oil and gas industry provides with energy several sectors, such as 
transportation, electricity, heating, etc. It also offers plenty of job opportunities 
around the world. Being such a vital infrastructure for the world’s economy 
combined with the fact that the products of oil and gas industry are extremely 
flammable, make the oil and gas industry attractive to terrorists. Especially after 
the 9-11 attacks, the need to improve the oil and gas security was intensified. 
Successful attacks on oil and gas facilities can cause severe consequences, such 
as oil/gas supply disruption, economic impact, injuries and fatalities. The 
emergency management is then of vital importance to secure the human life and 
uninterrupted processes. 
Bajpai et al. (2007) proposed an integrated approach to the management of 
attacks to oil and gas facilities, including both a preparedness stage and an 
emergency response stage. The preparedness stage contains a qualitative risk 
assessment. In the context of risk assessment, a threat analysis, a vulnerability 
analysis and a security risk factor table are carried out. The threat analysis aims 
at identifying all possible types of threats and their likelihood to happen. During 
the vulnerability analysis all the possible scenarios that might cause the threats 
are recognized. This analysis demands creativity and imagination. Finally, the 




security risk factor table aggregates the threats and the vulnerabilities of the oil 
and gas facilities and presents a total security risk status for each facility. 
In preparedness stage some security countermeasures are also included. These 
countermeasures regard cyber security (e.g. protection of crucial information 
existed in the industry’s computational systems or protection of SCADA systems), 
physical security (e.g. installation of closed-circuit television surveillance at 
critical places of the industry or exhaustive screening of people and parcels 
arriving at the industry) and policies and training of employees (i.e. security 
awareness programmes and acquisition of skills, such as emergency response, 
bomb threats, first aid, etc.). The emergency response stage comprises of an 
emergency plan, where several onsite (e.g. medical, safety, etc.) and offsite (e.g. 
law-enforcement) functional groups are motivated. The steps of the proposed 
emergency plan are listed in detail at Bajpai et al. (2007). 
 
2.3 Event management 
The term event is frequently met in the discipline of process engineering and is 
defined as the cause of an observed abnormality occurring during a process 
(Venkatasubramanian et al. 2003). Abnormality, or fault, reflects any deviation 
from the normal operation of the process. The activity that addresses the events 
in order to bring the process back to normal conditions is called Abnormal Event 
Management (AEM). AEM includes a timely detection of the event, a diagnosis 
stage where the principle causes of the event are explored and the 
decisions/actions required to return back to normal operation 
(Venkatasubramanian et al. 2003). 
As far as WDSs are concerned, an event refers to any failure that may happen in 
the network. Events in WDSs can range from minor failures, such as small-
scale/single-equipment failures to larger-scale failures, such as large-scale 
discoloration or pipe bursts. This term has been adopted by the relevant 
academic literature to denote all the possible types of failure. Hence, event is a 
general term used throughout the present section to denote any failure type and 
should not be confused with the corresponding term used in the water industry 
(see section 2.2). 




An efficient Event management in WDSs can be divided in three stages: Event 
detection, Event localisation and Event response (Vamvakeridou et al. 2010; 
Romano et al. 2011; Jung et al. 2015; Kapelan et al. 2017). The first two stages 
regard the identification of an event in the network and the raising of an alarm. 
Through identification, the event is quantified in terms of amount of lost water, is 
subsequently detected and finally located in the network (Romano et al. 2011). 
The third stage is associated with the decisions and actions required to eliminate 
the negative consequences (i.e. low pressures, discolouration, etc.) to the 
consumers (Jeong et al. 2006; Bicik et al. 2009; Nayak & Turnquist 2016) and is 
the main subject of the present work. 
Event response stage includes two sub-stages: Isolation and Recovery. Isolation 
needs to be carried out with high priority to isolate the failure and allow repairs. 
Recovery includes the Event impact assessment and selection and 
implementation of interventions (i.e. Event interventions). Event interventions 
may not be required, depending on the severity of the failure (Vamvakeridou et 




Figure 2-4: Integrated Event management process 
 
2.3.1 Event detection and localisation 
As stated earlier, the Event detection is the first stage of the Event management 
process. Through Event detection, operators are notified that an abnormal 




situation takes place in the network. Sometimes, it may simply be an erroneous 
alarm. However, if the alarm is correct, depending on the detection method used, 
Event detection stage informs the operators of the severity of the event too. For 
example, when statistical/Artificial Intelligence (AI) data-driven techniques are 
used, the alarm is raised once a predetermined threshold is exceeded. Operators 
through these techniques can see how much the threshold is exceeded and 
hence get an initial view of the severity of the failure. Additionally, if the water 
company receives many calls for an event, the magnitude of the event may be 
roughly defined. Although such a critical stage, Event detection is not the focus 
of the present work. Detailed information about this stage and review of the 
detection methods developed so far can be found at Puust et al. (2010), Romano 
et al. 2011 and Laucelli et al. (2016). 
There are two types of detection techniques, the hardware-based and the 
hydraulic-based techniques (Romano et al. 2011). The first ones, make use of 
specialised devices for the detection of the leak in the network. Although the most 
accurate techniques in terms of reliability and preciseness, they are only 
inspecting and not monitoring techniques, hence they cannot be used for the real-
time detection of an event in the WDS. 
The hydraulic-based techniques make use of the process parameters (i.e. 
pressure and flow) and are divided into model-based and data-driven techniques. 
Model-based techniques make use of hydraulic models and can detect the event 
in the network through the processes of calibration and optimisation (Puust et al. 
2010; Laucelli et al. 2016). The drawback of these techniques is that they are 
time-consuming. On the other hand, data-driven techniques continuously exploit 
the flow/pressure data collected by the SCADA systems. These techniques allow 
a real-time event detection and have been more applicable in the real-life 
challenges of water companies. 
While Event detection regards the discovery and a rough quantification of the 
event in the network, it does not provide any information about its location. Event 
localisation stage which is the second one is then required for the determination 
of the event’s position. The location of the event can be determined with varying 
degree of accuracy (Romano et al. 2011). The approximate localisation defines 
the likely boundaries of the area where the event takes place. Usually, 




approximate localisation is accomplished when operators using related 
techniques try to locate the event prior to the field visit. On the other hand, the 
exact location of the event can be usually determined only after the field visit, i.e. 
by using specialised equipment (e.g. sounding type devices to locate a leak due 
to a smaller burst event). 
A recent advance in the detection technology has been accomplished by Romano 
et al. (2010; 2011). The authors developed a contemporary automated detection 
system, the so-called Event Recognition System (ERS), which can detect the 
pipe bursts or equipment failures in the WDSs in a timely and reliable manner by 
using predictive analytics based on statistical/AI techniques. The above 
methodology was extended by Romano et al. (2011) with the ability to 
approximately locate the event. 
Laucelli et al. (2016) also made progress in the detection stage by introducing 
the Evolutionary Polynomial Regression (EPR) modelling paradigm. According to 
the authors, both of the above methodologies enable water companies to react 
faster to the events, mitigating the negative impacts to the consumers. This also 
may imply a more effective Event response stage, which is the focus of the 
present study and is described in the next section. 
 
2.3.2 Event response 
Event response is the last stage of the Event management and includes all the 
decisions and the actions to be made in order to mitigate the negative 
consequences of a potential WDN event to the consumers. The Event response 
stage used to be based on a completely manual process. Operators would use 
their experience to send field workers to check for the alarm. If the alarm was 
erroneous, that would mean time waste and financial consequences for the utility. 
Even if the alarm was correct, the response was time-consuming and would result 
frequently in customer complaints. 
Lately, the advances in control systems have partially automated the response to 
the events. Water utilities identify the significance of the automation of their 
systems, since the increasingly generated data from the sensors and/or SCADA 
systems are not manageable by humans. However, their focus is not to 




completely automate the Event response stage since the human factor is always 
indispensable when decisions have to be taken. Their target is then to automate 
as much as possible the process of Event response in order to provide operators 
with comprehensible information about the event (e.g. location, damaged pipe 
age, damaged pipe characteristics, time to arrive to the event position, closest 
valves to the event’s location, etc.). This would enable operators to make more 
informed decisions for a more effective response. 
In the literature, such as in Vamvakeridou et al. (2010) and Mahmoud et al. 
(2018), two Event response stages are distinguished: the stage of Isolation and 
the stage of Recovery. The first one includes all the actions required to isolate 
the event in the network by manipulating suitable valves. This stage has been 
thoroughly studied in the past by several authors, such as Jun and Loganathan 
(2007) and Giustolisi & Savic (2010), and is not the main subject of the present 
work. The stage of Recovery contains two more sub-stages: Event impact 
assessment and Event Interventions. Event impact assessment regards the 
estimation of the consequences of the event itself and of the isolation of the event 
to the rest of the network, as well as the impact assessment of the potential 
subsequent interventions. Event interventions are the actions to mitigate the 
consequences and are not always required. The stage of Recovery is the focus 
of the present work and relevant work will thoroughly be reviewed subsequently. 
For completeness, some work related to the Isolation is also mentioned. 
 
Isolation 
Isolation could be regarded as the first step of the Event response process 
(Vamvakeridou et al. 2010). The closing of isolation valves generates 
subsystems in the WDS, which are frequently called segments in the literature 
(Jun & Loganathan 2007; Kao & Li 2007). The isolation of a damaged element 
not only prevents the failure from expanding to the rest of the system, but also 
allows easier repair of the damaged element. It becomes obvious then, that being 
able to identify the segments in WDS is significant. Jun & Loganathan (2007) 
presented in their paper a comprehensive review of the work carried out in the 
topic of Isolation and segment identification until then. 




Proper distribution of isolation valves takes into account the trading-off between 
isolating as many as possible elements of the network and the reduction of 
installation costs. Past guidelines have proposed valves to be placed at both ends 
of each pipe in a network (Kao & Li 2007). However, budgetary limitations do not 
allow the development of such networks in real life. Given the budgetary 
limitations, valves do not exist at both ends of every pipe. Hence, if a pipe failure 
occurs, existing valves isolate larger sections of the networks (i.e. segments).The 
manual segment identification is theoretically possible, but in reality (i.e. complex 
networks) infeasible (Kao & Li 2007). Hence, the development of efficient 
algorithms for the segment identification is demanded. 
The studies about segment identification reviewed in this thesis (i.e. Jun & 
Loganathan 2007; Kao & Li 2007 and Giustolisi et al. 2008), describe 
methodologies which are algorithm-based. The above methodologies make use 
of topological matrices. The topological matrices include topological information 
of the system elements (pipe network, nodes, valve locations, etc.). The 
algorithms in Jun & Loganathan (2007) and Kao & Li (2007) search through the 
columns and the rows of the matrices, which represent the pipes and the nodes 
of the network, respectively. When at the end of the pipe and/or at a node there 
is not a valve, the pipe/node is added to the segment. In that way, the isolated 
segments and the corresponding pipes/nodes within a segment are identified. 
The algorithm proposed by Giustolisi et al. (2008) use the aforementioned 
matrices to solve a linear-algebra problem, making some hydraulic-nature 
assumptions. 
Most of the studies associated with the Isolation, also deal with the identification 
of the unintentional segments in the network (e.g. Jun & Loganathan 2007, Kao 
& Li 2007). This situation is called in the literature unintended isolation. 
Unintended isolation may result from two potential conditions: Either an element 
enclosed in a segment may be unintentionally isolated, when no failure has 
occurred on that. Or a segment that may be connected with the main supply 
source only through other disconnected segment(s) is automatically isolated (Jun 
& Loganathan 2007). The first one is caused by the inadequate number of valves 
in the network, while the second one is related to the lack of network redundancy, 
or in other words, to the inadequate number of connecting pipes and loops. 




There also has been the term critical segments for describing the unintentional 
segments whose isolation causes complete interruption to the downstream 
network (Kao & Li 2007).The algorithms for the identification of the unintentional 
segments described in the reviewed papers make use of either of two algorithm-
based techniques: The Breadth-First-Search (BFS) or the Depth-First-Search 
(DFS). BFS is a step-by-step process which searches the network for segment 
connectivity. It was used by Jun & Loganathan (2007) for the unintended 
isolation. 
However, as Kao & Li (2007) stated, BFS is a time-consuming process and 
instead they utilised the DFS technique for the identification of critical segments. 
Hence, the DFS algorithm checks for articulation points in a network. Articulation 
points are the sole connections between two or more subsystems and their 
deletion divides the system into two or more subsystems, respectively. 
Jun & Loganathan (2007) and Kao & Li (2007) also make use of the segment-
valve diagram. In the segment-valve diagram, the segments are presented as 
nodes and the valves as their connecting links. This diagram allows the easier 
visualisation of the segment expanding after successive valve closings. 
 
Recovery 
Recovery is the second stage of the Event response process. It includes the 
subsequent stages of Event impact assessment and the selection and 
implementation of suitable interventions (called as Event Interventions 
hereunder). Recovery is an iterative process, which starts with the initial impact 
assessment. The initial impact assessment aims at estimating the impact of the 
event and its isolation over a pre-specified time horizon assuming no follow-on 
interventions. This is done by using a suitable impact assessment model ranging 
from simple quantification of e.g. number of customers affected to more complex 
and detailed assessments (see e.g. Bicik et al. 2009). If the initial impact is 
deemed significant enough, a possible operational interventions (including their 
combinations) are identified and analysed. The optimal interventions are then 
selected by trading off the related operational costs of interventions and the likely 
negative impact reduction (estimated by using the impact assessment model 
mentioned above). The iterative procedure of Recovery is depicted in Figure 2-5 




and the two Recovery stages are herein reviewed. They are also presented in 
Table 2-2 at the end of this section, together with relevant information (e.g. 
references, methodology types, etc.). 
 
 
Figure 2-5: Recovery stage of the Event management process 
 
Event impact assessment 
Kao & Li (2007) proposed a segment-based optimisation model for decision-
making on pipe replacement carrying out a risk-based analysis. For the impact 
assessment they utilised the pressure-driven model proposed by Gupta & Bhave 
(1966) and measured the undelivered water volume. For the evaluation of failure 
rate, they used regression analysis to predict the failure rate of a pipeline per mile 
per year (described by Walski & Pelliccia 1982) and Poisson distribution to find 
the general failure potential of the pipeline. The optimisation objective is to 
maximise the improvement in the water supply reliability in all pipe segments after 
replacement. The optimisation mathematical model is described in ILOG (2002). 
The objective (i.e. improvement) is expressed in terms of risk and is equal to the 
sum of the water shortage of each segment multiplied with the failure rate of each 
segment. The decision variables is the status (i.e. with failure or not) of each 
segment. The constraints include the failure rates definition and cost restrictions 
of the replacement. The authors claim that segment-based models used in 
replacement/repair decision-making improve water supply reliability. The 
segment network can be beneficial in other ways too, e.g. in monitoring location 
siting, partitioning management zones, pipeline network design or expansion. 




However this work is not appropriate for near real-time decision making on pipe 
repair/replacement due to long process of identifying segments, especially in 
complex real-life networks. Additionally, the authors in their impact assessment 
considered only one impact aspect, i.e. the undelivered water volume, and no 
other impact aspects, including discolouration potential, were taken into account. 
Giustolisi et al. (2008) developed an algorithm to automatically identify network 
topological changes due to abnormal system operation (i.e. valve closing to 
respond to network failure). Their approach is impact assessment coupled with a 
pressure-driven model to evaluate the water shortage in terms of undelivered 
water volume due to abnormal operation. Like Kao & Li (2007), they executed 
Extended Period Simulation (EPS) in EPANET2.0 to calculate the pressure 
heads under normal and abnormal conditions. Unlike Kao & Li (2007), they 
adopted the pressure-driven model developed by Todini (2003). 
In this model, they carried out some modifications in order to improve the 
convergence of the solution. They still, though, used the equation of Wagnar et 
al. (1988), for the calculation of water-shortage volume, based on the 
aforementioned calculated pressure heads. According to the authors, the 
proposed algorithm is novel in identifying topological network changes, which can 
be useful for managing planned and unplanned interruptions to the water supply. 
However, the case-study did not present potential of the new method to be 
applied in near real-time decision-making on response to water network failures.  
Kapelan et al. (2006) carried out a risk-based analysis, estimating both the impact 
of a failure in the network and the failure probability rate. The authors made use 
of pressure-driven analysis (proposed by Giustolisi et al. 2008) in an extended 
period simulation for the impact estimation. The impact was measured in 
undelivered water demand to the customers. For the calculation of the failure 
probability rate, they utilised the relationship of Bernardi et al. (2005), which is 
dependent on the pipe characteristics. The method was tested on the simple real-
life network of Apulian town in southern Italy. The method could potentially be 
used to support near-real time decision-making about repair planning, as well as 
to evaluate the expected reduction in risk due to pressure management or 
rehabilitation. However, the method considers only undelivered water demand in 
the impact assessment (i.e. different impact aspects including discolouration 




potential are not considered). Additionally, the method is not tested on more 
complex real-life networks. 
Beuken et al. (2008) developed a water quality index in the context of a 
quantitative risk analysis. They suggest to calculate discolouration risk based on 
minimum and maximum velocities and maximum flow rates. The minimum and 
maximum flow velocities in an average demand day are calculated with a 
hydraulic model for each pipe. The same model is used to estimate the largest 
flow rate for each pipe under the same demand conditions. Then, a score is 
assigned to each pipe for each discolouration risk type (i.e. based on velocities 
and on flow rates). A score of 1 means low, a score of 2 means moderate and a 
score of 3 means high discolouration risk.  
The discolouration risk for every pipe is calculated as the sum of the scores based 
on both velocity and flow rate. The resulting discolouration risk scores are 
grouped in five severity categories, i.e. “VERY LOW” with a total score of 2, 
“LOW” with a total score of 3, “MODERATE” with a total score of 4, “HIGH” with 
a total score of 5 and “VERY HIGH” with a total score of 6. 
Once the discolouration risk score for every pipe has been found, the 
discolouration risk increase for every pipe can be calculated as the difference 
between the discolouration risk score under ‘failure’ and normal conditions. The 
‘failure’ condition is defined here as the WDS condition after the occurrence of 
the event and/or the implementation of the intervention(s). Similarly to the normal 
condition, the DRI under failure condition is calculated in a pressure-driven EPS 
hydraulic model which simulates the failure network. The discolouration risk 
increase is then ranked based on the total score increase, i.e. “NO RISK” with a 
total score increase equal to 0, “LOW INCREASE” with a total score increase 
equal to 1, “MODERATE INCREASE” with a total score increase equal to 2 or 3 
and “HIGH INCREASE” with a total score increase equal to 4. 
In the context of this thesis, the above paper in combination with the work of Bicik 
et al. (2009) (see subsequently) were used for the estimation of the discolouration 
risk increase index. In this thesis, it was regarded that calculating the number of 
pipes that are in danger of discolouration risk increase is a more comprehensible 
way of presenting to operators the water quality condition in the network. 
Operators in water utility practice do not necessarily concern about the number 




or direction of the particles in the water pipe during the event. On the contrast, 
they concern about which pipes in the network show risk of discolouration 
increase in order to inform customers in the affected areas and avoid customer 
complaints. 
Bicik et al. (2009) proposed an impact model which evaluates the negative effect 
of WDS failures from an operational rather than strategic point of view. The 
proposed impact assessment has been partially adopted in the current thesis and 
hence described here thoroughly. The operational perspective is short-term (e.g. 
short-term failures caused by pipe bursts) and allows better prioritisation of 
decisions in the operating room. Hence, the model can assess the impact of a 
failure to the customers based on a list of Performance Indicators (PIs). They 
make use of existed PIs developed by the pertinent authority in the UK, Ofwat. 
Existed PIs measure the long-term pressure adequacy (i.e. DG2) or the long-term 
water supply continuity (i.e. DG3). However, the authors believe that these PIs 
are insufficient in estimating the impact, since they reflect a long-term (i.e. 
strategic) perspective, and they do not take into account the type of customers 
and their vulnerability to the failure. According to the model, the effects of the 
different impact factors are listed in a table based on the value tree proposed by 
Michaud & Apostolakis (2006). According to the table, there is mainly social 
impact to the customers and economic impact to utilities. The proposed impact 
model includes PIs for the following impact factors: low pressure, water supply 
interruption and discolouration. The quantities that measure the first two PIs are 
calculated in the hydraulic solver EPANET2.0 (a modified version which takes 
into account pressure-driven analysis). For the estimation of discoloration 
potential, the hydraulic model is coupled with an offline model which relates the 
calculated disturbances in the normal flow to discoloration potential. 
The low pressure PI for the impact to customers measures three quantities as 
surrogate for the social impact: the number of customers affected by low 
pressure, the volume of undelivered water due to low pressure and the average 
low pressure duration. It should be stressed that each of the three above 
quantities are calculated for four different types of customers. The low pressure 
PI for the impact to utilities estimates the economic impact measuring the lost 
revenue due to low pressure, taking into account the amount of metered and 
unmetered customers. 




The water supply interruption PI measures the same quantities as in the low 
pressure PI and the duration of the interruption lasts from its beginning until it is 
fully recovered. Furthermore, five different duration classes are proposed to 
distinguish the severity of the interruption. Finally, each quantity of the PI is 
calculated for every customer type. The discolouration PI measures the number 
of pipes that are more likely to experience the phenomenon. The estimation of 
the discolouration likelihood was carried out by the model proposed by Dewis & 
Randall-Smith (2005) and is based on risk trees. However, the authors believe 
that a discolouration model based on shear stress would be more appropriate. 
They finally made use of Geographical Information Systems (GIS) for the 
visualisation of the results (i.e. properties with low pressure and/or interruption, 
height of pressure at nodes and increased discolouration potential for each pipe). 
The method was applied on a large real-life WDS. The method provides insight 
regarding the proper evaluation of negative impact of WDS failures, but there is 
no evidence in the paper that it can be used in near real-time decision making. 
Diao et al. (2016) developed a Global Resilience Analysis (GRA) methodology in 
order to evaluate and enhance resilience in water infrastructure under extreme 
conditions. GRA is a risk-based analysis of the system differentiating from other 
related studies due to the focus on the failure modes that stress the system rather 
than the threats. They distinguish the failure modes from the threats by saying 
that the failure modes typically are pipe failure, excess demand, and substance 
intrusion, which are caused by internal (e.g. water hammer) or external threats 
(e.g. ground movement). The method has been applied in four different WDSs 
for the aforementioned different failure modes. Impact is measured through the 
ratio of unsupplied demand to the total demand. The results show that the GRA 
can identify the range of impact under different scenarios for each failure mode. 
It is also shown that increased resilience in one failure mode may lead to 
decrease of resilience to another one. The authors in this study developed a 
computer program in C# which calls Epanet engine for hydraulic and water quality 
simulations. However, they simplified their numerical calculations by omitting 
some scenarios due to ill-conditioned equation systems. Their approach also 
might be more appropriate for strategic system assessment/enhancement rather 
than real-time impact assessment, because the main aim of the method is to 
assess/enhance system resilience in the long term. 




Qi et al. (2018) developed an impact assessment framework which includes both 
hydraulic and water quality impact indicators. In the context of the proposed 
framework, statistical analysis of the different impacts also takes place, the spatial 
distribution of each indicator is analysed and finally the pipes of the network are 
ranked based on each individual impact indicator as well as single indicator (i.e. 
considering all aspects of impact). The framework was tested on three different 
WDSs and the results indicate that impacts of pipe breaks are depended on pipe 
diameters, pipe locations, time of break and the indicator considered. The above 
analyses are conducted with the aim to provide guidance for effective event 
management and restoration planning strategies in a water utility. However, the 
proposed impact evaluation framework might be more appropriate for strategic 
(i.e. long term) rather than real-time response planning to a network event (e.g. 
break, etc.). This is due to the fact that its focus is to provide a good 
understanding of network properties after analysing different break scenarios 
which run offline. 
 
Event Interventions 
Selection and implementation of interventions is the last stage of the Recovery 
phase. At this stage, the decisions are made and the actions are taken to 
minimise the previously estimated negative consequences of the failure event. 
This is the most crucial part of the Event management process. However, the 
decisions made during this stage are strongly dependent on the previous steps 
of the Event management process. Hence, an effective Event management plan 
should develop methodologies taking into account all the aforementioned stages 
(i.e. Integrated Event Response methodologies). Such methodologies are usually 
parts of Decision Support Tools (DST) in water utilities. Some of such 
methodologies are described in this section. For completeness, the separate 
stage of Event interventions is described in this stage, though. 
Jeong et al. (2006) developed a mathematical mitigation model for the 
minimisation of the consequences of a physical attack that leads to water supply 
disruption in a part of the network. The interventions here are the successive 
demand adjustments across the residual network until the desired pressure 
heads are satisfied and impact minimisation has been achieved. Model input are 




the residual network, a demand level and a priority level of each node. Hydraulic 
simulator EPANET2.0 is used for the control of the hydraulic feasibility (i.e. control 
of mass and energy conservation and pressure adequacy of the residual network 
after the demand-level changes). Although in real life water demand at a 
customer node cannot directly be controlled, in emergency situations voluntary 
participation of customers is anticipated. Observations have shown that a 
reduction of at most 50% can be achieved when customers are informed properly 
and are available to help (Jeong et al. 2006). Hence, in the context of the model, 
three demand levels are defined: 0 (water supply discontinued, no demand 
satisfied); 1/2 (half demand satisfied); and 1 (all demand satisfied). 
Once the demand has been determined, the flow and pressure characteristics of 
the residual network are calculated using the hydraulic solver EPANET2.0 to 
check for hydraulic feasibility. The consequences of water shortage on a node 
are measured through the objective function which considers two factors: the 
priority level (i.e. importance) of that node and the negative impact of reducing 
the normal demand to a specific level on the node. The negative impact is 
calculated using predefined theoretical impact functions/curves which take into 
account the customer sensitivity. The model aims at mitigating the above 
consequences (i.e. minimising the objective function) by creating a feasible 
demand pattern in the residual network. The impact function takes the three 
demand options and returns impact severity for each node (i.e. implicit impact 
estimation). 
Five methods are proposed for the solution of this optimisation problem. The first 
two search for optimal solution: The Branch-and-Bound (B&B) algorithm and the 
Genetic Algorithm (GA). The three others are heuristic methods: The Pressure-
Based Method (PBM), the Weight-Based Method (WBM), and the Pressure and 
Weight-Based Method (PWBM). According to B&B, the solution space is 
represented by a search-tree. Every level of the search-tree corresponds to a 
customer and every node at each level corresponds to a demand option (among 
the three aforementioned options). The method starts searching for a solution 
from a node called root. After checking for hydraulic feasibility (through the 
constraint functions) in the solver EPANET2.0, a potential solution is generated 
across the search-tree, which is reflected in a path. Each solution represents a 
demand pattern. To accelerate the method, the techniques of search strategy 




and pruning are used. More details about the B&B method can be found in Beale 
(1979). B&B method, although simple and easy to program, can be time and 
space consuming, particularly for large networks (Jeong et al. 2006). In such 
cases, Jeong et al. (2006) proposed the GA methodology to search for the 
optimal solution. Here the solution space consists of the candidate solutions, 
namely individuals. GA iteratively looks for the optimal individuals by modifying 
the solution space. 
In the work of Jeong et al. (2006), each individual includes a set of genes and 
each gene represents a demand option. Like in the case of B&B, each solution is 
checked for hydraulic feasibility against the constraint functions. The techniques 
of point crossover and random mutation are used for the generation of new 
offspring. The three last heuristics (PBM, WBM and PWBM) aim at finding a 
feasible demand pattern based on the idea of reducing one level of demand at 
the top-ranked node. The ranking of nodes differs for each heuristic method. 
Hence, the residual network is submitted to the solver EPANET2.0 and if 
inadequate pressure distribution is returned, the demand level is reduced by one 
in the following way: In the PBM method the top-ranked node selected for 
demand reduction is the node with the smallest pressure (but still positive 
demand). In the WBM, the selected node is the one with the lowest priority level. 
Finally, in the PWBM, the selection of the top-ranked node takes into account 
both the pressure and the priority level of the node. 
The general methodology was applied to three networks: two small ones (12 and 
24 customer nodes) and one large network (685 customer nodes). The results 
showed that the B&B method is regarded more efficient than the heuristics in the 
small networks. However, as far as the large networks are concerned, the GA is 
more efficient than the other methods in providing the optimal solution (Jeong et 
al. 2006, Jeong & Abraham 2009). Furthermore, the authors observed that if the 
solutions from the heuristics are incorporated in the initial population of GA, the 
algorithm may be more efficient. 
One of the eliminations of this research is that the methodology was applied in 
artificial networks and each network was located in a single pressurized zone. 
Real-life networks, though, include multiple pressure zones and several assets 
for adjusting the flow, such as pumping stations, water tanks, etc. Moreover, the 




applied methodology assumed a static demand pattern without taking into 
account the demand peaks in a 24-hour horizon. According to the authors, if the 
daily peaks were taken into account, the consequences of the water shortage 
would further be reduced. Furthermore, the impact assessment of the demand 
reduction is carried out through theoretical impact functions/curves. On the other 
hand, the advantage of the proposed methodology is that takes into account the 
customer sensitivity to the water shortage and the customer behaviour under 
failure conditions (i.e. reduction of normal demand). 
Jeong & Abraham (2009) expanded the approach proposed by Jeong et al. 
(2006) in a more realistic way taking into account the dynamic demand pattern 
during the day. Their approach was also more reasonable, because they 
proposed water rationing plans for different types of customers. According to 
these plans, water is supplied to the affected customers at least for a short-period 
during the day (instead of complete water supply shut-off in some customer 
nodes during the restoration, as Jeong et al. (2006) had assumed). 
Three different types of customers are assumed in this study: residential, 
industrial and critical customers. The consequences of the partial water supply 
are measured in a different way for every customer type. All three consequence 
measurements make use of the degree of impact of the selected water rationing 
plan. For the estimation of the degree of impact, the impact curves mentioned in 
Jeong et al. (2006) are used, as shown in Figure 2-6. Each impact curve/function 
corresponds to a different customer type. Hence, the curve f1 describes the 
consequences of a partial supply to highly sensitive customers. Curve f2 
represents a linear impact. Finally, curve f3 reflects customers with the lowest 
impact of a potential partial water supply. For the residential customers the impact 
function f3 is assumed. In the case of industrial customers all three impact curves 
are used, because three different types of industry are assumed. For the critical 
customers, the impact curve f1 used. 
 





Figure 2-6: Impact function curves for the impact estimation of a potential partial 
water supply to different types of customers (Jeong & Abraham 2009) 
 
The consumption pattern is also determined for every customer type. As far as 
the water rationing plan for residential customers is concerned, the typical graph 
of diurnal consumption (i.e. one peak early in the morning and one peak early in 
the evening) is utilised. A simplification of this graph, though, is eventually 
assumed. According to this simplification, step-wise periods of time, during which 
the consumption remains constant, are used. The time steps, or segments, have 
four hours duration. To fully or partially cover the water needs of the customers 
only ten different (and most representative) water plans are suggested: One plan 
for full water supply during the day and two plans for partial supply (three plans 
of 8-hour supply and six plans of 4-hour supply). 
As far as the industrial customers are concerned, the consumption pattern was 
classified into three categories: the typical one where water consumption takes 
place during the working hours (from 8am. to 5pm.), the typical restaurant 
consumption from 5pm. to 9pm. and the night consumption by facilities with water 
tank for energy-saving reasons. For each type of industry customers, four 
different water rationing plans are proposed by the authors: one full supply, two 
partial supplies and no supply. Finally, the first and third aforementioned 
consumption patterns were used for the critical customers, as their consumption 




broadly varies depending on their service. The corresponding water supply plans 
were also used. 
The above consequence measurements form the three objectives (i.e. objective 
functions) that need to be minimised. For the solution of this multi-objective 
optimisation problem, the Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm, type II, 
(NSGA II) is used. For the control of hydraulic feasibility of the proposed water 
supply plans, the authors made use of EPA in the hydraulic solver EPANET2.0. 
The optimisation process is shown in Figure 2-7. 
 





Figure 2-7: Optimisation process to find the optimal water supply plan to the 
different types of customers in the work of Jeong & Abraham (2009)  
 
In addition to the water rationing plans, the authors examined the role of water 
tanks immediately after the disaster. They found out that increasing the tanks 
capacity or maintaining a high level in the tanks can significantly reduce the 
negative consequences. Hence, increased tank capacity will provide with water 
the destroyed part of the network for the first days immediately after the disaster, 
eliminating the consequences and enabling emergency managers arrange their 
mitigation strategies. However, water companies should consider additional costs 
for acquiring increased capacity tanks, as well as issues related to water quality.  




The advantage of the model is that it can be applied at water shortage situations 
not only due to physical attacks (as the study assumes) but also due to extreme 
natural events. To this end, the proposed methodology could be applied under 
other extreme water network events, such as large-scale pump or pipe 
failures/bursts. One of the limitations of the model is that the demand is not 
dependent on the pressure. Hence, potential pressure reduction due to leakage 
or unaccounted for water that implies demand shortage is not taken into account 
in this model. Another limitation of the study is that the demand scheduling for 
the water supply plans takes place based on the volunteering participation of the 
customers. Such an assumption, though, is very unsteady and the authors 
believe a valve-controlled method should be developed for this reason. 
Turner et al. (2012) also developed a mitigation methodology when physical 
attacks or extreme natural disasters strike the water infrastructure. The same 
assumption as in Jeong et al. (2006) and Jeong & Abraham (2009) was made: 
After the disaster, the system is divided into the damaged and undamaged (or 
residual) one. The damaged sub-system is isolated to allow for repairs, while the 
residual system must be hydraulically supported in order to meet the minimum 
pressure requirements at all demand nodes. In the study of Turner et al. (2012) 
reconfiguration of the residual network is also carried out through demand 
adjustments. 
Unlike Jeong et al. (2006) and Jeong & Abraham (2009), they propose a valve-
based isolation technique to change the demand levels at the nodes of the 
residual network. Their suggestion of interventions is to pressurise a set of 
demand nodes in the residual network that are accessible and deliver water 
through trucks from these nodes to the nodes in the same residual network that 
are not accessible (and hence unpressurised). The objective of their study, which 
is reflected into the objective function, is to minimise the sum of the costs of not 
providing the required demand to prioritised sub-systems and of transportation 
from pressurised to unpressurised sub-systems in the residual network. The 
model of the selected network is skeletonised (i.e. a single demand node 
represents several customers of the same neighbourhood). It is also divided into 
sectors, which include several customer demand nodes. Each sector is assigned 
a priority weight to account for customer sensitivity. Based on that weight the 
corresponding cost index is calculated reflecting the cost of not pressurising the 




specific sector. The above costs are normalised dimensionless quantities, 
providing an implicit way of measuring the consequences of the water shortage. 
The problem is solved using linear optimisation, by converting the non-linear 
constraints into linear through some assumptions/relaxations. 
The authors believe that their study contributes to controlling the computational 
time through the relaxation/linearisation methods they proposed. Other 
advantages include that they consider the customer sensitivity through the weight 
factors for ever sector they assume and the real-life network applications of their 
model. Some limitations of their study are the assumption static demand patterns 
and that the cost indices they proposed have been calculated based on high level 
of abstraction. 
 
Integrated Event response methodologies 
The current advance in SCADA and data logging technologies has enabled water 
utilities towards more real-time reactions to WDS events (Bicik et al. 2008). 
However, the massive data generated by these systems cannot be effectively 
processed in the operating room, despite the technological development of 
control systems. Hence, so far the WDS operation under failure conditions has 
mainly been approached from a strategic point of view, which focuses on the 
long-term water supply management (Bicik et al. 2008, Bicik et al. 2009). As a 
result, operators need support for a near real-time response to a failure. The 
focus should then be concentrated on how to provide them with comprehensible 
information and let them make the decisions, rather than substitute them. 
Water industry has also realised that a more realistic representation of failure 
implies a risk-based approach rather than a sole looking at either the impact or 
the frequency of the failures in the WDS (Bicik et al. 2008). Such approaches can 
later on be part of Decision Support Systems (DSS) in order to enable the 
decision-making. Subsequently, some integrated methodologies that consider 
the above are proposed. These methodologies basically implement the three 
aforementioned steps of the Event response process (i.e. Isolation, Event impact 
assessment and Event interventions) and are also presented in Table 2-2. 




Bicik et al. (2008) proposed a risk-based DSS methodology for supporting 
operators in decision-making against a failure. The methodology is based on the 
general process of WDS under abnormal conditions. Figure 2-8 presents the 
steps of a WDS operation once an abnormal event has been captured. The Data 
Collection is carried out automatically by the online sensors placed in the network 
in form of time-series. At this stage, the notifications by customers in form of 
phone-calls are also included and processed manually by the operators. The 
Filtering process takes place automatically in order to reach a level of confidence 
that the abnormal event is real. Once some confidence has been gained, an 
Alarm is generated automatically. The Investigation step then follows, which 
includes the actions to be made in order to assess if the perceived problem is 
real. At this stage, there is the automatic process of the risk estimation of each 
potential incident associated with a specific alarm and the manual process of field 
inspection, if needed. 
 
 
Figure 2-8: Steps of WDS operation under abnormal conditions (Bicik et al. 
2008) 
 
The structure of a DSS which works on a risk-assessment basis is depicted in 
Figure 2-9. The Detector module includes the three first steps of the WDS 
operation under abnormal conditions (as depicted in Figure 2-8). The Detector 
also identifies a set of potential incidents for each alarm generated. The Risk 
Evaluator module in fact represents the Investigation step of Figure 2-8. This 
module turns a WDS operation under abnormal conditions into risk-based. At this 
stage, the risk is estimated for each potential incident (of a specific alarm) in order 
to prioritise the intervention actions. The partial risk of each incident is presented 
in a non-aggregated form (i.e. the probability of occurrence and the impact to 
customers are presented separately). Hence, once an alarm has been prioritised, 
the operator is able to identify the real cause (i.e. incident) of this alarm, which 




may not have the largest risk (but either the largest impact or the largest 
probability). The partial risks are subsequently aggregated to form an overall risk 
of the specific alarm in order to prioritise the alarms generated. The alarm 
prioritisation is accessed by operators using an aggregation function based on 
Yager’s Ordered Weighted Averaging (OWA), which reflects the operator’s level 
of risk-aversion. The Intervention Manager includes an offline database with 
interventions to a particular incident, which is automatically retrieved when a 
specific alarm is raised. It also includes the decision-making of the operators, who 
select an intervention from the database or even combine/modify interventions 
aiming to the risk reduction. The interventions provided by the database are in 
this case only valve manipulations, depending on the incident. 
The Risk Evaluator module, specifically, includes the impact evaluator and the 
probability evaluator. The probability is calculated using the Dempster-Shafer 
theory of evidence. According to the theory, several independent bodies of 
evidence are utilised and the corresponding levels of belief and plausibility (i.e. 
probabilities) are estimated. Each body of evidence can dynamically change, 
based on the quality of its success. Additionally, most of the bodies are time-
dependent, allowing the corresponding probabilities to change, if new evidence 
is available. The impact is calculated using an impact model based on a list of 
basic impact factors. The impact factors are classified based on the interested 
parties forming a value tree (Michaud & Apostolakis 2006). The different impact 
factors are calculated using pressure-driven analysis in EPANET2.0. The results 
are then integrated with GIS to visualise them to the operators. 
 
 
Figure 2-9: Structure of a risk-based DSS (Bicik et al. 2008) 
 




Vamvakeridou et al. (2010) proposed an integrated Intervention Management 
Model (IMM), in the context of a general DSS methodology for operational WDS 
management. The IMM takes into account the two successive steps of the Event 
response stage (i.e. Isolation and Recovery). These two separate steps are 
implemented in two different modules, the IMM1 and IMM2, respectively. 
As far as the IMM1 is concerned, the methodology by Jun and Loganathan (2007) 
for automatic Isolation was followed, even though the event has not been verified. 
This stage is carried out taking into account the minimum impact on customers, 
which implies optimal closing of valves. The IMM1 is split into two parts: the offline 
and the online part. In the offline part, all possible sets of valves to isolate the 
network segments have been recorded on a database. These sets correspond to 
different failure scenarios and for each one of them the optimal valve closings are 
proposed. The online part, which in fact is the IMM1, runs through the database 
in real-time after an alarm has raised and provides the operators with the optimal 
valve closings. 
After the identification of the failure, IMM2 takes place. IMM2 consists of the 
Event impact assessment and the Event interventions. Event impact assessment 
is conducted using hierarchical aggregation of partial impact indicators. The 
partial impact indicators are found in Bicik et al. (2009), where the discoloration 
impact factor is estimated using the model proposed by Dewis & Randall-Smith 
(2005). It is worth stressing the innovative partial factor “system impact”, which 
among others (water lost and metered undelivered demand) counts for the 3rd 
party damage too. The calculation of the partial impact factor is conducted in an 
extended form of EPANET2.0 which takes into account the pressure-driven 
analysis, applying EPS. The final impact factor results from the hierarchical 
aggregation of the partial ones and is presented to the operators. 
After the initial impact assessment of the failure, the manual activation of 
operators takes place, where they have to find the optimal solution to alleviate 
the estimated failure impact. Three intervention options are included in the IMM2: 
valve manipulations in the same DMA or between DMAs, the change of PRV 
status and the installation of overland bypasses. Due to the unlimited number of 
sets of interventions needed to reduce the impact, Multi-Objective Genetic 
Algorithm (MOGA) takes place. The two objectives are the minimisation of impact 




and the minimisation of the interventions. The decision variables considered are 
the three aforementioned intervention options. The optimisation is coupled with a 
heuristic algorithm partially based on the Discrete Dynamic Dimensioned Search 
principles, in order to reduce the initial number of MOGA candidates. 
The above impact assessment process is also carried out for the estimation of 
the impact of the proposed intervention(s). After the impact assessment of each 
or combination(s) of interventions, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is 
applied. AHP is a qualitative process, where the decision maker pairwise 
compares two different criteria or indicators. The qualitative character of the 
process is reflected in the linguistic definitions listed in a matrix, which operators 
can use to rank the potential interventions. 
Mahmoud et al. (2018) also proposed an integrated methodology for near real-
time response to pipe burst events in WDSs. The proposed methodology includes 
all the stages of Event response: Isolation and Recovery (Event impact 
assessment and Event interventions). However, the Event interventions stage is 
the one where they suggested a new methodology, as the rest of the stages were 
based on existed methodologies. 
The first stage of the response methodology (i.e. Isolation) is addressed by a 
combination of methodologies developed in past studies. As defined by Jun & 
Loganathan (2007) and mentioned earlier here, the disconnected area around 
the event is called segment. Both the segments and the unintended segments 
are identified into the network utilising the methodology developed by Giustolisi 
& Savic (2010). Finally, the algorithm of Jun & Loganathan (2007) is used to 
identify the closest set of valves.  
For the impact estimation, an impact function, called performance indicator (IM), 
is proposed. IM is expressed in terms of undelivered water volume to consumers. 
The initial impact assessment regards the impact of the isolation (i.e. first Event 
response stage) of the event. However, the same impact function is subsequently 
used for the impact estimation of the application of the proposed interventions 
(described later). The undelivered water volume results after subtracting the 
delivered demand at a specific node from the required demand at the same node, 
when the actual pressure is less than the required pressure. The required 
demand is generated by historical operational data. The delivered demand is 




calculated by an implicit pressure-driven analysis in the hydraulic solver 
EPANET2.0. The Recovery stage includes a recovery optimisation problem. In 
the context of that, a two-objective optimisation problem is solved. The first 
objective is the minimisation of the impact, which implies the minimisation of the 
objective function IM. The second objective is the minimisation of the operational 
cost, which is associated with the minimisation of the number of intervention 
options, expressed in the objective function INV. Three distinct options are 
considered, as in Vamvakeridou et al. (2010): valve manipulations, PRVs’ outlet 
pressure adjustments and installation of overland bypasses from nearby 
hydrants. 
In order to minimise the computational time and make the response more real-
time, an offline assessing procedure takes place. According to it, the single 
interventions, valve manipulations and overland bypasses, are checked for 
feasibility (i.e. if their impact is less than the impact of the initial isolation). The 
single intervention PRVs’ adjustments is not checked for feasibility, as it is in 
advance assumed as a non-feasible single intervention, in cases of full water 
supply interruption (Vamvakeridou et al. 2010). For the assessing procedure, a 
reference value of impact (IMR) is estimated and compared with the impact of a 
selected single intervention. The IMR regards the option “do nothing” and, in fact, 
reflects the estimated impact of the first-stage Isolation. The process is iterative 
until all the possible single interventions are checked for feasibility. The 
successful candidates proceed to the optimisation stage. The assessing 
procedure is shown in Figure 2-10. After this offline process, an online (i.e. after 
the detection/localisation of the event) procedure takes place. During this 
procedure, based on hydraulic simulations the flow directions are 
calculated/observed. Hence, only the candidates included in the critical flow path 
(i.e. path that feeds the affected nodes) are considered in the optimisation 
problem. 
 





Figure 2-10: Offline assessing process for feasibility of all the possible single 
interventions (followed in Herman et al. 2018) 
 
After reducing the initial population, NSGA II for the finally identified candidates 
is implemented and a Pareto set of solutions is identified and presented. The 
axes of the optimisation are the two objectives (i.e. the impact and the cost). The 
first objective regards the impact of different combinations between the feasible 
candidates (i.e. feasible valve isolations and feasible overland bypasses) and the 
PRV(s). The second objective is associated with the cost of these combinations. 
This methodology was tested and verified on the small real-life network of C-
Town (Marchi et al. 2014). The result was a Pareto set of optimal solutions. From 
this set, the authors suggested a potential optimal recovery option that could be 
proposed to the operators. According to the authors, the application on the case 
study showed that the proposed methodology is effective and can be applied in 
near real-time. It provides the operators with a set of optimal solutions and it is 
them that decide how to respond to the failure. Thus, the methodology could 
potentially be a part of a DSS.  




However, it was only tested on a simple network. Application of NSGA II on more 
complicated real-life networks, even after reducing the initial population, is 
expected to be time-inefficient (i.e. not able to identify solutions in near real-time) 
(Keedwell & Khu 2006; Kang & Lansey 2012). To address the issue of NSGA II 
inefficiency in real-life networks, different heuristic and meta-heuristic methods 
have been proposed in the literature. Some examples include Halhal et al. 1997, 
Tolson et al. 2009, Keedwell & Khu 2006, Kang & Lansey 2012, Bragalli et al. 
2012, Zheng et al. 2014 and Gonçalves et al. 2014. However, all these examples 
regard the optimisation of WDS design. Hence, in the present work a heuristic 
optimisation method is proposed for optimisation of restoration measures (i.e. 
operational interventions) to address the above issue. 
Paez et al. (2020), in their summary paper, presented several integrated methods 
for the response to WDS events after an earthquake disaster (i.e. they considered 
real-life and complex pipe network failures). Later, Zhang et al. (2020) proposed 
an integrated optimisation-based framework to maximise resilience of a WDS 
after a disaster-type event (e.g. earthquake). However, both these studies 
identified the optimum set of response interventions that includes pipe repair or 
replacement only (i.e. without proposing different types of response 
interventions). This limitation is circumvented in this thesis by developing a 
methodology that utilises multiple intervention types (e.g. rezoning, water 
injection) and that also enables identifying the best time for their implementation 
in the field in order to restore supply. 
 
Table 2-2: Aggregated table with information about each stage of the Recovery 
process 
Reference Description 
Kapelan et al. 
(2006) Recovery stage 
 Event impact assessment 
 Methodology 
 Risk-based analysis. 
 Extended period simulation. 
 Pressure-driven modelling by Giustolisi et al. (2006). 
 Impact measured in undelivered water demand. 
 Failure probability rate by Bernardi et al. (2005). 
 Case-study 





Tested on a simple real-life network (Apulian town in southern 
Italy). 
 Pros/cons of method 
 
Method potentially used to support repair planning decision 
making. 
 
Method potentially used for evaluating the expected reduction 
in risk due to pressure management or rehabilitation. 
 
Method fast for near real-time decision-making for repair 
activity or rehabilitation/renewal planning. 
 
Method not considering different impact aspects (i.e. only 
undelivered water demand). 
 Method not tested on more complex real-life networks. 
 No discolouration potential estimated in impact. 
Kao & Li 
(2007) Recovery stage 
 Event impact assessment 
 Methodology 
 Risk-based analysis. 
 Extended period simulation. 
 Pressure-driven model by Gupta & Bhave (1966). 
 Impact measured in undelivered water volume. 
 Failure probability rate by Walski and Pelliccia (1982). 
 
Optimisation method (ILOG 2002) for identifying optimal 
pipeline replacement. 
 
Optimisation objective is to maximise the improvement in the 
water supply reliability in all pipe segments after replacement.  
 
Optimisation decision variables are the status (i.e. with failure 
or not) of each segment.  
 
Optimisation constraints include the failure rates definition and 
cost restrictions of the replacement.  
 Case-study 
 
Tested on a hypothetical network and a real-life network 
(Sanchung area in Taipei City). 
 
The hypothetical network is simple and the real-life is more 
complex. 
 Pros/cons of method 
 
Segment-based models used in replacement/repair decision-
making improve water supply reliability. 
 
Segment network can be beneficial in other ways too, e.g. in 
monitoring location siting, partitioning management zones, 
pipeline network design or expansion.  
 
Not appropriate for near real-time decision making on pipe 
repair/replacement due to long process of identifying 
segments, especially in complex real-life networks.  
 
The impact assessment considered only one impact aspect, 
i.e. the undelivered water volume and no other impact aspects, 
including discolouration potential. 
Giustolisi et 
al. (2008)  Recovery stage 




 Event impact assessment 
 Methodology 
 Impact assessment analysis. 
 Extended period simulation. 
 Pressure-driven model by Todini (2003). 
 Impact measured in undelivered water volume. 
 Case-study 
 
Tested on an artificial network and a real-life network (Apulian 
town in southern Italy). 
 
The artificial network is simple and the real-life is more 
complex. 
 Pros/cons of method 
 
The proposed algorithm is novel in identifying topological 
network changes. 
 
Method useful for managing planned and unplanned 
interruptions to the water supply. 
 
The case-study did not present potential of the new method to 
be applied in near real-time decision-making on response to 
water network failures. 




Event impact assessment 
Methodology 
Quantitative risk analysis. 
Extended period simulation. 
Risk/impact measured in water quality index. 
Case-study 
Tested on a Dutch water network retrieving customer 
complaints related to water quality in the period 1993 to mid 
2005. 
Pros/cons of method 
Development of a method for the assessment of water quality 
based on real data, i.e. customer complaints. 
Time inefficiency due to numerous manual data conversions 
required for the quantitative risk analysis. 
Bicik et al. 
(2009) Recovery stage 
 Event impact assessment 
 Methodology 
 Impact assessment analysis. 
 Extended period simulation. 
 
Pressure-driven analysis and value tree by Michaud & 
Apostolakis (2006). 
 Impact measured in different performance indicators. 
 Case-study 
 
Tested on a large real-life network (Apulian town in southern 
Italy). 
 The real-life network is large and complex. 
 Pros/cons of method 





The impact model considers discolouration risk through 
evaluating the risk-trees-based model by Dewis & Randall-
Smith (2005). 
 
The impact model evaluates impact from the operational 
perspective (i.e. short-term), e.g. short-term failures caused by 
pipe bursts allowing better prioritisation of decisions in the 
operating room. 
 
The method provides insight regarding the proper evaluation of 
negative impact of WDS failures, but there is no evidence in the 
paper that it can be used in near real-time decision making. 
Diao et al. 
(2016) Recovery stage 
 Event impact assessment 
 Methodology 
 Risk-based analysis. 
 Extended period simulation. 
 
Epanet engine called via computer program in C# for hydraulic 
simulations 
 
Impact measured in in ratio of unsupplied demand to the total 
demand. 
 Case-study 
 Tested on four real-life network. 
 The real-life networks are relatively small and not complex. 
 Pros/cons of method 
 
Focus of the method on the failure modes that stress the 
system rather than the threats. 
 
The method can identify the range of impact under different 
scenarios.  
 
The method is more appropriate for strategic system 
assessment/enhancement rather than real-time impact 
assessment, because the main aim is to assess/enhance 
system resilience in the long term. 
 
The impact assessment considered only one impact aspect, 
i.e. the undelivered water volume and no other impact aspects, 
including discolouration potential. 
Qi et al. 
(2018) Recovery stage 
 Event impact assessment 
 Methodology 
 Impact assessment analysis. 
 Steady state hydraulic simulation. 
 
Pressure-driven analysis by using equation of Wagner et al. 
(1988). 
 
Impact measured in six hydraulic and water quality (i.e. 
including discolouration potential) related metrics. 
 Case-study 
 
Tested on two simple real-life networks and one complex real-
life network. 
 Pros/cons of method 





The method can provide guidance for effective event 
management and restoration planning strategies in a water 
utility. 
 
The method can benefit government departments in designing 
effective management planning when natural disasters occur. 
 
The method is more appropriate for strategic (i.e. long term) 
rather than real-time response planning to a network event, due 
to the fact that its focus is to provide a good understanding of 
network properties after analysing different break scenarios 
which run offline. 
Jeong et al. 
(2006) Recovery stage 
 Event interventions 
 Methodology 
 
Optimisation analysis (B&B, GA) and heuristics (PBM, WBM, 
PWBM). 
 
Optimisation objective is the minimisation of negative impact of 
water shortage to the customers. 
 
Optimisation decision variables are the proportion of water 
demand satisfied for each customer node. 
 Optimisation constraints consider hydraulic feasibility. 
 Impact measured implicitly in impact severity. 
 Case-study 
 
Tested on two small hypothetical network and one large real-
life network. 
 Pros/cons of method 
 The method can be applied in near real-time for small networks. 
 
If the solution of heuristic is included in the initial population of 
GA, then GA solution time is accelerated. 
 The network models include only one pressure zone. 
 Impact assessment does not consider discolouration potential.  
Jeong & 
Abraham 
(2009) Recovery stage 
 Event interventions 
 Methodology 
 Optimisation analysis (NSGA II). 
 
Optimisation objective is the minimisation of negative impact of 
water shortage (for each customer type). 
 
Optimisation decision variables are the degrees of impact of a 
selected water rationing plan (for each customer type). 
 Optimisation constraints consider hydraulic feasibility. 
 Demand-driven model. 
 Impact measured implicitly in impact severity. 
 Case-study 
 Tested on one large real-life network, Epaville. 
 Pros/cons of method 





The proposed methodology could be applied under other 
extreme water network events, such as large-scale pump or 
pipe failures/bursts.  
 
Three different types of customers are assumed in this study: 
residential, industrial and critical customers.  
 Impact assessment does not consider discolouration potential.  
 The method cannot be applied in near real-time. 
Turner et al. 
(2012) Recovery stage 
 Event interventions 
 Methodology 
 Optimisation analysis (Optimization package CPLEX 12.3). 
 
Optimisation objective is the minimisation of the sum of the 
costs of not providing the required demand.  
 
Optimisation decision variables are the degrees of impact of a 
selected water rationing plan (for each customer type). 
 Optimisation constraints consider hydraulic feasibility. 
 Impact measured in volume and transportation cost. 
 Case-study 
 Tested on three skeletonized real-life networks. 
 Pros/cons of method 
 
The method has the potential to support utilities in decision-
making on security improvements. 
 
The method contributes to controlling the computational time 
through the new optimisation relaxation/linearization methods. 
 The method assumes static demand patterns. 
 
 The cost indices have been calculated based on high level of 
abstraction. 
 Impact assessment does not consider discolouration potential.  
Vamvakeridou 
et al. (2010) Recovery stage 
 




Optimisation analysis (Heuristic based on Discrete Dynamic 
Dimensioned Search). 
 
Optimisation objectives are the minimisation of negative 
impacts to customers and the number of interventions. 
 
Optimisation decision variables are the intervention types (i.e. 
opening valves connecting two different DMAs, modifying the 
exit pressure from PRVs and setting an overland bypass 
between fire hydrants). 
 
In the impact assessment pressure-driven analysis and 
hierarchical aggregation are used. 
 
Impact measured in different PIs, including discolouration 
potential. 
 Case-study 
 Tested on a large network in North Yorkshire. 




 Pros/cons of method 
 
The method proposes an integrated decision support system 
for response to water network failures. 
 
The method can provide near real-time decision-making 
support due to the offline extensive pre-processor.  
 
The linguistic preferences for the impact indicators were 
obtained by a questionnaire distributed among employees of 
the company and may be a long complicated work/process to 
apply in water utilities. 
Mahmoud et 
al. (2018) Recovery stage 
 
Event impact assessment & Event interventions (Integrated 
response methodologies) 
 Methodology 
 Optimisation analysis (NSGA II). 
 
Optimisation objectives are the minimisation of negative impact 
to customers and the number of interventions. 
 
Optimisation decision variables are the intervention types (i.e. 
opening isolation/rezoning valves, modifying the exit pressure 
from PRVs and setting an overland bypass between fire 
hydrants). 
 In the impact assessment pressure-driven analysis is used. 
 Impact measured in undelivered volume of water. 
 Case-study 
 Tested on a small real-life network (C-Town) 
 Pros/cons of method 
 
The method proposes an integrated decision support system 
for response to water network failures. 
 
The method can provide near real-time decision-making 
support in small networks due to the offline and short online 
selection of initial optimisation population.  
 
The method has not been tested on large real-life networks and 
hence it is expected that in such case it cannot provide near 
real-time support. 
Paez et al. 
(2020) Recovery stage 
 




Optimisation analysis (NSGA II, heuristic methods, 
combination of above). 
 
Optimisation objectives are the minimisation of negative impact 
measured in six different metrics. 
 
Optimisation decision variable is the status of isolation valves 
(i.e. open valve means repaired/replaced pipe). 
 In the impact assessment pressure-driven analysis is used. 
 
Impact measured in six metrics related to system functionality 
and time/magnitude of supply interruption.  
 Case-study 




 Tested on a large real-life network (B-City). 
 Pros/cons of method 
 
The study presents several different approaches of restoring a 
water system after an extreme natural disaster contributing to 
near real-time (in some approaches) decision-making. 
 
The study identifies the optimum set of response interventions 
that includes pipe repair or replacement only (i.e. without 
proposing different types of response interventions).  
 
Discolouration potential is not considered in the impact 
assessment. 
Zhang et al. 
(2020) Recovery stage 
 




Optimisation analysis (GA-based dynamic optimisation 
method). 
 Optimisation objective is the maximisation of resilience. 
 
Optimisation decision variable are the status of pipes or tanks 
that need to be repaired. 
 In the impact assessment pressure-driven analysis is used. 
 Impact measured in resilience 
 Case-study 
 Tested on a large real-life network (B-City). 
 Pros/cons of method 
 
The benefit of the proposed optimization method is that the total 
number of the decision variables (damaged elements) and the 
decision variables themselves can both vary when the 
hydraulic status of the WDS is updated.  
 
The new method can be beneficial to practitioners, water 
utilities, and relevant government departments by supporting 
them on the decision-making on natural disasters, such as 
earthquakes, floods, and typhoons. 
 
The study identifies the optimum set of response interventions 
that includes pipe repair or replacement only (i.e. without 
proposing different types of response interventions).  
 
There is no evidence in the paper that the new method can be 
used in near real-time. 
 
Discolouration potential is not considered in the impact 
assessment. 
 
2.4 Gaps in knowledge 
This section presents the gaps in knowledge identified based on the above 
literature review. The gaps regard the Event response methodology of both the 
UU practices and the academic literature. The identification of these gaps will 




form the basis on which an effective and efficient response methodology will be 
proposed. The list of the gaps identified include: 
 Need to develop an overall decision support framework for effective near 
real-time management of events with focus on the response stage. 
Although several discreet methodologies for each Event response stage 
have been proposed, only few studies have developed integrated Event 
response methodologies to support decision-making and also to interact 
with operators in near real-time. For instance, Jun & Loganathan (2007) 
developed an Isolation methodology, Bicik et al. (2009) proposed an Event 
impact assessment methodology and Jeong & Abraham (2009) presented 
an Event interventions methodology. Only Vamvakeridou et al. (2010) and 
Mahmoud et al. (2018) presented overall Event response methodologies 
(with focus on the Recovery stage). This issue is addressed in the present 
thesis by proposing an overall response methodology, which supports and 
guides the operator throughout the entire response process (from 
detection and localisation of a failure event to implementation of the 
response interventions in the field) whilst allowing the operator to have a 
final say. The conceptual framework of the proposed methodology is also 
based on the interaction with the operator in near real-time by allowing 
operators to propose/assess different ‘what-if’ scenarios without being 
hydraulic experts. 
 Need to develop improved methods for impact assessment in the context 
of real-time response. This includes developing models that are able to (a) 
better quantify the reduced water consumption in event affected parts of 
the network. The better quantification could involve models that assess the 
impact in terms of time of lost water, as proposed for example by Kumar 
et al. (1999) and indicated in the related regulators, and not of volume of 
lost water. Models for impact assessment could also (b) address other 
aspects/dimensions of the impact, such as impact on 3rd parties or impact 
included in other PIs (see e.g. in Bicik et al. 2009) or impact estimation on 
customers with different vulnerability (see e.g. in Jeong et al. 2006 and 
Jeong & Abraham 2009). Such impact aspects are not taken into account, 
for instance, in the latest integrated Event response methodology 
proposed by Mahmoud et al. (2018). The present thesis proposes 




improved impact assessment using realistic impact indicators that cover 
different aspects of the event. These indicators are also consistently 
calculated for every proposed response intervention (to facilitate easy 
comparison between different response interventions). 
 Need for consideration of the discoloration potential into the impact 
assessment process. Discolouration is regarded of great importance for 
both customers and water utilities. It is associated with the quality of water 
in our taps, which affects our health and safety. It is also the main water 
quality indicator during failure events in utilities, because it is linked to 
customer complaints. Water utilities aim to provide high customer service 
and avoid customer complaints, due to ethical reasons but also due to 
regulators guidelines. As reviewed earlier in this chapter, Mahmoud et al. 
(2018) who developed an overall response methodology did not take 
discolouration aspect into account during the impact assessment process. 
On the other hand, the rest of the methods reviewed earlier which 
discussed the discolouration impact aspect (e.g. Qi et al. 2018, Bicik et al. 
2009, Beuken et al. 2008), did not incorporate it in an integrated response 
strategy. This issue is addressed in the present thesis by proposing a 
discolouration method/model (based on previous work/literature) to 
calculate the increase in discolouration potential in the context of an overall 
response methodology. 
 Need to develop improved methods for more realistic selection of 
operational interventions that (a) are driven by actual intervention costs 
rather than surrogate measures (such as number of interventions 
proposed by Vamvakeridou et al. 2010 and Mahmoud et al. 2018). This 
will require developing suitable cost models for a range of possible 
interventions. These methods should also (b) take into account various 
operational requirements (e.g. duration of injection from overland 
bypasses, etc.). Finally, (c) consideration should be given to operational 
interventions not previously addressed in the literature. For instance, in 
Vamvakeridou et al. (2010) and Mahmoud et al. (2018) only three options 
of interventions are taken into account. The aforementioned needs are 
covered in the present overall response methodology by proposing 
potential interventions (and combinations of them) to implement on the 




field based on the real costs of interventions. The proposal of the 
intervention plan also considers the duration of the interventions 
implementation on site (i.e. through the cost of employees’ working hours) 
making the selection of the final intervention plan more realistic. Finally, 
novel intervention types are used such as water injection from water 
trucks, apart from those already considered in the previous literature (e.g. 
rezoning and valve manipulation). 
 Need to develop improved optimisation method in the context of real-time 
response. Based on the reviewed literature, it was shown that NSGA II is 
not appropriate for real-life and complicated systems if a near real-time 
response is required. This is due to the randomly generated initial 
population which although increases population diversity, it slows down 
the optimisation convergence. It is also due to the long time it takes to 
complete a single hydraulic evaluation of a complex network. To this end, 
alternative methods are required, e.g. heuristic methods, to identify near 
optimal response solutions in near real-time, even in complex real-life 
systems. In this work, a novel, heuristic-based optimisation method is 
proposed, which is able to identify near-optimal solutions in near real-time, 
both in simple and in complex, real-life networks. 
 Need to develop methodology that can support effective exploration of 
operator preferred responses (i.e. manually created responses), in 
addition to the more automated ones. This involves identification and 
development of different ‘what-if’ type scenarios and related modelling 
support. An example of interaction between the automatic process of 
impact estimation and the manual process of decision-making by 
operators for the Event response is the AHP, e.g. proposed by 
Vamvakeridou et al. (2010), which however does not produce/present to 
the operators potential response solutions to enable a more efficient 
decision-making. In the present response methodology, operators are 
allowed to manually propose their desired response solution based on 
their preferences/experience (along with the automatically proposed 
solutions in a different step of the methodology) and assess its end-impact 
and cost. This novel interaction with the operator in near real-time takes 




place via the proposed tool (e.g. allowing operators to propose/assess 
different ‘what-if’ scenarios without being hydraulic experts). 
 
2.5 Summary and Conclusions 
In the present chapter, a literature review on the response stage of the general 
event/incident management process was carried out. In the context of this, two 
procedures were discussed: the Emergency management in section 2.2 and the 
Event management in section 2.3. The Emergency management in section 2.2 
reviewed the real-life procedures followed by the industry in case of emergency. 
It was stated that Emergency management is an integral part of the business plan 
of every kind of industry, which enables the coordination of actions in case of 
emergency events, in order to eliminate the negative consequences. In this 
section, the sub-sections of Emergency management in water systems, in UU 
and in other infrastructure systems (i.e. Urban security and Oil & gas) were 
discussed. 
The Event management in section 2.3 reviewed the academic literature related 
to the management of failures in WDSs, such as pipe bursts and equipment 
failures. The main focus was on the stage of Event response, while a less 
thorough review of the first two stages (i.e. Event detection and Event 
localisation) was carried out for completeness. In section 2.4, a discussion was 
made around the gaps in knowledge so far, which are expected to form the basis 
for the proposed response methodology. Finally, the present section targets at 
summarizing the above sections and concluding to some basic points. 
Based on the literature review presented in this thesis, the following conclusions 
are drawn: 
 Most of the studies related to the development of a response methodology 
address separately the Event response stages (i.e. Isolation and 
Recovery). These studies do not aim to provide integrated methodologies 
on how to respond to water network failures. They aim to develop 
numerical methods to address individually the phases of the overall 
response process. Only a few studies presented an integrated response 
methodology. In these studies, existing Isolation methodologies were 




coupled with the proposed Recovery methodologies for the development 
of an overall response management procedure. 
 The Event impact assessment methodologies found in the reviewed 
papers mostly quantify the impact in terms of volume of lost water. 
However, not extensive literature proposes the impact assessment in 
terms of time of lost water, as the related water regulators do. Additionally, 
more extensive work should be carried out in considering as many PIs as 
possible stated in the water regulators, such as impact on 3rd parties or 
impact estimation on customers with different vulnerability. 
 Although models for the discoloration potential estimation have been 
developed, they have not been incorporated in some of the integrated 
Event response methodologies. 
 In the latest integrated Event response methodologies a specific number 
of intervention options has been proposed. However, in real-life more 
interventions are applied during the response to an event. The selection 
of the optimal interventions is also carried out minimising the number of 
interventions and not considering the actual intervention costs, which 
would be of more interest for the water industry. 
 Only a few studies have developed response strategies where the 
operators interact with the control system in near real-time. Moreover, in 
these studies the operators receive information about the impact of the 
proposed interventions, without the ability to propose their desired 
response solutions (i.e. ‘what-if’ scenarios) to enable a more efficient 
decision-making. 
 The visualisation tools used so far in the integrated Event response 
methodologies are the GIS, presentation of possible solutions through a 
Pareto-style figure and aggregated tables where the partial impact 
indicators and the overall impact is presented. However, no visualisation 
tool has been developed to couple the impact assessment with a list of 
possible solutions (based on ‘what-if’ scenarios and automatically 
generated optimal responses) in order to enable an efficient response. 
 
 











3 RESPONSE METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
The water industry faces considerable challenges in making effective use of 
hydraulic models and sensor data that is collected in WDSs in near real-time 
(typically every 15-30 minutes). This data and models are still not used much in 
a water utility’s control room, especially when it comes to identifying a suitable 
strategy to respond to failure events in near real-time. Relevant academic work 
has not adequately addressed this challenge mainly due to the focus on specific 
stages (i.e. isolation, impact assessment or intervention) rather than the overall 
response process. Furthermore, for an effective near real-time response there is 
still a need to develop: 1) improved impact assessment methods that are based 
on realistic metrics used in the water industry and that are also used in a 
consistent manner to facilitate easy comparison between different response 
interventions, 2) better informed and realistic selection of response interventions 
to be implemented (e.g. based on operational costs, availability of different types 
of interventions, etc.) and 3) effective interaction with the control room operators 
that takes into account their expert judgement, preferences and experience. 
In this chapter, a novel response methodology that aims to fulfil the above needs 
is proposed. The proposed response methodology is implemented via the IRPT, 
as mentioned in the Introduction. The IRPT is used to guide/support operators in 
identifying an effective response solution (i.e. a particular response intervention 
or a set of response interventions). The main aim of this chapter is to show the 
potential of the IRPT to improve utilities’ current practice by supporting/guiding 
operators in the identification of low end-impact (i.e. the total negative impact 
after implementation of the response solution) and low cost response solutions. 
The chapter is organised as follows. First, in section 3.2 the current practice 
response methodology in UU and other water industries is described. Then in 
section 3.3 the response methodology concept, impact assessment, optimisation 
method and modelling are discussed. In section 3.4 the decision-support tool is 






3.2 Current practice response methodology  
Different utilities deal with events in a different way and use more or less 
structured approaches. This section briefly describes a response methodology 
mainly based on ad-hoc response interventions and that can be considered 
typical for the UK water sector. In this methodology, the response interventions 
are largely based on the experience and expert judgement of control room 
operators, despite various systems are used by the operators to support their 
decisions. The current response process described in this section has derived 
from personal interaction of the author of this thesis with people from UK industry 
(i.e. UU), and it is not found in the literature. 
The detection of an event in a water utility is nowadays usually done in two 
possible ways: a) through customer calls (i.e. reporting no water/low 
pressure/discolouration/etc.) and/or b) through an automated detection system 
(i.e. alarms generated based on flow and/or pressure data). Once the detected 
event is confirmed and approximately localised (e.g. roughly based on customer 
calls’ addresses and/or using other semi-automated means), the utility typically 
mobilises some available water trucks, called Alternative Supply Vehicles 
(ASVs). This is done as an immediate restoration measure after an impact 
assessment usually carried out manually and/or with limited hydraulic model 
support. Here, an assessment involving the calculation of the water volume 
required to be supplied per hour (and hence the number of ASVs required per 
hour) based on the affected DMAs normal water demand may also be carried 
out. 
At the same time, in the control room, after further manual (e.g. by checking 
service reservoirs’ levels using online systems) and/or hydraulic-model-
supported initial impact assessment, operators request isolation of the event. 
Isolation is then carried out either as soon as possible (e.g. if the service 
reservoirs’ levels are quickly dropping or there is significant third-party damage) 
or later in the day, depending on severity/time of the event and other factors. 
There are also occasions, where the repair can be conducted without isolating 





section of a small-diameter pipe, where simple patch clamps or special pin-hole 
leak repair clamps can be used for repair without shutdowns. If isolation is 
required, the isolation valves are usually identified manually - as the closest 
operable valves to the event. With some ASVs already on site (or not), the control 
room operators then attempt to identify the most suitable response intervention 
or set of response interventions (e.g. how many more ASVs should be sent to the 
site, a suitable rezoning plan, overland bypasses, etc.) to be implemented while 
the repair is being carried out. Online map systems, offline connectivity maps, 
calculation sheets and hydraulic models can be used by the operators for this 
purpose. The current practice response methodology followed by water industry 
nowadays can be seen as a flowchart in Figure 3-1. 
Bearing in mind the above, it is worth stressing that despite using hydraulic 
models for some of the aforementioned activities can be considered as common 
practice, hydraulic analysis is not always carried out thoroughly. This is due to 
limitations in terms of the time that can be dedicated to this activity, the skills 
required to run hydraulic simulations, the ability to only test a few scenarios and 







Figure 3-1: Current practice response to water network failure events, typical in 
UK water industry 
 
3.3 New response methodology 
3.3.1 The concept 
The new response methodology proposed in this thesis consists of the following 
main steps: Step 1) initial impact assessment, Step 2) identification of the 
isolation plan, Step 3) manual identification of a response solution proposed by 
an operator, Step 4) automatic identification of a response solution generated 
using optimisation, and Step 5) identification of the response solution to be 
implemented in the field. These five steps do not need to be necessarily carried 
out in a sequential manner as presented here. The proposed response 
methodology’s steps are described in more detail subsequently and are also 













Step 1. Before the proposed response methodology is initialised via Step 1, the 
utility has already confirmed and localised the event. Hence, knowing the location 
of the event, an initial impact assessment is performed in Step 1 assuming the 
‘do nothing’ scenario. The impact assessment in this step is carried out for the 
initial condition of the system. The initial condition of the system assumes no 
intervention in the network to restore the supply. The initial impact assessment 
enables operators to gain a view of the system’s resilience, i.e. how long the 
system can operate normally (i.e. supply water to the customers) after the event 
detection/localisation and before it gets affected due to the event. This step could 
automate the initial impact assessment in utilities currently carried out manually. 
In the manual initial impact assessment, operators right after the event 
confirmation check the service reservoir levels (see flowchart in Figure 3-1). 
During this process they make manual calculations to estimate the system’s 
capability to supply water before the reservoir gets empty. However, this process 
includes time-consuming manual calculations delaying the identification of the 
best response plan in near real-time. Hence, response methodology’s step 1 
facilitates quicker, more precise and more effective (i.e. via known impact 
indicators, see sub-section 3.3.2) estimation of the system’s initial condition. As 
soon as the initial impact assessment has been completed, the operators are 
asked if isolation needs to take place or if it can be carried out. The two following 
options can then be applied: 
a. If isolation can/needs to take place, the operators create an event 
isolation plan in step 2. 
b. If isolation cannot/does not need to take place, they move to step 3 to 
propose a manual solution. 
Step 2. This step includes the identification of the best isolation plan. It is stressed 
that the decision to implement isolation or not is still manual/human-based, 
because it is dependent on factors that a computer cannot consider (e.g. whether 
isolation valves are accessible, operable or can be localised, whether there is 
contaminated field in the surrounding area, etc.). For the identification of the 
isolation plan, the best (i.e. closest to the event) set of valves is automatically 
provided to the operators by the IRPT and the operators are then asked if they 
are satisfied with this set (e.g. if the identified valves can been localised and/or 





the next best set of isolation valves. This process is repeated until the IRPT 
proposes the best possible set of valves (i.e. closest valves to the event that can 
be localised and operate). As soon as the best set of isolation valves is selected, 
the operators input into the IRPT the isolation duration and different potential 
isolation start times. Then, the IRPT automatically calculates the end-impact of 
the different isolation start times and these are presented to the operators. In view 
of the calculated end-impacts, the operators can then select a desired start time 
of isolation. Once the isolation plan (i.e. set of isolation valves and isolation start 
time) is finalised, the operators are asked if they consider the resulting end-impact 
(i.e. individual impact indicators) low. It is stressed here that ‘low’ and ‘high’ end-
impact is judged by operators. Operators are more likely to judge as ‘low’ or ‘high’ 
one individual impact aspect, rather than the aggregated end-impact, because 
individual impact indicators are more comprehensible to them. Additionally, for 
the individual impact indicators (used in practice) there are thresholds specified 
by water regulators. Then the two following options can be applied: 
a. If they consider the end-impact low, they proceed with the 
implementation of the ‘isolation only’ final solution without applying any 
further intervention. Once repair/isolation is completed the system 
returns back to its normal operation. 
b. If they consider the end-impact high (or isolation is not possible), they 
identify the more comprehensive response solution as follows. The 
operators are asked if they want the IRPT to automatically generate an 
optimal solution. The two following options are possible: 
i. If they prefer an automatic solution, they move to step 4.  
ii. If they do not prefer an automatic solution, they proceed by 
proposing a manual solution in step 3. 
Step 3. In this step, the operators are able to propose manual solution(s) by 
interacting with the IRPT. Here they are enabled to generate several response 
solutions (i.e. ‘what-if’ scenarios), which include the combination of interventions 
of their preferences. This could be applied in small-scale/low-impact events (e.g. 
small leaks/bursts without 3rd party damage or many customers affected), where 
there is no need to identify the optimum solution. Hence, by assessing only a 
specific number of response scenarios, operators are able to identify a satisfying 





enables the operators to input their desired and available (e.g. 
accessible/operable) intervention(s) and the start time of this (these) 
intervention(s). It is stressed that here operators are able to input a desired start 
time for each proposed intervention (i.e. different start times). It then provides 
decision support to the operators by assessing and visualising the end-
impact/cost of the proposed manual solution. Then the operators are asked if they 
are satisfied with the end-impact/cost of their proposed manual solution. Two 
options then are possible: 
a. If end-impact/cost is considered low, a final solution has been found. 
Once repair/isolation is completed (if applied), the restoration plan (i.e. 
identified manual solution) is revoked and the system returns back to 
normal operation. 
b. If end-impact/cost is considered high, the operators are allowed to 
modify the identified solution(s) or propose alternative manual 
solutions and compare their end-impact/cost by moving to step 5 or ask 
the IRPT to automatically generate an optimal solution in step 4. 
Step 4. Operators input into the IRPT all the desired and available interventions, 
as well as a time range in which the various interventions could start. Then, the 
optimisation (through a novel heuristic algorithm) runs and near-optimal solutions 
are automatically generated and assessed by the IRPT in near real-time (i.e. up 
to 1 hour after event confirmation). It is stressed that unlike the identification of a 
manual solution in step 3, the proposed optimisation method identifies solutions 
that start at the same time. This assumption/limitation enables a near real-time 
identification of optimal solution(s), because the number of decision variable (and 
hence the search space) is reduced (i.e. only the intervention options are 
considered as decision variables and not the start time of each intervention 
option). The result of the optimisation is a Pareto front of near-optimal solutions. 
Operators are then able to select one (or more) near-optimal solution(s) on the 
Pareto front (depending on whether or not the end-impact/cost is low). The 
selected solution is assessed and visualised to them. Finally, they are asked if 
they wish to further modify this (these) solution(s) manually. Then two possible 





a. If they wish to modify the identified optimal solution, they move to step 
5. 
b. If they do not wish to modify the identified optimal solution, then a final 
solution has been found. Once the repair/isolation is completed, the 
restoration plan is reversed and the system returns back to its normal 
operation. 
Step 5. In this step, the operators are first asked if they want to go back all the 
way to step 1, with modified system state used as a starting point. This is done 
to account for the fact that the initial condition of the system may have changed 
in the meantime, e.g. isolation cannot be conducted anymore due to inoperable 
valves or contaminated field, or magnitude of leak/break is different. If initial 
condition has not changed, in this step they can further modify a solution from 
step 3 or step 4, as well as propose new solution(s). Here, the IRPT enables 
operators to compare all of the identified solutions consistently (i.e. consistent 
impact metrics) and with support of effective visualisations (e.g. multiple maps in 
a single window) of the end-impacts and costs. All this enables the operators to 
select the final solution they wish to implement.  
Once the system operation is back to normal, the operators identify the lessons 
learned. 
 
3.3.2 Impact assessment methodology 
Hereunder, the impact indicators and the assessment method of the proposed 
response methodology are described. The IRPT provides to operators the 
capability to automatically assess the end-impact (i.e. the total negative impact 
after implementation of the response solution to the customers) of a proposed 
solution based on realistic metrics. In the IRPT a consistent framework for end-
impact assessment (i.e. same impact metrics calculated for every proposed 
response solution) is implemented. This facilitates comparison of different 
response solutions (i.e. in step 5 of the methodology) and enables more informed 
decision-making. Furthermore, the IRPT allows the operators to perform this 





The impact indicators proposed in this thesis have been developed bearing in 
mind the UK water industry practice as well as previous relevant literature (e.g. 
Bicik et al. 2009). Most of these indicators have not been used before in this 
context (at least in the published literature). The following aspects of end-impact 
are considered: water supply interruption, low pressure impact and discolouration 
risk increase impact. More specifically, the following indicators are used: 1) 
Customer Minutes Lost (CML), 2) Average Minutes Low Pressure (AMLP), 3) 
Unaccounted for Water (UW), and 4) Discolouration Risk Increase (DRI). AMLP 
and UW are calculated for different customer types, namely: residential, industrial 
and sensitive (i.e. schools and hospitals). The impact horizon in the proposed 
response methodology is the period of time for which the end-impact is assessed. 
It starts from the detection/localisation time of an event and lasts until the repair 
is completed (i.e. time period over which restoration interventions can be 
implemented). 
CML is defined as the mean duration customers are without water supply (i.e. 
equivalent to pressure ≤3m in the main) in a given reporting year. CML is a real-
life indicator used in water utilities nowadays and is calculated for every Discrete 
Pressure Area (DPA) (i.e. discrete areas within a DMA). It is measured in minutes 
per customer (mins/cust). In this study CML is found as follows: 
𝐶𝑀𝐿 [𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠/𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡] = ∑
𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑆𝐼 𝑋 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑆𝐼 
𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡
                                                                                    (1) 
where: CustSI is the total number of customers in each DPA affected by supply 
interruption at least during one time-step (i.e. 15mins) over the impact horizon; 
DurSI is defined as the length of time for which properties are without a continuous 
supply of water in mins – only events with duration ≥ 3 hours are taken into 
account; Cust is the total connected customers at year end (fixed number for 
each utility). 
The AMLP indicator is defined as follows: 
𝐴𝑀𝐿𝑃 [𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠/𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡] =
𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐿𝑃 𝑋 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝐿𝑃 
𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡
                                                                                     (2) 
where: CustLP is the total number of customers affected by Low Pressure (LP) 
(i.e. minimum_pressure < pressure < required_pressure, where 
minimum_pressure is usually considered in UK utilities as equal to 3m and 





over the impact horizon; DurLP is the average low pressure impact duration over 
the impact horizon in mins; Cust is the total number of connected customers at 
year end (fixed number for each utility).  
The total number of customers affected by LP (i.e. CustLP) is calculated based on 
Bicik et al. (2009) as follows:  
𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐿𝑃 = ∑ (𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖) 𝑋 
𝑁
𝑖=1 {
1   𝑖𝑓  𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 𝑃𝑖(𝑡) <  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑞         ∀𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇)}
0  if 𝑃𝑖(𝑡) < 𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛
              (2a) 
where: N is the number of demand nodes in the system; i is the demand node; t 
is the simulation time (with assumed time step of 15mins); T is the impact horizon 
in hours; Pi(t) is the pressure at demand node i and time t (m of head); Pmin is the 
minimum pressure in m of head under which there is supply interruption (equal 
to 3m, as applied in water utility practice); Preq is the required pressure in m of 
head under which there is low pressure impact (equal to 15m, as applied in water 
utility practice); Custi is the number of customers (of all the types) supplied by 
node i. 
The average low pressure impact duration (i.e. DurLP) over impact horizon is 
estimated as follows (Bicik et al. 2009): 
𝐷𝑢𝑟𝐿𝑃  [𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠] =
1
𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
 𝑥 ∑ ∑ {
𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖     𝑖𝑓   𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 𝑃𝑖(𝑡) <  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑞 




𝐻𝑦𝑑𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑝                                                                                                                 (2b) 
where: Custtotal is the total number of customers affected by the failure at least 
during one time-step over given impact horizon T and HydStep is the hydraulic 
time-step (i.e. 15mins). 
The UW indicator is calculated as follows (Bicik et al. 2009):  
𝑈𝑊  [𝑚3] =
900
1000
𝑋 ∑ ∑ {
(𝐷𝑖,𝑟𝑒𝑞(𝑡)−𝐷𝑖(𝑡)) 𝑋 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖 
𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡
         𝑖𝑓  𝑃𝑖(𝑡) < 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑞




𝑡=1                     (3) 
where: T is the impact horizon (hours), t is the simulation time (with assumed 
time-step of 15mins = 900sec); Di,req(t) is the requested demand at node i and 
time t in l/s; Di(t) is the delivered demand at node i and time t in l/s; Custi,count is 
the number of customers supplied by demand node i. Note that the requested 
water demand may be undelivered due to either complete interruption or low 





The DRI is estimated based on a combination of the methods found in Beuken et 
al. (2008) and Bicik et al. (2009). Beuken et al. (2008), which was also reviewed 
in chapter 2, suggest to calculate discolouration risk based on minimum and 
maximum velocities and maximum flow rates. Here, the minimum and maximum 
flow velocities in an average demand day are calculated with a hydraulic model 
for each pipe. The same model is used to estimate the largest flow rate for each 
pipe under the same demand conditions. The DRI under normal condition (i.e. 
without simulating an event) is calculated in a pressure-driven EPS hydraulic 
model. Then, a score is assigned to each pipe for each discolouration risk type 
(i.e. based on velocities and on flow rates), as shown in Table 3-1. Hence, a score 
of 1 means low, a score of 2 means moderate and a score of 3 means high 
discolouration risk.  
 
Table 3-1: Method for rating the discolouration risk due to flow velocity and flow 
criteria (Beuken et al. 2008) 
Discolouration 
risk type 



















Type 2 Flow 





HIGH Q≥50m3/h 3 
 
The discolouration risk for every pipe is calculated as the sum of the scores based 
on both velocity and flow rate. The resulting discolouration risk scores shown in 





LOW” with a total score of 2, “LOW” with a total score of 3, “MODERATE” with a 
total score of 4, “HIGH” with a total score of 5 and “VERY HIGH” with a total score 
of 6. 
 







1 2 VERY LOW 
2 3 LOW 
3 4 MODERATE 
4 5 HIGH 
5 6 VERY HIGH 
 
Once the discolouration risk score for every pipe has been found, the 
discolouration risk increase for every pipe can be calculated as the difference 
between the discolouration risk score under ‘failure’ and normal conditions. The 
‘failure’ condition is defined here as the WDS condition after the occurrence of 
the event and/or the implementation of the intervention(s). Similarly to the normal 
condition, the DRI under failure condition is calculated in a pressure-driven EPS 
hydraulic model which simulates the failure network. The discolouration risk 
increase is then ranked based on the total score increase, i.e. “NO RISK” with a 
total score increase equal to 0, “LOW INCREASE” with a total score increase 
equal to 1, “MODERATE INCREASE” with a total score increase equal to 2 or 3 
and “HIGH INCREASE” with a total score increase equal to 4, as shown in Table 
3-3. 
 











1 0 NO RISK 
2 1 LOW INCREASE 
3 2 or 3 
MODERATE 
INCREASE 
4 4 HIGH INCREASE 
 
Following the calculation of the discolouration risk increase for every pipe in the 
network, the number of pipes with at least “LOW INCREASE” (i.e. with total score 
increase equal to 1 or higher) is used to estimate the DRI (based on a modification 




𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑗,𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 − 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑗,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 ≥ 1   𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑗,𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 > 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑗,𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚
0                                                                                          𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
}           (4) 
where: Np is the number of pipes in the network; Discj,norm and Discj,failure are the 
total discolouration risk of pipe j under normal and failure conditions, respectively.  
 
3.3.3 Optimisation method 
Optimisation problem formulation 
In the present sub-section, the proposed optimisation method used in the 
response methodology is described and formulated. Initially the optimisation 
problem (i.e. objective functions, decision variables and constraints) are 
presented. Then a heuristic-based approach to solve the optimisation problem 
(i.e. to identify near optimal solutions in near real-time) is discussed. As presented 
earlier, the IRPT provides to operators the capability to automatically identify a 
number of optimal solutions (i.e. in step 4 of the response methodology) by 
solving a two-objective optimisation problem. The two objectives are the 
minimisation of total end-impact (of a given response solution) and the 
minimisation of the total cost associated with this solution.  
The first objective function is the minimisation of the total (i.e. aggregated) end-
impact, i.e. impact after interventions are implemented. This is estimated by 
normalising and then adding up the values of the individual impact indicators (see 





with specified weights based on the priority/preferences of the operators as 
follows:  




                                                                                                 (5) 
where i is the index of each impact indicator with i ϵ [1, 4]; 𝑓𝑖
′ is the normalised 
impact indicator i and wi is the weight of impact indicator i with ∑ 𝑤𝑖 = 1. 
It is stressed here that by assigning weight to each impact indicator, operators in 
a water utility are able to ‘guide’ the identification of a response solution towards 
their preferences. Hence, by assigning e.g. a higher weight value to a selected 
indicator, this impact indicator is significantly reduced (more than the other 
indicators) in the identified solution. This is important in water utility practice, 
because operators many times prefer to reduce more one impact aspect for 
different reasons. For example, if an event occurs in an area with repeated 
discolouration problems, they may decide to increase the weight of DRI in order 
the DRI to be significantly reduced (comparing to the rest of indicators). In that 
way they avoid the customer complaints too. 




                                                                                                                                (6) 
where 𝑓′ is the normalised impact indicator value; f is the non-normalised impact 
indicator value; fmin is the minimum impact indicator value and fmax is the 
maximum impact indicator value. 
If an impact indicator is equal or includes time, the minimum value is equal to 0 
and the maximum value is equal to the maximum value of simulation duration. If 
an impact indicator is equal or includes number of customers, the minimum value 
is equal to 0 and the maximum value is equal to the total number of customers in 
the network under scrutiny. If an impact indicator is equal or includes volume of 
water, the minimum value is 0 and the maximum value is equal to the total water 
volume able to be supplied by all the sources in the network under scrutiny. 
Finally, if an impact indicator is equal or include number of pipes, the minimum 
value is 0 and the maximum value is equal to the total number of pipes in the 





The second objective function is the minimisation of the total cost associated with 
the response solution, calculated as follows: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑧𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑧𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑧 + 𝑐𝑃𝑅𝑉𝑑𝑃𝑅𝑉𝑁𝑃𝑅𝑉 +  𝑐𝐴𝑆𝑉ℎ𝐴𝑆𝑉 +  𝑐𝑂𝐿𝐵ℎ𝑂𝐿𝐵                     (7) 
where crez, cPRV are the costs (£) per hour of manipulating (i.e. opening, closing 
or adjusting) a single rezoning or PRV and cASV, cOLB are the costs (£) per hour 
of ASV and Overland Bypass (OLB) injection; drez, dPRV are the times it takes to 
open, close or adjust a single rezoning valve or PRV, in hours; hASV, hOLB are the 
total durations of ASV and OLB injection (i.e. hours of injection from all the ASVs 
and OLBs sent to site) and Nrez, NPRV are the numbers of rezoning valves and 
PRVs to open, close or adjust in the specific response solution. 
The above unit costs (i.e. crez, cPRV, cASV, cOLB) are estimated based on the 
information obtained from the water utility. For example, in the cost of overland 
bypasses other factors could be taken into account, e.g. the cost of fuel for the 
transportation of bypasses to the site as well as other standard fees. However it 
was chosen here not to do so, i.e. to calculate this cost only based on the hourly 
cost of injection, because the duration of injection primarily affects the cost 
calculation. Therefore, the cost function presented above is approximate only, but 
it can still be used for relative comparison of different solutions during the 
optimisation process. The cost function shown here can be easily replaced with 
a more accurate one where additional information is available. 
It is highlighted here that the cost function in Equation 7 calculates the 
cost/expenses of the intervention of the utility (via the intervention measures) to 
the network under failure. There are other sources of cost/expenses for the utility, 
such as cost of reputation, customer complaints, undelivered/lost water, etc., that 
was not counted here for simplification reasons. 
The decision variables of the optimisation problem are the status of each 
operational intervention (i.e. interventions used or not) in a given response 
solution. At this point it is worth stressing that the term intervention here is defined 
by a specific set of intervention types and locations. For example, one 
intervention is the ASV injection located at point 1 and a different intervention is 
ASV injection located at point 2 (i.e. same type but different location). Similarly, 
one intervention is rezoning from valve 3 (i.e. located at point 3) and a different 





and location of each intervention occurs at the same point in time, and not in 
different stages during the decision-making.  
The operational intervention types considered in this methodology are: 1) 
rezoning by valve manipulations (i.e. opening of initially closed boundary valves), 
2) water injection at different network locations, 3) overland bypasses and 4) 
combination of these. Water injection, which is a novel type of intervention 
considered in this study, is carried out through the ASVs. It is important to stress 
that rezoning is assumed to last until the repair is complete (i.e. as in utility’s 
general practice) and, hence, its duration is not considered as a decision variable. 
ASV injection, on the other hand, is carried out until the tank (modelled at each 
injection point, see above) gets empty. This may happen before the repair is 
complete, depending on the water demand (under normal conditions) of the 
affected area.  
The intervention of overland bypass (OLB) is a quite common intervention 
measure in utilities. Overland bypasses bypass water from one unaffected 
node/area/DMA to another affected node/area/DMA. In practice, they are linked 
to hydrants and they come to specified diameters and lengths. Hence, in the 
hydraulic model of this thesis, all the possible OLBs (i.e. with length under 300m) 
were modelled as additional pipes with initially closed status (i.e. inactive). 
When/if a response solution requires an OLB to be activated, the IRPT gives the 
order to the Epanet file to open the status of this OLB pipe. 
It is also important to highlight here that the start time of implementation of the 
interventions is not a decision variable. This implies that the interventions (i.e. 
types and locations) identified by solving the optimisation problem are 
implemented at a fixed time. This start time is selected by the operators, who are 
able to input it in the IRPT. Finally, note that the proposed optimisation method 
can be used if additional interventions are considered, i.e. the optimisation 
methodology proposed here is not limited to the intervention types considered 
here. 
The mathematical description of the present two-objective optimisation problem 
follows: 





Subject to: 𝒙 = (𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑧,𝑖, 𝑡𝐴𝑆𝑉,𝑗 , 𝑡𝑃𝑅𝑉,𝑘, 𝑡𝑂𝐿𝐵,𝑙, 𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑧,𝑖, 𝑠𝐴𝑆𝑉,𝑗,𝑠𝑃𝑅𝑉,𝑘,𝑠𝑂𝐿𝐵,𝑙) ∈ 𝑋                 (9) 
                  i = [1, Nrez],   j = [1, NASV],   k = [1, NPRV],   l = [1, NOLB]  
where: x is the decision variable vector; X is the decision variable space; trez,i is 
the start time of rezoning from location point i; tASV,j is the start time of ASV 
injection from location point j; tPRV,k is the start time of setting adjustment of PRV 
located at point k; tOLB,l is the start time of injection from OLB located at point l; 
srez,i is the status of the rezoning valve located at point I; sASV,j is the status of the 
ASV valve located at point j; sPRV,k is the status of the PRV located at point k; 
sOLB,l  is the status of the OLB located at point l; Nrez is the total number of rezoning 
valves; NASV is the total number of ASV points; NPRV is the total number of PRVs 
and NOLB is the total number of overland bypasses. 
The optimisation constraints are as follows: 
Total_impact  ≤  Total_impactref                                                                                            (10) 
∑ 𝑄𝑙(𝑡)𝑙∈𝑖𝑛(𝑛) − ∑ 𝑄𝑙(𝑡)𝑙∈𝑜𝑢𝑡(𝑛) − 𝑄𝑛,𝑑𝑒𝑙(𝑡) = 0,    𝑛 ∈ 𝑁                                           (11) 
𝐾𝑙𝑄𝑙
𝑎(𝑡) = 𝑃𝑢(𝑡) − 𝑃𝑑(𝑡),     𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑙 = (𝑢, 𝑑) ∈ 𝐿                                                              (12) 
trez,i , tASV,j , tPRV,k , tOLB,l ∈ {tmin, tmax}                                                                  (13) 
srez,i , sASV,j , sOLB,l ∈ {sc, so}                                                                              (14) 
sPRV,k ∈ {smin, smax}                                                                                            (15) 
where: tmin, tmax are the min and max time each intervention can start, respectively; 
sc is the closed status of the valve, equal to 0; so is the open status of the valve, 
equal to 1; smin is the minimum value of PRV setting; smax is the maximum value 
of PRV setting; Total_impactref  is the reference value of total end-impact equal to 
the total end-impact of the initial impact assessment (i.e. ‘do nothing’ case) 
calculated in step 1 of the response methodology; Ql(t) is the flow rate in link l = 
(u,d) at time t, in(n) and out(n) are the set of pipes that are supplying to and 
delivering flow from node n at time t, respectively; L is the number of network 
links; Kl is the head friction loss coefficient at link l and α is the Hazen–Williams 
coefficient (α = 1.852).  
The optimisation constraint in Eq. (10) ensures that the identified response 
solution will further reduce end-impact when compared to the ‘No intervention’ 





impact higher than the reference value is rejected. The optimisation constraints 
in Eqs (11) and (12) represent the mass conservation and the energy 
conservation equations for the network. The optimisation constraints in Eqs (13), 
(14) and (15) define the values that the decision variables of the present 
optimisation problem can take. 
It is stressed here that optimising for minimum end-impact and cost has multiple 
benefits for a utility. The most important benefit is reducing the impact on the 
customers which can be costly in many ways (financially but also in terms of 
reputation, etc.). A couple of other examples related to costs include: 1) 
operational savings in the long-term as many events may occur each year - 
although the cost of a single response solution may be small (e.g. hundreds of 
pounds), and 2) less time spent on site for opening valves or injecting water - this 
could benefit utilities in terms of more efficient scheduling of the technicians’ 
activities. 
It can be noticed from the above that the two objective functions are the total 
impact and total cost. The total impact, from one hand, is influenced by the 
individual impact indicators. The different indicators are influenced by the duration 
of the event/supply interruption, the number of customers affected and the 
number of pipes with increased risk of discolouration. As far as the cost function 
is concerned, the optimisation is influenced by the individual costs of the different 
interventions, and hence by the number and location of these interventions. It can 
be observed that in all above impact and cost aspects, the level in the tank plays 
a significant role. The level in the tanks at the moment of the event defines the 
time the network will continue to supply water, and hence the duration/magnitude 
of supply interruption (i.e. total impact) and the intervention types (i.e. total cost). 
Having said this, the control of pumping stations during an emergency could be 
a significant move to control the tank levels. However, this type of intervention 
was not considered here, because it is not a common measure of response to 
pipe bursts in UK water utility practice. 
 
Heuristic-based optimisation method  
The heuristic-based optimisation method developed here consists of three main 





under normal (i.e. business as usual) operation of the system (i.e. no event has 
been detected/localised). It contains all the (offline) actions required by the 
utilities to identify their available intervention options (i.e. types and locations) in 
their system. The online steps (steps 1 and 2) include manual/human decisions 
and automatic calculations for the preparation of the optimisation and the 
optimisation through a heuristic algorithm, respectively. In Figure 3-3 the 
optimisation steps and the heuristic algorithm are shown. 
 
 
Figure 3-3: New optimisation method steps and heuristic algorithm 
 
The proposed optimisation method’s steps are described in details in the 
following text. Step 0 includes the offline preparation for the optimisation. Here, 
the initial list of all the interventions is identified. This database of interventions 
should be updated periodically by the utility to reflect reality. The offline process 
here, unlike the process in Mahmoud et al. (2018), does not consider any event 





affected DMAs/nodes. This is due to the fact that when offline, it is impossible to 
predict/evaluate all the possible event scenarios, including start time of event, 
start time of isolation, magnitude of leak/burst, location of event, etc. 
In step 1, the online preparation for optimisation takes place. Specifically in step 
1a, the initial list of interventions from step 0 is narrowed down in the following 
way: (a) the overland bypasses and rezoning valves located in areas that link 
affected with unaffected DMAs are considered, (b) the overland bypasses and 
ASV points located in the affected DMAs are considered and (c) the PRVs located 
upstream of affected nodes are considered. Hence it is implied that at this step, 
the affected DMAs/nodes of the specific event have to be identified after hydraulic 
analysis. In this step, a DMA is affected when at least one node has pressure 
less than 15m (i.e. low pressure or no supply impact) for at least one time-step 
(i.e. 15mins). It is stressed that the affected DMAs/nodes and the narrowed-down 
interventions are identified automatically by the IRPT after running the initial 
impact assessment. Hence operators in this step have only to manually initialise 
the initial impact assessment (i.e. by inputting the required information in the tool) 
and then automatically the affected DMAs/nodes and the narrowed-down 
interventions are presented to them. This step lasts as long as it takes for a single 
impact evaluation to run, i.e. from some seconds (in small/simple networks) to 
some minutes (in larger/more complex, real-life networks). 
In step 1b, individual evaluation of end-impact and cost for the narrowed-down 
interventions (i.e. identified in step 1a) for a selected (by operator) start time is 
conducted. This step is also conducted automatically by running impact 
assessment of the aforementioned interventions. The manual process the 
operators have to follow here is to take the list of the narrowed-down interventions 
from step 1a and input it in the tool together with the start time of their preference. 
After the impact assessment of all the narrowed-down interventions, the 
individual interventions that do not reduce the initial end-impact (i.e. of the ‘No 
intervention’ case) are rejected and not considered anymore in the next step. The 
start time is selected by operator due to time limitation to evaluate every single 
start time. This implies that all the interventions will be implemented at the same 
time. This is a significant limitation of the proposed optimisation method, because 
in practice each intervention occurs at a different time. However, when online, the 





operators compensates this limitation though, as engineering judgement makes 
this selection more realistic (i.e. time to reach site, availability/accessibility of 
recourses, etc.). In Mahmoud et al. (2018) the start time of interventions is not a 
variable either (e.g. for the burst on pipe P307 they consider start time 8 hours 
after detection for all the interventions). 
It is stressed that the heuristic proposed in step 2 (i.e. optimisation step) can be 
also applied considering the start time of each intervention as a decision variable. 
The duration of step 1b is equal to the duration of a single impact assessment 
evaluation (i.e. a number seconds for small networks or a number minutes for 
larger networks) multiplied with the number of the narrowed-down interventions. 
For example, for a complex real-life network where a single impact evaluation 
takes e.g. 3mins and 10 interventions have been identified in step 1b (found to 
reduce initial end-impact), then step 1b takes 3mins x 10 interventions = 30mins. 
In step 1c, a number (hereunder equal to x) of interventions (i.e. a sub-set of the 
interventions identified in the previous step) with the lowest end-impact is 
selected and these interventions are nominated to the optimisation stage (i.e. 
next step). This number depends on the time it takes for each evaluation to be 
completed and the time left for a near real-time response to be conducted. Hence, 
continuing the aforementioned example (mentioned in the previous paragraph) 
where 10 interventions were identified in step 1b in a complex, real-life network, 
then these 10 interventions could be all selected here in step 1c (i.e. x=10 
interventions). This is due to the fact that 10 interventions in step 1c (i.e. 10 
decision variables for the optimisation in the next step) imply 10 more impact 
evaluations in the optimisation step (i.e. the optimisation runs as many 
evaluations as the number of decision variables, see heuristic concept in the next 
paragraph). This step is completely manual and hence, it takes a number 
seconds for operators to decide. 
In step 2, the optimisation via a novel heuristic algorithm takes place online. The 
heuristic algorithm is completely automatic and the steps are described 
hereunder. In step 2a in real-time, an initial solution is identified (from the 
identified list of x interventions in step 1c) by the heuristic algorithm as the single 
intervention with the lowest cost. If more than one solutions with the same lowest 





the algorithm. Then, the heuristic identifies the subsequent solution i in step 2b 
as the single intervention from step 1 with the lowest end-impact. If more than 
one solutions with the same lowest end-impact exist, then the solution with the 
lowest cost for this end-impact is selected by the algorithm. This is done in order 
to account for the other extreme point, i.e. the solution with the lowest end-impact. 
Solution i is accepted if at least one of the two objectives is better (i.e. lower) 
comparing to the previously accepted solution (i.e. at this point the initial solution). 
In step 2e new solutions are identified by combining the remaining single 
interventions. At every iteration, the single intervention with the next lowest end-
impact is added to the previous solution. If the new solution is rejected, then the 
last single intervention that was added is removed and the next best (i.e. with 
lowest end-impact) single intervention is added. Iterations (i.e. new solutions 
generation) end when all the single interventions identified in step 1 have been 
added/used. Like step 1b, this step’s duration is equal to the duration of a single 
impact assessment evaluation (i.e. some seconds for small networks or some 
minutes for larger networks) multiplied with the number of the interventions. 
It is stressed that the heuristic’s checks of end-impact/cost of the subsequent 
solutions (i.e. steps 2c, 2d, 2f and 2g), do not always generate non-dominated 
solutions. For example, when both objectives of the subsequent solution are 
lower than the ones in the previous solution, then the subsequent solution 
dominates the previous one. This issue is addressed at the end of iterations (in 
step 2j) by identifying the non-dominated solutions. The non-dominated solutions 
then form the final Pareto front of near-optimal solutions proposed to operators. 
It is also highlighted that the focus of this proposed optimisation method is not on 
the selection of the initial population, but on the improvement of the optimisation 
method for the generation of near optimal solutions in near real-time. Hence, the 
heuristic algorithm proposed here (in step 2) can be easily linked to any preferred 
method for selection of initial population (i.e. step 1 can be substituted with any 
desired initial population selection method).  
The concept of the development of the heuristic algorithm is based on the 
creation of the Pareto front curve. On a graph with vertical axis equal to the end-
impact (%) and horizontal axis equal to the total cost (£) of a response solution, 





Starting from the upper left point of this curve, this point is expected to be the 
solution with the lowest cost and largest end-impact comparing to the rest of 
solutions on the Pareto front. Based on this consideration, the initial solution 
identified in step 2a of the heuristic is the single intervention with the lowest cost 
(between all the single interventions identified in step 1 of the method). This 
cheapest single intervention is also expected to obtain the largest end-impact 
between the rest of Pareto front solutions, because the subsequent solutions will 
be combinations of single interventions, i.e. with lower end-impact. 
The next point on the Pareto front, as we follow the curve from the left to the right, 
is a solution with lower end-impact and higher cost comparing to the upper left 
point (i.e. first solution). In the heuristic this point is identified via step 2b, as the 
single intervention with the lowest end-impact (between all the single 
interventions identified in step 1 of the method). This solution is expected to 
obtain lower end-impact and higher cost than the upper left point, but not the 
lowest one and highest one, respectively. This is because the subsequent 
solutions (identified via step 2e of the heuristic) include combinations of single 
interventions, i.e. with lower end-impact and more expensive. The assessment 
criteria in steps 2f and 2g of the heuristic ensure that each subsequent solution 
improves (by reducing either end-impact or cost or both) the next one. Then, each 
subsequent solution is rejected or accepted in steps 2h and 2i, respectively, 
based on these assessment criteria. 
For the purposes of the case studies (see chapter 5), the NSGA II is also 
conducted in order to point out the error introduced due to the heuristic’s 
limitation. In the NSGA II method the same objective functions and constraints as 
in the heuristic method are used. The difference between the two optimisation 
methods lies in the decision variables. Hence, in the NSGA II the decision 
variables are not only the status of interventions, but also the start time of each 
intervention. Hence, whereas tmin, tmax (in Eq. 13) in the heuristic method are 
equal to each other, in the NSGA II they are different to each other and for each 
intervention. In that way, in the NSGA II solutions, each intervention can start in 
a time range and each start time can be different from the others. This 





The heuristic-based optimisation method described in this section seems to be 
quite promising in terms of accuracy and computational time based on the results 
obtained (see Chapter 5). It is an online process, which means that it is 
implemented after the event has been detected/localised (in step 4 of the 
response methodology). The online implementation of this method allows 
operators to input in the tool all the known details of the event (i.e. event start 
time, burst pipe location, impact horizon duration, weights of impact indicators, 
location of potentially non-operable valves, start time of interventions, etc.). It is 
hence noticed that there are many factors that define an event. Simulating all the 
possible combinations of these factors offline (i.e. when plenty of time exists) in 
order to simulate different event scenarios might be effective, but only in some 
cases. This is due to the difficulty of operators to think/predict all the possible 
scenarios, especially considering that in real-life there are many unpredictable 
factors (i.e. non-accessible points, non-operable valves, etc.). Additionally, it 
might be the case that an event occurs which they have not simulated/predicted 
offline and hence they might waste significant time when online in the attempt to 
identify the response for this event from their offline database. Hence, an online 
method, such as the heuristic-based one developed here, which is based on the 
real data of the event for the identification of an optimum response is more useful 
for utilities. 
 
3.3.4 The modelling  
Pressure-driven model 
As mentioned earlier, the proposed response methodology is implemented via 
the interactive decision-support tool, the IRPT. In the IRPT, the hydraulic 
simulations are carried out by using EPANET2 (Rossman 2000) and pressure-
driven network modelling based on methodology developed by Paez et al. (2018). 
According to the last study, the pressure-driven network is modelled by adding 
the following artificial elements to each node, in order: a Flow Control Valve 
(FCV), a dummy node, a Throttle Control Valve (TCV), another dummy node, a 
Check Valve (CV) and a reservoir, as shown in Figure 3-4. 
In Figure 3-4, the FCV ensures that the delivered flow does not exceed the 





the required demand at the node. The downstream dummy node is added to link 
the FCV with the downstream TCV. The TCV is used to simulate the pressure-
flow relationship when pressure value is lower than the required pressure. This 
is applied by setting TCV’s head loss coefficient based on rearranging Wagner’s 
equation and equating the head loss in the valve with the pressure at the node. 
After the TCV, another dummy node is added to link it with the CV. The CV does 
not allow any inflow (i.e. flow towards the node), if the pressure at the node is 
less than zero. Finally, the reservoir is used to represent the appliances lumped 
in the demand node, and therefore should not supply any flow. The parameters 
of the CV are properly set to produce negligible head losses when water is flowing 
in the right direction (i.e. short length and large diameter). Finally, the elevation 
of the reservoir is equal to the elevation of the demand node to make sure that 
there are not additional head losses. 
 
 
Figure 3-4: Artificial elements connected to each demand node for the pressure-
driven modelling proposed by Paez et al. (2018) 
 
The demand-driven analysis conducted by EPANET2 accurately estimates the 
nodal demands in normal operating conditions, but not in the pressure-deficient 
ones that occur during various system failures (e.g. during a pipe burst or some 
equipment failure). Hence, in this study, the original EPANET2 hydraulic model 
is modified by using the approach proposed Paez et al. (2018). This method 
works by adding suitably chosen dummy elements to the original EPANET2 
model (see Figure 3-4). This creates the pressure driven model that is able to 
simulate hydraulic conditions in the network under both normal and pressure 
deficient conditions. The Paez et al pressure-driven method has been selected 
here as it was thoroughly tested, validated and demonstrated to work effectively 
on real-sized networks producing accurate hydraulic results (Paez et al. 2018). 





of different impact indicators, but then so does any other pressure-driven method 
– this is simply the price to pay for being able to simulate pressure-driven 
conditions in the pipe network. Finally, note that the selection of a pressure-driven 
model is not the focus of this study, i.e. any other reliable and accurate pressure 




In this study, an ASV is modelled as a tank linked to the injection point (i.e. 
demand node) through a pump (to manage the pressure pumped into the 
network) and a valve (to allow water flow from the tank to the system). Usually, 
utilities dispatch 3 ASVs of 30m3 to every injection point in order to guarantee 
continuous supply to the affected node/customers. In this study, to simplify the 
coding required in the IRPT, 1 artificial ASV with volume equal to 90m3 (i.e. 3 x 
30m3) is modelled at each injection point. Each artificial ASV tank connects to the 
ASV point via a dummy TCV (diameter 50mm, setting 5x1020, loss coefficient 
0.5), two dummy pipes (length 1m, diameter 97mm, roughness Darcy-Weisbach 
0.15), a pump (pump flow is a function of pump head: for flow=0 litres/sec, 
head=32m, for flow=20 litres/sec, head=31m, for flow= 40 litres/sec, head=28m) 
and a tank (elevation equal to elevation of node, initial level 1.5m, minimum level 
0m, maximum level 1.5m, diameter 50mm, volume curve is a function of level: for 
0m, volume=0m3 and for 1.5m, volume=90m3). The above settings were obtained 
by the utility and the ASV modelling layout is shown in Figure 3-5. 
It is important to highlight that the ASV configuration in Figure 3-5 attempts to 
resemble the reality. Hence, it is important to model a pump and a specific tank 
level, because in real-life a specific amount of water (i.e. contained in the tank) is 
pumped into the system under a specified pressure-flow relation (i.e. given in the 
pump settings of the ASV). 
It is also stressed that the TCV in the configuration of Figure 3-5 plays the role of 
closing or opening the ASV. Initially, the TCV is closed, which is simulated in the 
IRPT with a very large value of TCV setting, i.e. very large head loss, (e.g. 
5x1020). Once an ASV needs to be activated, then the IRPT gives the order to 
the Epanet file to open the TCV by changing the setting to a very small setting 







Figure 3-5: ASV modelling in the IRPT 
 
Break/leak modelling 
The modelling of a break or leak is carried out based on the methodology used 
in Paez et al. (2020) by adding the following elements, as shown in Figure 3-6, 
two dummy pipes, one check valve and one emitter. Based on Paez et al. (2020), 
the emitter coefficient is 𝐾  = 6.07 ⋅ 10−5 ⋅ 𝑑 2 for breaks (𝑑  is the diameter of the 
pipe in millimetres and 𝐾  is in 𝐿 /𝑠 /𝑚 0.5) and 𝐾  = 3.87 ⋅ 10−3 ⋅ 𝑑  for leaks, while 
the emitter exponent is 𝛼  = 0.5. 
 
 
Figure 3-6: Modelling of a break or leak in the IRPT 
 
It can be observed that the emitter coefficient depends on the diameter of the 
pipe and the event type. For breaks (i.e. significant amount of outflow, usually 





diameter. On the other hand, for leaks (i.e. lower amount of outflow), the emitter 
coefficient depends on the first exponent of diameter. The elevation of the emitter 
is the average elevation of the elevations of the two demand nodes, because in 
the model the emitter is connected in the middle of these two demand nodes. 
Similarly to the node of emitter, the dummy node linked with the emitter through 
the check valve, also obtains the average elevation of the two demand nodes. 
The check valve now is used to ensure one direction flow from the system 
towards the environment (i.e. as in the case of leaks/breaks). The length, the 
diameter and the roughness of the check valve are such that ensure negligible 
headloss (i.e. length equal to 0.01, diameter equal to 999, Darcy-Weisbach, D-
W, roughness equal to 0.0001). Finally, the two dummy pipes are used to simulate 
the alternative path of water towards the emitter (i.e. towards the environment) 
when there is break/leak on the pipe. This is simulated in the model by closing 
the status of the failure pipe and opening the status of the two dummy pipes. The 
length of each of the two dummy pipes is equal to the half length of the failure 
pipe, because as said earlier the dummy node connecting the two dummy pipes 
is located in the middle of the failure pipe. Additionally, the sum of the lengths of 
the two dummy pipes should be equal to the length of the pipe, because the 
model simulates an alternative path (i.e. with the same properties) from the failure 
pipe. Having said this, the diameter and roughness of the two dummy pipes are 
the same with the diameter and roughness of the failure pipe. 
 
3.4 The decision-support tool IRPT 
The proposed response methodology has also been developed as an interactive 
decision-support tool, the IRPT. As mentioned in the Introduction, the IRPT is 
implemented in the programming environment of MATLAB R2016b (Higham et 
al. 2016). The IRPT links to EPANET 2.0 (Rossman 2000) for the execution of 
the hydraulic simulations. The IRPT also links to the QGIS software to visualise 
the spatial distribution of end-impact on a suitable map of the analysed water 








Figure 3-7: Application of the proposed response methodology via the IRPT 
 
As mentioned earlier, the proposed methodology consists of five steps (see 
section 3.3), as also shown in Figure 3-7. Step 0 is not a methodological step, 
but is only applied within the IRPT to store some piece of information. For the 
application of the methodology via the IRPT, a three-stage routine is followed in 
each of the five methodological steps (i.e. step 1 to step 5): Stage 1) involves 
obtaining the operators’ inputs, Stage 2) involves carrying out hydraulic 
simulations to assess the end-impact/cost for each solution and Stage 3) involves 
visualising the calculated end-impact of each solution. 
Hereunder the steps shown in Figure 3-7 are explained in more details. In step 
0, some general initial information are inputted once in the IRPT and the results 
are saved in the MATLAB space for use in the latter steps. The initial general 
input information is shown in Figure 3-8. The pieces of information shown in 
Figure 3-8 are human-based decisions (i.e. based on operators’ 







Figure 3-8: Initial general information inputted in the IRPT 
 
In step 1 operators are able to apply the initial impact assessment via the IRPT. 
For the execution of the initial impact assessment (i.e. ‘No intervention’ case), no 
more input information (i.e. in stage 1) is required into the IRPT. This is because 
all the required information has already passed in the IRPT in step 0. Here the 
EPANET file with the event simulated is called through the MATLAB environment. 
The output of this script (i.e. stage 3) is the list of impact indicators and the total 
end-impact value. Furthermore, in stage 3 of step 1 (i.e. visualisation) the impact 
indicators can be visualised on a map like in Figure 3-9. It can be observed that 
apart from the impact indicators, operators can also visualise the pressure 
timeline of a selected DMA (by inputting the Critical Metered Point, CMP, of this 
DMA into the tool). In Figure 3-9, the Supply Interruption (SI) duration (used in 
the calculation of the CML impact indicator) is visualised as an example. CML 
cannot be visualised on a map because it is a single impact value. In the same 
way as in Figure 3-9, the UW and the low pressure duration (for the AMLP 
indicator) can be visualised. The DRI is visualised by colouring the pipes in the 





order of -0.5 appearing in Figure 3-9 are normal even during the pressure-driven 
analysis in EPANET due to isolation of a big part of the network model. 
 
 
Figure 3-9: Visualisation on a QGIS map (i.e. stage 3) of the SI duration for 
the initial impact assessment (i.e. methodological step 1) 
 
In step 2 operators are able to identify the best isolation plan via the IRPT. Step 
2 includes three independent pieces of script. In the first one, operators input no 
more additional information in the IRPT in stage 1 and the IRPT proposes the set 
of the closest valves (as shown in Figure 3-10a) based on graph theory. If 





inaccessible, then they input (the list of) these/this valve(s) into the IRPT (in the 
second script of this step), as shown in Figure 3-10b. Then the IRPT proposes 
the next closest valves (i.e. alternative plan) based on graph theory. The output 
of the above scripts is the list of the best (i.e. closest to the event and operable) 
isolation valves. As soon as the best isolation plan is identified, then an impact 
assessment (the third script of this step) is carried out. For this one, a separate 
script is run by inputting in the IRPT the identified set of isolation valves and a 
desired isolation start time (as shown in Figure 3-10c). The output of this script is 
the list of impact indicators and the total end-impact value of the selected isolation 




Figure 3-10: (a) Input information into the IRPT for the isolation plan 
identification (i.e. step 2 of the response methodology) (b) Input information into 
the IRPT for the identification of alternative isolation plan (c) Input information 
into the IRPT for the estimation of end-impact of a selected isolation plan 
 
In step 3 operators can generate a manual solution within the IRPT. For the 
execution of step 3, two additional pieces of information are required to be 
inputted into the IRPT (i.e. in stage 1), as shown in Figure 3-11. The output of this 
script (i.e. stage 3) is the list of impact indicators and the total end-impact and 





(i.e. visualisation) the impact indicators can be visualised on a map like in Figure 
3-9 (i.e. in the same way as in the ‘No intervention’ case).  
 
 
Figure 3-11: Input information into the IRPT for the generation of manual 
solution (i.e. step 3 of the response methodology) 
 
In step 4 operators are able to identify near-optimal solutions via the IRPT. Step 
4 includes three independent pieces of script (based on the optimisation strategy 
described in sub-section 3.3.3). In the first one (i.e. based on step 1a of the 
optimisation method), operators input no more additional information in the IRPT 
in stage 1. Then the IRPT identifies the affected nodes/DMAs and the intervention 
options located in the affected and unaffected DMAs (as shown in Figure 3-12a). 
In the second piece of code (i.e. based on step 1b of the optimisation method), 
they input the list of the identified interventions from step 1a and a desired start 
time of all interventions, in stage 1. Then the IRPT calculates and presents to the 
operators the end-impact and cost values for every individual evaluation of the 
above single interventions (in stage 3), as shown in Figure 3-12b. Finally, a 
separate script is run for step 2 of the optimisation method (i.e. heuristic 
algorithm). Here, operators input in the IRPT the x number of interventions (i.e. 
their end-impact and cost as identified in step 1c of the optimisation method). 
Then IRPT runs the heuristic algorithm and identifies the Pareto front of near 
optimal solutions. This Pareto front is then presented to them in stage 3 (as shown 
in Figure 3-12c). In stage 3, a near optimal solution on the Pareto front can be 
selected by operators and its end-impact can be visualised on a map (as shown 







Figure 3-12: (a) Input information into the IRPT for the identification of affected 
nodes/DMAs and interventions in the affected DMAs (i.e. step 1a of the 
optimisation method) (b) Input information into the IRPT for the 
calculation/presentation of end-impact and cost of the identified interventions 
from step 1a (i.e. step 1b of the optimisation method) (c) Input information into 
the IRPT for the identification of the Pareto front of near optimal solutions (i.e. 
step 2 of the optimisation method) 
 
In step 5 operators can manually modify an identified solution (from the previous 
steps) via the IRPT. The identified solution might be result of a manual suggestion 
(in step 3) or of optimisation (in step 4). Operators in this step can modify the 
status and the start time of each intervention of the identified solution. For the 
execution of step 5, two additional pieces of information are required to be 
inputted into the IRPT (in stage 1), the same as in step 3 (see Figure 3-11). The 
output of this script (i.e. stage 3) is the list of impact indicators and the total end-
impact and cost values for the provided manual response. Furthermore, in stage 
3 of step 5 (i.e. visualisation) the impact indicators can be visualised on a map 





3-13). Comparing different solutions in a single window facilitates quick and 
effective response decision-making. The negative pressures of the order of -0.5 
appearing in Figure 3-13(a) are normal even during the pressure-driven analysis 




Figure 3-13: Comparison of different solutions, i.e. (a) No intervention case, (b) 
a modified manual solution and (c) a selected optimal solution, generated within 
the IRPT in a single window 
 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter presented a near real-time response methodology to water network 
events. Initially the current utility practice was described. Then the proposed 
response methodology concept, impact assessment, optimisation method and 
modelling were presented. Finally, the implementation of the response 





In section 3.3 the response methodology was presented in detail. As it was 
shown, the key novelties of the response methodology are as follows: i) 
structured yet flexible approach supporting and guiding the operator throughout 
the entire response process (from detection and localisation of a failure event to 
implementation of the identified response solution in the field) is designed whilst 
allowing the operator to have a final say, (ii) novel interaction with the operator in 
near real-time via the IRPT (e.g. ‘what-if’ scenarios) without hydraulic expertise 
requirements, (iii) provision of automatically generated recommendations (e.g. 
near optimal response interventions via a novel heuristic algorithm, assessed 
end-impacts) enabling operators to make better informed decisions, (iv) improved 
impact assessment (based on realistic impact indicators) that covers different 
aspects of the event with respective indicators calculated consistently (i.e. via the 
same impact metrics) for every proposed response intervention (to facilitate easy 
comparison between different response solutions), and (v) more realistic 
selection of operational interventions (i.e. considering operational costs, 
availability of different types of interventions, start time of interventions’ 
implementation, duration of interventions’ implementation, etc.). 
In section 3.4, the implementation of the response methodology within a decision 
support tool was presented. The decision support tool, called IRPT, is developed 
in the MATLAB environment and links to EPANET for the execution of hydraulic 
simulations and to QGIS for the visualisation of the impact indicators on a map. 
IRPT consists of six main MATLAB coding-bodies, each one executing a set of 
MATLAB functions. The first coding-body includes the functions to store in the 
MATLAB space the initial general information required for all the next steps. The 
next five steps are the five methodological steps, each one conducted 
independently and as many times as operator desires. In each of the five 
methodological steps, there is the first stage where the information is inputted 
into the tool by the operator (not hydraulic expertise is required). Then in the 
second stage the hydraulic simulations are conducted by calling the EPANET 
functions and the end-impact/cost is calculated. Finally in the third stage the 
impact indicators are visualised on a map. 
The proposed response methodology has been applied on a semi-real case study 
(i.e. a case study based on a real system and event, but with event timeline and 





results obtained (presented in the next chapter) demonstrate the potential of the 
response methodology and its application through the interactive tool (i.e. the 
IRPT) to improve water utilities’ current practice.  
 
 




4 VALIDATION OF THE NEW 
RESPONSE METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
The present chapter aims to illustrate the benefit of interaction of water utility 
operators with the IRPT in identifying a suitable response solution to a water 
network event. In the present semi-real case study (i.e. case study based on a 
real system and event, but with simplified event timeline and operators’ 
responses for modelling and computational reasons), the solution identified after 
interaction with the IRPT is referred to as the ‘New methodology response’. The 
response solution based on utilities’ current practice (hereafter referred to as the 
‘Current practice response’) is also identified in the present chapter. The ‘New 
methodology response’ (identified in near real-time, i.e. approximately 1 hour 
after event detection/localisation) is ultimately compared with the ‘Current 
practice response’, in order to demonstrate the benefit resulting from the 
operator’s interaction with the IRPT. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In section 4.2, the semi-real case study is 
described. In section 4.3, the IRPT’s steps are implemented for the case study’s 
event in order to identify the ‘New methodology response’. Specifically, initially 
step 1 of the methodology is used to perform the initial impact assessment, then 
step 3 is used to identify and assess a manually proposed solution (using the 
‘what-if’ scenario simulation capability afforded by the IRPT). Then, step 4 is used 
to calculate the optimal solutions. Finally, step 5 is used to compare the manual 
solution with the optimal solutions and decide the best/final one (i.e. the ‘New 
methodology response’). The solution selected by operators using the IRPT is 
ultimately compared with the ‘Current practice response’ in section 4.4 in order 
to demonstrate the benefit resulting from the operator’s interaction with the IRPT. 
 




4.2 Description of the semi-real case study 
The semi-real case study used here is based on the following real system 
(hereunder called P-Town) and event. On Saturday 2nd November 2019 at 14:00, 
a WTW that serves approximately 100000 customers located in the North West 
of England shut down following observation of high turbidity levels. This event 
was due to a burst on a main within the WTW. The shutdown resulted in 
intermittent supply and low pressure to some customers. The WTW remained 
shut until the quality of the water leaving the WTW could be assured to meet the 
required standards. The utility mobilised ASVs to the area and implemented 
network changes (i.e. rezoning) in order to minimize customer end-impact. 
Bottled water was delivered directly to priority services and sensitive customers. 
The repair was completed 24 hours after the shutdown. 
In the IRPT, the shutdown is modelled by closing the pipe downstream the service 
reservoir (i.e. P8703) directly fed by the WTW (the WTW feeds this service 
reservoir only) at 14:00, in order to facilitate the hydraulic simulations. As far as 
the actual utility’s response actions are concerned, a number of simplifications 
and assumptions were made to simplify the coding required in the IRPT. Hence, 
ASV injection at each point is carried out by using a single artificial ASV 
(equivalent to 3 x 30 m3 ASVs usually sent to site) (see sub-section 3.3.4). 
In reality ASVs supplied water intermittently at some injection points (i.e. started 
at different times during the event and did not inject water consecutively) and with 
more than three ASVs (i.e. injection loads) used in some cases. Additionally, the 
rezoning valves considered in the IRPT’s simulations do not necessarily coincide 
with the rezoning valves actually used by the utility during the event. This is due 
to the fact that the hydraulic model used did not precisely reflect the real valves 
layout. Finally, the actual start times of the interventions have been rounded to 
the next hour (e.g. if an intervention started at 19:30 in real-life, then in the IRPT 
it assumed to start at 20:00).  
Figure 4-1a shows the location of the considered service reservoir and the 
downstream pipe that was closed (i.e. pipe P8703) for modelling the shutdown, 
as well as the location of the industrial users, schools, hospital and the network 
model’s DMAs (each DMA represented with different colouration). 






Figure 4-1: (a) Location of the considered service reservoir (fed by the WTW), 
simulated closed pipe P8703, schools, industrial users, hospital and DMAs; and 
(b) Location of the available interventions (i.e. rezoning valves and ASV 
injection points) 
 
Because of all of the above, we refer to the case study under scrutiny as “semi-
real”, i.e. based on a real system and event, but with several simplifications and 
assumptions. Bearing in mind the typical response strategy described earlier, we 
refer to the response actions shown in Table 4-1 as the ‘Current practice 
response’, although they only approximate (i.e. in terms of total end-impact, start 
time of impact, affected areas, etc.) the actual real-life response. This said, it is 
also important to stress here that many factors may have influenced the actual 
response actions taken by the utility. These factors have not been accounted for 
in this study and, hence, the term ‘Current practice response’ should be construed 
accordingly. 
 




Table 4-1: Semi-real case study’s event timeline and ‘Current practice response’ 
interventions 
Saturday Nov 2nd 2019 
14:00 WTW shut down 
15:00 ASV injection in DMA 003 (one injection point) 
20:00 ASV injection in DMA 009 (one injection point) 
21:00 ASV injection in DMA 004 (one injection point) 
22:00 ASV injection in DMA 010 (one injection point) 
Sunday Nov 3rd 2019 
00:00 Rezoning from DMA 001 to DMA 005 (five rezoning valves) 
00:00 Rezoning from DMA 005 to DMA 006 (five rezoning valves) 
00:00 Rezoning from DMA 003 to DMA 008 (two rezoning valves) 
01:00 ASV injection in DMA 007 (two injection points) 
14:00 Repair is completed  
 
4.3 New methodology response 
In this section, the identification of the response solution through the IRPT’s steps 
(i.e. ‘New methodology response’) is presented. It is worth stressing at this point 
that step 2 of the IRPT methodology is not applied here, because the event is 
considered to be the shutdown (i.e. not the burst). Hence, in this case, operators 
do not need to ask the support of the IRPT for the identification of the best 
isolation start time and of the best isolation valves to close.  
 
4.3.1 Initial general input into the IRPT (step 0) 
Before the implementation of the methodological steps, the following general 
information is inputted into the IRPT in step 0: 1) the damaged pipe ID is “P8703”; 
2) the total number of customers registered in the utility is equal to 3293080 
(value obtained by the utility); 3) Pmin is equal to 3m and Preq is equal to 15m (as 




applied in water utilities’ practice); 4) the impact assessment horizon (i.e. 
simulation duration) is equal to 24 hours = 1440mins; 5) the start time of the event 
is equal to the event localisation, i.e. at 2pm; and 6) the indicators weights are 
equal to: wCML=0.4, wAMLP=0.15, wUW=0.3 and wDRI=0.15. 
Regarding the impact horizon, it is highlighted that the completion time can only 
roughly be estimated before the actual repair commences. However, 24 hours is 
considered to be a reasonable period over which the repair of a major burst is 
likely to be carried out. Regarding the weight factors of the impact indicators, it is 
stressed that they are decided by operators based on the priority they wish to 
give to each of them during the optimisation process (i.e. in step 4). Hence, 
operators here decide to give priority to reducing CML and UW, as in utilities’ 
practice these indicators are usually considered important. Despite its 
importance, it was chosen not to give higher priority to DRI in the optimisation 
problem, because minimisation of the second objective (i.e. cost) is expected to 
substantially reduce the risk of discolouration (due to minimisation of the number 
of valve manipulations and ASV injections).  
 
4.3.2 Initial impact assessment (methodological step 1) 
The first step of the methodology is to apply the initial impact assessment. Here, 
operators aim at assessing the initial end-impact over the impact horizon (i.e. until 
the repair is completed). Based on the above input and the network under 
investigation: 1) the total number of customers in the section of network under 
scrutiny is equal to 46545; 2) the maximum value of UW is equal to the total 
volume of water required to supply the whole section of network under normal 
operation (equal to 175530m3); and 3) the maximum value of DRI is equal to the 
total number of pipes in the section of network (equal to 8750 pipes). Hence, the 
maximum values of the impact indicators are: CMLmax=20.35mins/cust (based on 
Equation 1), AMLPmax=20.35mins/cust (based on Equation 2), UWmax=175530m3 
(based on Equation 3) and DRI=8750 pipes (based on Equation 4). The minimum 
values of all impact indicators are equal to 0. Then, CML is calculated by the IRPT 
as equal to 4.0mins/cust, AMLP is equal to 3.6mins/cust, UW is equal to 3330m3 
and DRI is equal to 14 pipes (out of the 8950 pipes in this section of network). 
This results in a total initial end-impact as equal to 11.2%.  




The location of the affected customers with supply interruption (SI) for more than 
3 hours is shown in Figure 4-5a (with purple-gradient colouration), in sets of 3 
hours (i.e. 3-6, 6-9, 9-12, >12 hours). The above impact values (computed over 
the 24-hour impact horizon) highlight the significance of this event that affected a 
wide area comprising different DMAs. The affected area also includes 2 schools, 
1 industrial node and the hospital (all purple-gradient coloured depending on the 
SI duration). However, the risk of discolouration (or DRI) could be considered low 
(i.e. only 14 pipes are at high risk). 
Using the IRPT, operators are also able to check the pressure over the impact 
horizon and, hence, get a view of when the aforementioned affected customers 
start getting end-impact. At the bottom of Figure 4-5a, the pressure graph for DMA 
005 (selected as an example here because the hospital is located in that DMA) 
is presented. It can be noticed that DMA 005 (and, hence, the hospital too) starts 
being affected approximately 5 hours after the shutdown, if nothing is done. The 
IRPT also provides the capability to visualise the other aspects of the impact, 
such as the low pressure duration at each node, the volume of undelivered water 
at each node and the discolouration risk increase at each pipe, as well as for 
different DMAs, in a similar way as shown in Figure 4-5a. All this is a significant 
advantage over what done/available as part of current practices. Step 1 is 
completed in 3 minutes, i.e. as long as it takes of a single impact/cost evaluation 
to take place (for the complex network of P-Town). 
 
4.3.3 Manually proposed solution (methodological step 3) 
For the purposes of this work, a fictional operator proposes a realistic (i.e. that 
could have potentially be identified in the utility’s control room) manual solution 
(denoted hereafter as ‘New response - manual’) in step 3 of the methodology, 
after having carried out the initial end-impact assessment. The available 
interventions (i.e. 12 rezoning valves and 6 ASVs) are shown in Figure 4-1b. 
Looking at the initial end-impact (in Figure 4-5a), the fictional operator decides to 
inject water into the affected DMAs 003, 004, 010 and 007 (i.e. by using all 
available ASVs) and rezone affected DMAs 005, 006 and 008 by opening all the 
available rezoning valves. This is because the fictional operator wants to 
intervene into all affected DMAs where available interventions exist. Then, 




looking at the pressure graphs of the DMAs where ASV injection is available (i.e. 
DMAs 003, 004, 010 and 007), presented in Figure 4-2 for the ‘No response’ 
scenario, he/she decides to start injecting into these DMAs 5 hours after the 
shutdown (i.e. when the impact starts in the horizon). This is because he/she 
wants to allow plenty of time to mobilise the ASVs and also allow injection to start 
at 19:00 when a peak in demand is expected. He/she finally decides to rezone 
as soon as possible (here assuming 2 hours after the shutdown to allow plenty of 
time for technicians to get to site), because rezoning for longer period is expected 
to significantly reduce end-impact without increasing cost (i.e. rezoning duration 
does not affect cost, see cost function in the section of impact assessment in the 
chapter of response methodology). Bearing in mind the above, it is worth 
stressing that the IRPT supports operators with modelling different ‘what-if’ 
scenarios in an easy way. For example, the same fictional operator could have 
also tried opening less valves to rezone those DMAs just by modifying the 
information he/she did input in one field of the IRPT’s graphical user interface. 
Assuming that crez is equal to £27, cASV is equal to £32 (both provided by the utility 
to make this manual solution more realistic) and drez=2 hours (i.e. one hour for 
technicians to open one rezoning valve and another one hour to close it), then 
CML is equal to 1.2mins/cust, AMLP equal to 1.7mins/cust, UW equal to 1235m3 
and DRI is equal to 316 pipes in the network. The total end-impact is equal to 
4.5% and the cost is equal to £813. The location of the affected customers with 
SI of more than 3 hours and the pressure graph of DMA 005 after applying the 
‘New response - manual’ solution are shown in Figure 4-5b. Step 3 is completed 
in 3 minutes, i.e. as long as it takes for a single evaluation of one manual solution 
to be conducted. 
 





Figure 4-2: Pressure vs time of different DMAs for the ‘No response’ case 
 
4.3.4 Optimal solution (methodological step 4) 
After having assessed the end-impact/cost of their manually proposed solution in 
step 3, the fictional operator asks the support of the optimisation in step 4. As 
mentioned earlier, operators here decide to give priority to reducing CML and UW. 
It is stressed that the weight factors selected here are indicative to illustrate the 
desired priority, but can be easily changed in the IRPT by the decision-maker.  
In the context of this step, the optimisation process is followed step by step. 
Hence, in offline step 0 of the optimisation method, all the available interventions 
are identified by the operators. It is stressed that step 0 is not conducted in real-
time. Hence it is assumed that this step has already taken place before the 
confirmation of the present event. For the network under scrutiny, 18 available 
interventions are identified, i.e. 6 ASVs and 12 rezoning valves. The location of 
the available interventions is shown in Figure 4-1b. It can be noticed that ASV1 
is located in DMA 003, ASV2 in DMA 009, ASV3 in DMA 004, ASV4 in DMA 010, 
ASV5 and ASV6 in DMA 007. Rezoning valves V1-V5 link DMA 001 with DMA 
005, V6-V10 link DMA 005 with 006 and V11, V12 link DMA 003 with DMA 008. 
It is stressed that the main point of Figure 4-1b is to show the DMAs where the 
interventions are located. This is required when applying the step 1 of the 
optimisation method (see following paragraph) where the interventions that link 




affected with unaffected DMAs are only nominated. Hence it is only important for 
the interventions IDs and their approximate location to be clear in the figure. 
In online step 1 and step 1a, the 18 available interventions are narrowed down 
as follows. The rezoning valves that link affected with unaffected DMAs and the 
ASVs located in affected DMAs are only nominated to the next step. It is stressed 
that the affected DMAs are found based on the initial system condition, i.e. the 
‘No intervention’ case, where the system with the closed pipe is modelled (i.e. 
modelling the shutdown). The affected DMAs (i.e. 002, 003, 004, 005, 006, 007, 
008, 010, 011 and 013) are presented in Figure 4-3. Hence, the following 
interventions are nominated: V1-V5 (linking unaffected DMA 001 with affected 
DMA 005), ASV1 (in DMA 003), ASV3 (in DMA 004), ASV4 (in DMA 010), ASV5 
(in DMA 007) and ASV6 (in DMA 007). It is noticed that in total 10 interventions 
(i.e. 5 rezoning valves and 5 ASVs) are considered as potential decision variables 
for the next step. Step 1a takes approximately 3mins to be completed (i.e. time 
required to run a single evaluation of the system for the ‘do nothing’ case). 
 





Figure 4-3: Location of affected nodes/DMAs for the ‘No intervention’ case in P-
Town network 
 
In online step 1b, the above 10 interventions are assessed individually for a fixed 
start time. Here, the start time 4pm is selected (i.e. 2 hours after the event 
detection) and put in the IRPT together with the identified interventions from step 
1a. Operators are quite likely to select this start time assuming that it will take 
approximately 1 hour for them to identify the intervention plan and another 1 hour 
for technicians to get to the field and implement the interventions. The assumption 
of 1 hour for the duration of the intervention plan identification lies on the fact that 
a single evaluation takes approximately 3 minutes to take place for the complex 
P-Town network. Hence, step 1b takes approximately 10 (evaluations) x 3 
(mins/evaluation) = 30mins. Then, step 2 (i.e. optimisation through heuristic) will 
also take approximately another 30mins, because in the heuristic 10 
combinations of interventions will be assessed (i.e. equal to the number of 
nominated interventions/decision variables). The time to complete the rest of the 




sub-steps (i.e. step 1a and 1.3) is negligible. The end-impact and cost of the 10 
identified interventions for the start time 4pm are shown in Table 4-2. It can be 
observed that all the 10 identified single interventions reduce the end-impact of 
the ‘No intervention’ case (i.e. equal to 11.2%). Hence, all of them are nominated 
as decision variables to the subsequent step of optimisation. 
In the online step 1c all of the identified single interventions are selected, because 
10 combinations of interventions for the P-Town network can be assessed in 
approximately 30mins and hence in near-real time after the event 
detection/localisation.  
 
Table 4-2: End-impact and cost (£) of single interventions for the P-Town event 
Intervention type  
Start time 
  2pm 4pm 
No intervention 
End-impact 0.1120 - 
Cost 0 - 
ASV1 
End-impact - 0.1071 
Cost - 120.9 
ASV3 
End-impact - 0.1100 
Cost - 24.18 
ASV4 
End-impact - 0.1109 
Cost - 64.48 
ASV5 
End-impact - 0.1100 
Cost - 16.12 
ASV6 
End-impact - 0.1103 
Cost - 16.12 
V1 End-impact - 
0.0704 
Cost - 55.02 
V2 
End-impact - 0.0752 
Cost - 55.02 
V3 
End-impact - 0.0735 
Cost - 55.02 
V4 
End-impact - 0.0497 
Cost - 55.02 
V5 
End-impact - 0.0845 
Cost - 55.02 
 
In step 2 of the optimisation method the heuristic algorithm is applied. Here 
operators input in the IRPT the end-impact and cost of the identified decision 




variables (i.e. 10 interventions). In step 2a of the heuristic, the initial solution is 
identified by the algorithm as the single intervention with the lowest cost. In Table 
4-2 it can be observed that ASV5 and ASV6 obtain the lowest cost equal to 
£16.12. From these two single interventions, ASV5 is selected as the initial 
solution, because the end-impact is lower/better (i.e. 11.00%) than the end-
impact of ASV6 (i.e. 11.03%).  
Then, in step 2b of the heuristic algorithm, the subsequent solution is identified 
as the single solution with the lowest end-impact among all interventions. In this 
example, the solution with the lowest end-impact is equal to 4.97% obtained by 
V4 (Solution 2). This solution reduces the end-impact (i.e. at least one of the two 
objectives) of Solution 1 and hence it is accepted. In the subsequent solution (i.e. 
Solution 3) the single intervention with the next lowest end-impact is added to 
Solution 2 (i.e. the last accepted solution). As noticed in Table 4-2, V1 obtains the 
next lowest end-impact (equal to 7.04%) and is added to Solution 2. Hence, 
Solution 3 is the combination of V4 and V1. Table 4-3 shows the end-impact and 
cost of all the solutions (i.e. intervention combinations) identified by the heuristic. 
It is observed that Solution 3 with end-impact equal to 5.00% and cost £110.04 
does not further reduce end-impact or cost comparing to Solution 2 and hence it 
is rejected. Because Solution 3 is rejected, in subsequent Solution 4, V1 is not 
considered and the single intervention with the next lowest end-impact is added. 
In Table 4-2 it is observed that V3 obtains the next lowest end-impact and is 
combined with V4 in Solution 4. Now, Solution 4 does further reduce end-impact 
comparing to Solution 2, and hence it is accepted, as shown in Table 4-3. The 
same process is followed until all the single interventions have been added (i.e. 











Table 4-3: Solutions identified by the heuristic algorithm for the P-Town event 






(£)   
No intervention 11.2 0   
Solution 1 (ASV5, t=4pm) 11.0 16.12 accept 
Solution 2 (V4, t=4pm) 4.97 55.02 accept 
Solution 3 (V4/V1, t=4pm) 5.00 110.04 reject 
Solution 4 (V4/V3, t=4pm) 4.95 110.04 accept 
Solution 5 (V4/V3/V2, t=4pm) 4.97 165.06 reject 
Solution 6 (V4/V3/V5, t=4pm) 5.11 165.06 reject 
Solution 7 (V4/V3/ASV1, t=4pm) 4.31 239.00 accept 
Solution 8 (V4/V3/ASV1/ASV5, t=4pm) 4.26 255.12 accept 
Solution 9 (V4/V3/ASV1/ASV5/ASV6, t=4pm) 4.09 279.30 accept 
Solution 10 (V4/V3/ASV1/ASV5/ASV6/ASV4, 
t=4pm) 4.05 367.96 accept 
  
 
The 10 solutions proposed by the heuristic algorithm (shown in Table 4-3) are 
finally checked for optimality in step 2j online. This implies that each proposed 
solution should not be better than any other solution (i.e. Pareto front). It is noticed 
that the accepted solutions in Table 4-3 are already the optimal ones and are the 
final solutions included in the Pareto front.  
In Table 4-3, it is noticed that all solutions (either the accepted or the rejected 
ones) obtain lower end-impact and higher cost than the ‘No intervention’ case, as 
expected. Then, Solution 1 was selected by the algorithm as the single 
intervention with the lowest cost (based on the algorithm concept described in the 
Response Methodology chapter). This cheapest solution, also, obtains the 
highest end-impact comparing to the rest of solutions, placing it at the upper left 
of the Pareto front (see also following Figure 4-4). Solution 2 was identified by 
the algorithm as the single intervention with the lowest end-impact from Table 4-2. 
This makes Solution 2 be placed at the second point in the Pareto front (see also 
following Figure 4-4), because the subsequent accepted solutions obtain lower 
end-impact and higher cost than Solution 2. It is also noticed that every 




subsequent solution (Solutions 3 to 10) either reduces end-impact and/or 
increases cost, because at every iteration the single intervention with the next 
lowest end-impact is added. This is expected, because the more single 
interventions with the next lowest end-impact are added to a response solution, 
the more likely it is that the end-impact will be reduced and/or the cost will be 
increased. Finally, in Table 4-3 it is noticed that only the solutions that reduced 
end-impact were accepted, because the cost at every iteration was either the 
same or increased. 
Finally, as also mentioned earlier, step 2 of the optimisation method takes 
approximately 30mins (i.e. near real-time). Hence the whole optimisation process 
took approximately (less than) 1 hour. 
In Figure 4-4, the heuristic’s Pareto front of near-optimal solutions (i.e. green 
colour), the ‘New response - manual’ solution (blue colour) and the ‘No response’ 
case (i.e. yellow colour) are presented.  
 
 
Figure 4-4: End-impact (%) vs cost (£) of near-optimal (heuristic) solutions, the 
‘New response - manual’ and the ‘No response’ 
 




4.3.5 Identification of the final response plan (methodological step 5) 
After the optimisation (step 4 of the methodology) is completed, in step 5 the 
fictional operator decides to compare the identified optimal solutions with the 
‘New response - manual’ solution in order to identify the best response plan. 
Here, for illustration reasons, he/she selects one solution from the Pareto front in 
order to compare it with the ‘New response - manual’ solution. The selected 
optimal solution (denoted hereafter as ‘New response - optimal’, pointed with a 
black arrow in Figure 4-4) is a solution with significantly reduced end-impact for 
a small cost increase compared to the rest of the optimal solutions with less cost 
and bigger impact (i.e. solutions found at the left side of the selected one) on the 
Pareto front. Such solution is quite likely to be selected by a decision-maker.  
The values of the impact indicators of the ‘New response - optimal’ solution (as 
well as those of the ‘New response - manual’ and ‘No response’) are shown in 
Table 4-4. As it can be seen from this table, the values of CML and UW are 
significantly reduced in the ‘New response - optimal’ compared to the ‘No 
response’ case. This implies that the considered weight factors were effective in 
this problem. It is also observed that the ‘New response - manual’ solution obtains 
smaller end-impact values for the CML, AMLP and UW compared to the ‘New 
response - optimal’ solution. However, cost and DRI are significantly reduced in 
the ‘New response - optimal’ solution compared to the ‘New response - manual’ 
solution due to the optimisation enforcing cost minimisation (i.e. two-objective 
optimisation problem). As expected, minimisation of cost function has also 
reduced the number of rezoning valves to open and the injection time, resulting 
in reduced disturbance in pipe flows, and consequently reduced risk of 
discolouration increase (i.e. low DRI value). 
The ‘New response - optimal’ solution also suggests only one intervention, i.e. 
opening one rezoning valve V4 which feeds DMA 005, starting at 4pm (i.e. 2 
hours after shutdown). No injection from ASVs is suggested, which explains the 
minimised cost (i.e. £55) of this solution. The significantly reduced total end-
impact of the ‘New response - optimal’ solution (i.e. 4.97%), compared to the 
11.2% of ‘No response’, is a consequence of starting the rezoning very early in 
the simulation (although only one valve is opened). It is also observed that the 
total end-impact of the ‘New response - manual’ solution (i.e. 4.5%) is not 




significantly lower than the total end-impact of the ‘New response - optimal’ 
solution (i.e. 4.97%). However, the cost of the ‘New response - optimal’ solution 
(i.e. £55) is much lower than the cost of the ‘New response - manual’ solution (i.e. 
£813). 
Furthermore, Figure 4-5c shows that in the ‘New response - optimal’ solution the 
number of affected customers with SI has been reduced when compared to the 
‘No response’. However, in the ‘New response - manual’ solution the affected 
area is smaller than the affected area in the ‘New response - optimal’ solution 
(e.g. DMA 011 is not affected with CML when applying the ‘New response - 
manual’ solution, but there is CML impact when applying the ‘New response - 
optimal’ solution). In both solutions the hospital is not affected anymore (see also 
the pressure graphs in Figure 4-5b and 5c) when compared to the ‘No response’ 
case. If applying the ‘New response - manual’ solution, the initially (i.e. ‘No 
response’) affected schools (in DMAs 011 and 013) and the industrial node (in 
DMA 011) are not affected anymore. However, in the ‘New response - optimal’ 
solution the school in DMA 011 is still affected, although for less hours (i.e. 
between 3 and 6 hours) compared to the ‘No response’ case. Through Figure 
4-5b and 5c operators are also informed that DMA 007 has still high SI impact 
(i.e. almost the whole DMA is affected with SI >12 hours, although the total CML 
is low) in both ‘New response - manual’ and ‘New response - optimal’ solutions. 
It is reminded at this point that the only available intervention in DMA 007 is 
injection from 2 ASV points (see Figure 4-1b). Hence, the IRPT also serves the 
purpose of informing the operators that they should look into more available ASV 
points and/or available rezoning (e.g. from adjacent unaffected DMA 002) in DMA 
007.  
 





Figure 4-5: Customers affected with SI and pressure graph for the                                                               
(a) ‘No response’; (b) ‘New response - manual’ and (c) ‘New response - optimal’ 
 
At this point in time (i.e. in step 5 of methodology), based on the information 
obtained by using the IRPT, the fictional operator has to make the following 
decision: 1) apply the ‘New response - manual’ solution due to the reduced CML, 
AMLP and UW when compared to the ‘No response’, 2) apply the ‘New response 
- optimal’ solution where CML, AMLP and UW are also reduced when compared 
to the ‘No response’ (although higher than those in the ‘New response - manual’ 
solution) but with cost and DRI impact much lower than the cost and DRI impact 
of the ‘New response - manual’ solution, 3) test/assess a different manual solution 
(i.e. ‘what-if’ scenario) and compare it with the other identified solutions, or 4) 
select a different near-optimal solution from the Pareto front in Figure 4-4 and 
compare it with the other identified solutions. For the purpose of this work, the 
different ‘what-if’ scenarios and the different near-optimal solutions are 
discounted due to space limitation. Hence, based on the results obtained, it is 
assumed that the fictional operator is more likely to select the ‘New response - 




optimal’ solution because of the minimum DRI (and small cost), as well as 
relatively low values of all the other impact indicators. The ‘New response - 
optimal’ solution is therefore considered to be the ‘New methodology response’ 
in the remainder of this paper. Step 5 could be conducted in a number minutes, 
as it includes the process of the decision-making by operators. Here operators 
compare one manual solution with one optimal solution and hence step 5 is 
assumed to take approximately 5 minutes to be completed. From the above it is 
noticed that the whole response decision-making process (i.e. the execution of 
the 5 methodological steps) took approximately (a little more than) 1 hour. 
 
4.4 Comparison between ‘Current practice response’ and ‘New 
methodology response’ 
In this section the CML, AMLP, UW, DRI, cost and total end-impact are calculated 
by the IRPT for the ‘Current practice response’ and are presented in Table 4-4. It 
can be noticed that even though CML, AMLP and UW are reduced when 
compared to the ‘No response’ scenario, the ‘New methodology response’ (i.e. 
the ‘New response - optimal’ solution) offers further improvements. Indeed, the 
‘New methodology response’ further reduced all impact indicators (especially DRI 
and cost). The ‘New methodology response’ also suggested less number of 
interventions to implement (i.e. opening of only one rezoning valve compared to 
opening of 12 valves and injecting from 6 points in the ‘Current practice 
response’) justifying the significant improvement in DRI and cost. This might be 
beneficial for utilities in cases where only a limited number of resources is 
available during the response decision-making. 
In the light of the above, it can be concluded that the ‘New methodology response’ 
identified through interaction with the IRPT outperforms the ‘Current practice 
response’. Hence, the IRPT proposed in the context of this work could be of 
significant value in a water utility. 
 




Table 4-4: Total end-impact and cost of ‘No response’, ‘Current practice 











































1.5 1.9 1475 92 55 4.97 
 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter presented an application of the proposed response methodology on 
a semi-real case study (i.e. case study based on a real system and event, but 
with simplified event timeline and operators’ responses). Initially, the semi-real 
case study was described. Then, the IRPT’s steps were implemented for the case 
study’s event in order to identify the ‘New methodology response’. The solution 
selected by operators using the IRPT (i.e. ‘New methodology response’) was 
ultimately compared with the ‘Current practice response’ (i.e. response solution 




identified with the current utility’s response practice) in order to demonstrate the 
benefit resulting from the operator’s interaction with the IRPT. 
In section 4.2 the semi-real case study was described. The event is a WTW 
shutdown that serves approximately 100000 customers in the North West of 
England. The WTW shut down due to high turbidity levels resulting from a burst 
on a main within the WTW. The repair of the burst lasted for 24 hours leaving 
significant part of the network with intermittent supply and low pressure. The utility 
mobilised a number of interventions (i.e. ASVs and rezones) in order to restore 
supply as long as repair was being conducted. In the IRPT, the shutdown was 
modelled as closing the pipe downstream the service reservoir immediately fed 
by the WTW. A number of additional assumptions for simulating the event in the 
IRPT, such as rezoning valves’ location, number of ASVs and loads of injection, 
rounded start time of interventions’ implementation, makes this case-study semi-
real. 
In section 4.3, the identification of the response solution through the IRPT’s steps 
(i.e. ‘New methodology response’) is presented. Initially, step 1 of the response 
methodology is used to perform the initial impact assessment. In this step it was 
identified that a significant part of the network (i.e. 10 DMAs, including schools, 
hospitals and industrial users) were affected (with CML) due to the shutdown. 
Hence, operators decided in step 3 to propose a manual solution (using the ‘what-
if’ scenario simulation capability afforded by the IRPT). Here, based on the map 
of affected DMAs and the graph showing the beginning of impact in the horizon 
(an additional capability of IRPT), they were able to propose a set of interventions 
and corresponding start times of implementation. Although the manual solution 
was quite satisfying (except the DRI and cost), step 4 of the response 
methodology was also applied for demonstration reasons. In step 4 they were 
able to identify near-optimal solutions by following the heuristic-based, 
optimisation method (proposed in this work) in near real-time. Finally, in step 5 
they compared the manual solution with a selected near-optimal solution. Here, 
they decided that the best/final solution (i.e. the ‘New methodology response’) is 
the selected near-optimal solution, due to much lower values of cost and DRI 
compared to the manual solution.  




In section 4.4, the IRPT was used to calculate the end-impact and cost of the 
solution identified by the utility based on their current practice (i.e. ‘Current 
practice response’). Then comparison between the ‘Current practice response’ 
and the ‘New methodology response’ showed that the IRPT enabled operators 
identify a response solution with much lower values in all impact indicators, and 
especially in DRI and cost. The ‘New methodology response’ (identified through 
interaction with the IRPT) also suggested less number of interventions to apply 
on site. This might be beneficial for utilities in cases where only a limited number 
of resources is available during the response decision-making.  
The key findings derived from the implementation of the response methodology 
on the above real-life case study are the following: 
 The new response methodology although structured (through the 5 steps), 
it is flexible, as it allows operators decide which step to apply and how 
many times, before the final decision of a response solution. Hence, in this 
case study operators decided to propose/assess manually a response 
solution and then to ask from the IRPT to identify a near optimal solution. 
If they wished, they could have proposed alternative response solution(s) 
in step 3 and/or compare it/them with an alternative selected near optimal 
solution in step 5. 
 The comparison between the “Current practice response” and the “New 
methodology response” showed that the “New methodology response” 
outperformed the ‘Current practice response’. It is concluded then that the 
IRPT enabled operators identify a satisfying response solution (and also 
better than the one identified in real-life) in near real-time, even in a 
complex, real-life network, such as that of P-Town. 
 The IRPT solution was identified in near real-time, i.e. approximately 1 












The present chapter aims to illustrate the reliability (or accuracy) of the new, 
heuristic-based method for near optimal response to water network failures in 
near real-time. Due to the limitation introduced by the new method (i.e. a fixed 
start time of interventions implementation is considered), the reliability of the 
method is investigated here. For this purpose, the method’s solutions are 
compared with the solutions of a more advanced/accurate, but also time-
consuming, method (e.g. here NSGA II). The accuracy of NSGA II has been 
tested/validated by many researchers in the past on different optimisation 
problems (e.g. Preis & Ostfeld 2008; Alfonso et al. 2010; Wang et al. 2013). 
Hence, the NSGA II is conducted here too (for the same optimisation problem but 
considering the start time of interventions a decision variable too) in order to 
compare the optimal solutions (generated by the NSGA II) with the near optimal 
ones (generated by the method). 
The reliability of the proposed optimisation method is tested through two case 
studies: 1) C-Town (for an assumed pipe failure event) and 2) P-Town (for a real-
life event). The first case study has been extensively used in the literature to 
demonstrate different optimisation methods, e.g. in Mahmoud et al. (2018). The 
second case study is used here in order to test the method on a more complicated 
real-life network under a real-life event scenario. The real-life event used in the 
second case is described thoroughly in chapter 4. The heuristic solutions 
obtained are compared to the corresponding results published in the literature 
(i.e. in Mahmoud et al. 2018). The aim of this comparison is to point out the benefit 
of the method compared to more conventional methods published in the 
literature. A sensitivity analysis is also conducted in order to investigate the 




sensitivity of the optimisation method to the start time of interventions 
implementation.  
The chapter is organised as follows. In section 5.2, the optimisation method is 
validated and demonstrated on the C-Town case study, with the sensitivity 
analysis being presented in sub-section 5.2.1. In section 5.3, the proposed 
optimisation method is validated on the P-Town case study. In section 5.4, the 
present chapter is summarised. 
 
5.2 C-Town case study 
The assumed failure event considered here is a burst on pipe P307 
detected/localised at 1am and isolated at 2am (i.e. 1 hour after 
detection/localisation). Figure 5-1 shows the C-Town network layout as well as 
the network elements and burst. It is highlighted that the isolation start time 
considered here is the same as the one used in Mahmoud et al. (2018) to allow 
for the comparison between the aforementioned study and the present one. 
Hence, the initial system condition here (that needs to be restored/recovered via 
optimised recovery interventions) is the system with the leaked pipe (at 1am) and 
isolated main (at 2am) (i.e. the same as in Mahmoud et al. 2018). Selecting a 
later isolation start time could reduce even more the end-impact, as proposed in 
the response methodology (see section 3.3). However, the selection of the 
isolation scenario is part of a more effective overall response methodology and 
hence not the focus/aim of the present chapter.  
The impact horizon starts from the detection/localisation time (i.e. 1am) and lasts 
until the end of isolation duration 25 hours later (i.e. at 2am of the next day), 
similarly to Mahmoud et al. (2018). Other assumptions made here which are the 
same as the ones used in the aforementioned work (to facilitate the comparison) 
are the following: 1) location of hydrant points (shown in Figure 5-1); 2) location 
of isolation valves (shown in Figure 5-1); 3) diameter, Hazen-Williams roughness 
coefficient and maximum length of overland bypasses (linking pairs of hydrants) 
equal to 200mm, 100 and 300m, respectively; 4) Preq = 15m (pressure under 
which low pressure impact is introduced and hence undelivered volume of water); 
5) same intervention types, i.e. PRVs setting adjustment and overland bypasses. 




(Rezoning valves and water injection are not considered here as intervention 
types, because there are not real-life data about them for the C-Town network 
and also they are not used in Mahmoud et al. 2018); 6) PRV settings allowed to 
change are: no increase, 5% increase, 10% increase, 15% increase, 20% 
increase, or 25% increase, all relative to the original PRV setting; and 7) 
assumption of recovery initialisation (i.e. start time of all interventions) at 9am (i.e. 
8 hours after event detection/localisation). It is stressed that the same 
assumption/limitation is used in the heuristic to facilitate the comparison between 
the two studies. However this is not the case with the NSGA II conducted for the 
case study in the present project where each intervention is allowed to start at a 
different time in the horizon.  
 
 
Figure 5-1: C-Town network layout with the simulated event (burst) on pipe 
P307 (Mahmoud et al. 2018) 
 
One significant discrepancy between the previous work and the present one is 
the impact assessment. Mahmoud et al. (2018) assess end-impact in a more 




conventional way, i.e. by considering only the volume of water undelivered to the 
customers. Here, end-impact is calculated taking into account different impact 
aspects (see impact assessment method in sub-section 3.3.2), including supply 
interruption (CML index), low pressure (AMLP index), undelivered water (UW 
index) and discolouration risk increase (DRI index). The same weight factors for 
all impact indicators have been used (see Eq. 5). 
Additionally, the second optimisation objective differs between the two studies. 
Mahmoud et al. (2018) optimises for the number of interventions (i.e. again in a 
more conventional way), whereas here the cost of the recovery interventions is 
used. It is stressed that smaller number of interventions does not always imply 
lower cost due to particular hydraulic network requirements (e.g. use of only one 
ASV injection point might be quite expensive when injecting many hours to meet 
the required demand). 
One additional discrepancy is that the opening/closing of isolation valves is not 
considered here as possible intervention type, as done in the previous work. This 
is due to the fact that manipulation of isolation valves is not a common means to 
intervene into the network when a failure occurs. It is stressed here that the 
opening/closing of isolation valves is not considered as intervention type during 
the identification of response solutions, i.e. in steps 3, 4 and 5 of the proposed 
response methodology. Isolation however is separately conducted in step 2 of 
the response methodology. 
Finally, Mahmoud et al. (2018) make use of the NSGA II method to solve their 
optimisation problem, whereas here the optimal solutions are identified based on 
the heuristic-based method. Although the above discrepancies, it is assumed 
here that it is still worth comparing the results between the two studies. In that 
way, the difference in optimal solutions will be demonstrated when different 
aspects of impact, selection of interventions (number of interventions vs cost) and 
optimisation methods are considered.  
Hereunder the proposed optimisation method is implemented step by step (see 
sub-section 3.3.3) for the C-Town case study. In the offline step 0, all the 
intervention types (i.e. overland bypasses and PRVs) and possible locations are 
identified for the C-Town network. The initial list of interventions includes 352 
overland bypasses and 5 PRVs for the C-Town network model. In the online step 




1a, the initial list is narrowed down by identifying: (a) the overland bypasses that 
link affected with unaffected DMAs, (b) the overland bypasses located in the 
affected DMAs, and (c) the PRVs upstream affected nodes. Hence, 247 overland 
bypasses are nominated to the online step 1b, out of which: 35 overland 
bypasses link (affected) DMA1 with (unaffected) DMA5, 20 bypasses link 
(affected) DMA2 with (unaffected) DMA4 and 192 overland bypasses are located 
in the affected DMA1 and DMA2. No PRV was identified to be upstream affected 
nodes, hence no PRV is nominated to the next step. Figure 5-2 shows the 
affected nodes/DMAs for the ‘No intervention’ case, the PRVs and some overland 
bypasses (i.e. the ones used in the intervention plans proposed by the 
optimisation as shown later, for clarity reasons). 
 
   
Figure 5-2: Location of affected nodes for the ‘No intervention’ case (i.e. with 
burst on pipe P307 and isolation in place), isolated area, PRVs and overland 
bypasses OLB1, OLB2, OLB3, OLB4, OLB5 and OLB6 in the C-Town network 
 




In the online step 1b (i.e. individual evaluation step), the 247 bypasses are 
assessed individually (for their total aggregated end-impact and cost) for a fixed 
start time in the impact horizon. Here it is assumed that operators decide the 
interventions start at 9am (i.e. 8 hours after detection), i.e. similarly to Mahmoud 
et al. (2018). This start time is a realistic decision, as it assumes that interventions 
start when there is peak in demand, as well as it allows plenty of time for the 
technicians to reach the site and start implementation. In the online step 1c, a 
number of interventions with the lowest end-impact (identified in step 1b) are 
selected and nominated to the optimisation step (i.e. step 2). Here 10 
interventions are selected, because this number is considered adequate to 
provide sufficient response plan for a small network such that of C-Town, as well 
as the total time required for evaluation can be conducted in near real-time. This 
lies on the fact that a single impact evaluation takes approximately 3 sec to take 
place for the simple network of C-Town. Hence, step 1b, which includes 247 
single impact evaluations (see above), lasts for 247 (interventions) x 3 sec (time 
of a single impact evaluation) = 741 sec. Considering that steps 1a and 1c take 
approximately 1 min each (because they do not require hydraulic simulation), 
then the overall preparation in step 1 takes approximately 14 mins. 
The end-impact (in absolute value) and cost (in £) of the 10 candidate 
interventions (i.e. overland bypasses in 10 different locations) for start time 9am 
are shown in  
Table 5-1. It is stressed that in the cost function in Eq. 7, only the cost of the 
overland bypasses has been used (assuming cOLB = 30£/hour, obtained by the 
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End-impact - 0.0744 
Cost - 540 
OLB2 
End-impact - 0.0745 
Cost - 540 
OLB3 
End-impact - 0.0663 
Cost - 540 
OLB4 
End-impact - 0.0856 
Cost - 540 
OLB5 
End-impact - 0.0838 
Cost - 540 
OLB6 
End-impact - 0.0809 
Cost - 540 
OLB7 
End-impact - 0.0814 
Cost - 540 
OLB8 
End-impact - 0.0862 
Cost - 540 
OLB9 
End-impact - 0.0862 
Cost - 540 
OLB10 
End-impact - 0.0862 
Cost - 540 
 
In step 2a of the heuristic, the initial solution is identified by the algorithm as the 
single intervention with the lowest cost. In  
Table 5-1 it can be observed that the cost of all interventions is equal to £540, 
because they are all the same intervention type, i.e. overland bypass, starting at 




the same time. Hence, the single solution OLB3 (that obtains the lowest end-
impact (i.e. equal to 6.63%) is selected as the initial solution (i.e. Solution 1). 
Then, in step 2b of the heuristic algorithm, the subsequent solution is identified 
as the single solution with the lowest end-impact among all interventions. In this 
example, the solution with the lowest end-impact has already been used, hence 
the lowest end-impact of the rest of solutions is identified. In  
Table 5-1, it is shown that the next lowest end-impact is equal to 7.44% obtained 
by OLB1 (Solution 2). This solution does not reduce the end-impact (i.e. at least 
one of the two objectives) and hence it is rejected. In the subsequent solution (i.e. 
Solution 3) the single intervention with the next lowest end-impact is added to 
Solution 1 (i.e. the last accepted solution). As noticed in  
Table 5-1, OLB2 obtains the next lowest end-impact (equal to 7.45 %) and is 
added to Solution 1. Hence, Solution 3 is the combination of OLB3 and OLB2. 
Table 5-2 shows the end-impact and cost of all the solutions (i.e. intervention 
combinations) identified by the heuristic. It is observed that Solution 3 with end-
impact equal to 6.77% and cost £1080 does not further reduce end-impact or cost 
comparing to Solution 1 and hence it is rejected. Because Solution 3 is rejected, 
in subsequent Solution 4, OLB2 is not considered and the single intervention with 
the next lowest end-impact is added. In  
Table 5-1 it is observed that OLB6 obtains the next lowest end-impact and is 
combined with OLB3 in Solution 4. Now, Solution 4 does further reduce end-
impact comparing to Solution 1, and hence it is accepted, as shown in Table 5-2. 
The same process is followed until all the single interventions have been added 
(i.e. after 10 iterations, as shown in Table 5-2). 
 
Table 5-2: Solutions identified by the heuristic algorithm for the C-Town event 
compared to the ‘No intervention’ case and optimal solutions proposed by 
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No intervention 8.63 0   
Solution 1 (OLB3) 6.63 540 accept 
Solution 2 (OLB1) 7.44 540 reject 
Solution 3 (OLB3/OLB2, t=9am) 6.77 1080 reject 
Solution 4 (OLB3/OLB6, t=9am) 6.08 1080 accept 
Solution 5 (OLB3/OLB6/OLB7, t=9am) 6.08 1620 reject 
Solution 6 (OLB3/OLB6/OLB5, t=9am) 6.07 1620 accept 
Solution 7 (OLB3/OLB6/OLB5/OLB4, 
t=9am) 5.98 2160 accept 
Solution 8 
(OLB3/OLB6/OLB5/OLB4/OLB8, t=9am) 5.98 2700 reject 
Solution 9 
(OLB3/OLB6/OLB5/OLB4/OLB9, t=9am) 5.98 2700 reject 
Solution 10 
(OLB3/OLB6/OLB5/OLB4/OLB10, t=9am) 5.98 2700 reject 
Solution A (Mahmoud et al. 2018) 
(OLB3,t=9am) 6.63 540 
 
Solution B (Mahmoud et al. 2018) 
(OLB3/OLB1,t=9am) 6.84 1080   
  
The 10 solutions proposed by the heuristic algorithm (shown in Table 5-2) are 
finally checked for optimality in step 2j online. This implies that each proposed 
solution should not be better than another solution (i.e. Pareto front). It is noticed 
that the accepted solutions in Table 5-2 are already the optimal ones and are the 
final solutions included in the Pareto front. Finally, step 2 includes 10 more impact 
evaluations, i.e. it lasts for 10 (evaluations) x 3 sec (time of a single impact 
evaluation) = 30 sec. This means that the total duration of the application of the 
optimisation method for the C-Town network is approximately 15 mins (i.e. 14 
mins from step 1 and 30 sec from step 2). 




In Table 5-2, the Pareto front of near optimal solutions is presented as the 
accepted solutions (i.e. bolded text). It is noticed that as expected on a Pareto 
front, each solution is not better than the other one, because a cheaper solution 
obtains higher end-impact and vice-versa. This means that operators have to 
decide the best solution based on their own criteria, which might depend on the 
value of specific impact indicators of a response solution, the highest expenses 
they wish to make for a response solution, etc. For example, if they gave priority 
to reduce the impact indicator of CML, then they would select a response solution 
from the Pareto front with the lowest value of CML even though this solution 
obtained higher total end-impact comparing to other solutions. The tool is able to 
provide the user with the values of each impact indicator for a specific solution on 
the Pareto front, as shown in the following Figure 5-3. 
After the implementation of the optimisation method proposed here, the NSGA II 
is conducted for the same event. The NSGA II results (for the C-Town event) are 
compared with the results of the optimisation method proposed here in order to 
identify the reliability of the method. The considered interventions, the impact 
horizon and optimisation objectives are the same as used in the heuristic. More 
specifically, the decision variables of the heuristic are the 10 overland bypasses 
identified in step 1 of the optimisation method. However, NSGA II here considers 
the start time of each intervention a variable too (i.e. in the range of 1 hour and 
24 hours after detection). This is done in order to indicate the error introduced by 
the limitation of heuristic (i.e. where a fixed start time is assumed). Additionally, 
the optimal solutions (i.e. combinations of overland bypasses) identified by 
Mahmoud et al. (2018) are assessed here (i.e. in the environment of IRPT) for 
their total end-impact (i.e. considering all aforementioned impact aspects) and for 
their cost. It is reminded here that Mahmoud et al. (2018) identified these optimal 
solutions by assessing impact of undelivered water (only) and number of 
interventions (i.e. not cost), and also by using NSGA II. Figure 5-3 compares the 
results obtained by the NSGA II (Pareto front) of the present optimisation 
problem, the Heuristic Pareto front of near optimal solutions, the Heuristic 
dominated (i.e. rejected) solutions, the ‘No intervention’ case and the solutions 
obtained by Mahmoud et al. (2018). 
 






Figure 5-3: End-impact vs cost of the solutions for the C-Town event identified 
by NSGA II (Pareto front), the Heuristic (Pareto front and dominated solutions) 
and Mahmoud et al. (2018) - CML in mins/cust AMPL in mins/cust, UW in m3 
and DRI in no. of pipes 
Based on the results shown in Table 5-2 and Figure 5-3 the following observations 
are made: 
 The Pareto front identified by the heuristic sufficiently approximates the 
NSGA II Pareto front, as the maximum discrepancy (i.e. error) of end-
impact between a NSGA II and a heuristic solution with similar costs (e.g. 
Solution 6 of heuristic compared to Solution 20 of NSGA II and Solution 7 
of heuristic compared to Solution 23 of NSGA II) is equal to 4%. 
 The Pareto optimal front identified by the heuristic is less dense than the 
Pareto front proposed by the NSGA II. Hence, only 4 near-optimal 
solutions are proposed by the heuristic compared to the 24 solutions 
proposed by the NSGA II. However this is not deemed significant 
drawback of the optimisation method, because all the proposed solutions 
are near-optimal. Additionally, it is believed here that in near real-time in a 




control room there is limited time available to check a big number of 
optimal solutions. 
 The optimisation process (i.e. online selection of population and heuristic) 
took approximately 15 minutes, whereas the NSGA II in the context of this 
case study took approximately 3 hours. Additionally, Mahmoud et al. 
(2018) required 30 minutes to solve the same optimisation problem (but 
for a fixed start time of interventions). Hence, the time that the proposed 
optimisation (with similar search space as in Mahmoud et al. 2018) was 
completed here is less than the last study, as well as less than the NSGA 
II in the context of this study. 
 In Table 5-2 and Figure 5-2 it is observed that all the overland bypasses 
identified in the accepted solutions (i.e. OLB3, OLB4, OLB5 and OLB6) 
are located in the affected DMA1, close to the affected nodes and isolated 
area (i.e. burst event). Hence it is confirmed the obvious point that 
bypassing affected nodes with unaffected nodes in the affected DMA and 
close to the isolated area can significantly reduce end-impact. 
 The NSGA II Solution B identified in Mahmoud et al. (2018) managed to 
reduce the undelivered water (i.e. their sole impact indicator) to 120 m3. 
However, the heuristic method identified solution (i.e. Solution 7) where 
the undelivered water was reduced to 32 m3. This is due to the fact that 
the heuristic optimised not only the undelivered volume of water, but also 
additional impact aspects (e.g. CML, AMLP) whose reduction facilitates 
the reduction of undelivered water. 
 In Mahmoud et al. (2018) Solution A and Solution B are the non-dominated 
solutions in their proposed NSGA II Pareto front. Hence, in their study, 
Solution B obtains lower end-impact (i.e. undelivered water volume, first 
objective) and bigger number of interventions (i.e. second objective) than 
the Solution A. However, in Figure 5-3 it is shown that when end-impact 
with more than one impact aspects is considered, Solution B is dominated 
by Solution A. This is due to the fact that although UW was reduced to 120 
m3 in Solution B (compared to 131 m3 in Solution A) and AMLP was 
reduced to 2.2 mins/cust in Solution B (compared to 2.5 mins/cust in 
Solution A), when increasing the number of interventions DRI was 




increased (from 106 in Solution A to 111 in Solution B). This ultimately 
caused the increase of the total aggregated end-impact of Solution B 
(instead of decreasing it as anticipated in a Pareto front). 
 
In Table 5-3 the two solutions identified by the heuristic and NSGA II (conducted 
here) with similar cost and end-impact are compared. This is done in order to 
point out the difference in interventions and/or start times that cause these small 
end-impact discrepancies. In Table 5-3, as far as the first comparison is 
concerned, it is observed that the NSGA II identified Solution 11 with exactly the 
same end-impact with Solution 1 (by heuristic) for the same cost and also by 
using the same overland bypass (i.e. OLB3) (at the same start time). As far as 
the second comparison is concerned, it is seen that the NSGA II identified 
Solution 16 with end-impact higher than the one in Solution 4 (by heuristic) but 
for lower cost. Hence no solution is better than the other. However it is worth 
noticing that the heuristic although its limitations identified a solution that with 
slight increase in cost (i.e. from £1020 in NSGA II to £1080 in heuristic) reduced 
the total aggregated end-impact. In these two solutions different overland 
bypasses and start times were used. This is anticipated in cases where different 
end-impact and cost values are identified in solutions from different methods. The 
overland bypasses used in the above solutions are shown in Figure 5-2. 
Table 5-3: Comparison of solutions with the same cost and slightly different end-
impact between heuristic and NSGA II for the C-Town event 
  Comparison 1 Comparison 2 
Optimisation 
method 
Heuristic NSGA II Heuristic NSGA II 
Solution Solution 1 Solution 11 Solution 4 Solution16 
Cost (£) 540 540 1080 1020 
End-impact 
(%) 
6.63 6.63 6.08 6.11 














5.2.1 Sensitivity analysis 
In the context of the C-Town case-study, a sensitivity analysis is conducted in 
order to test different start times of interventions. This sensitivity analysis aims to 
investigate the robustness of the optimisation method to the interventions’ start 
time. As it was mentioned earlier, the optimisation method proposes a (selected 
by operator) fixed start time (here assumed as 9am) due to time limitation to test 
different start times in near real-time. 
In the context of this sensitivity analysis, five more start times close to the selected 
one here (i.e. 9am) are tested, i.e. at 6am, 7am, 8am, 10am and 11am. The above 
additional start times are considered here to be adequate to conduct the 
sensitivity analysis. This is due to the fact that they are all morning hours (i.e. with 
similar demands) close to the initially selected one (i.e. some start times earlier 
than 9am and some start times later than 9am). Consideration of much later hours 
(i.e. after 12pm) might produce results substantially deviated from the original 
start time due to different demand levels. The results are shown in Figure 5-4 and 
are compared with the NSGA II results. 
 





Figure 5-4: Solutions of different start times identified by the optimisation 
method (i.e. heuristic) for the C-Town event 
 
From Figure 5-4 it is observed that: 
 The Pareto front obtained using the heuristics algorithm approximates the 
NSGA II front reasonably well, especially for the most important part with 
lower cost solutions. Indeed, for lower costs (i.e. lower than £1500) and 
for all the start times the heuristic approach identifies solutions that are 
almost identical to the NSGA II. For higher costs (i.e. higher than £1500), 
heuristic solutions are dominated by the NSGA II solutions but not by 
much, i.e. the distance between the two Pareto fronts is rather small with 
heuristic solutions with earliest start times (i.e. 6am and 7am) being closer 
to the NSGA II solutions.  
 The following overland bypasses exist in all heuristic solutions, regardless 
of the start time used: OLB3, OLB4 and OLB6. This is good news as these 
overland bypasses are the most important ones, as confirmed by the 
NSGA II solutions.  
 




5.3 P-Town case study 
In this section, the optimisation method is tested on the P-Town case study. The 
steps of the optimisation method for the P-Town network and event have already 
been applied in chapter 4. Hence, in this section the heuristic solutions are 
compared to the NSGA II results (conducted in the context of the present case 
study). As mentioned in chapter 4, the P-Town real-life event is a WTW shutdown 
detected/localised at 2pm on 2nd November 2019. The shutdown lasted for 24 
hours (i.e. until 2pm next day). The impact horizon considered here lasts from the 
detection/localisation time (i.e. 2pm first day) until the end of shutdown/isolation 
(i.e. 2pm next day), i.e. 24 hours horizon.  
After the implementation of the optimisation method for the P-Town case study in 
chapter 4 (see sub-section 4.3.4), the NSGA II is conducted here for the same 
event in order to compare the results between the two optimisation methods. The 
considered interventions, the impact horizon and the optimisation objectives are 
the same as used in the heuristics based method. More specifically, the decision 
variables of the heuristic are the 5 rezoning valves and 5 ASVs identified in step 
1 of the optimisation method (see Figure 4-1). Additionally, the same indicators 
weights as the ones used for the impact assessment in the heuristic are used: 
wCML=0.4, wAMLP=0.15, wUW=0.3 and wDRI=0.15. 
However, NSGA II here considers the start time of each intervention a variable 
too (i.e. in the range of 1 hour and 23 hours after detection). This is done in order 
to indicate the error introduced by the limitation of the method (i.e. assuming a 
fixed start time). It is highlighted that consideration of start time of 1 hour after 
event detection/localisation in the NSGA II might not be realistic (even in the 
heuristic method where optimisation is conducted in some minutes), because the 
response decision-making process takes approximately 1 hour, and then about 1 
more hour is required for the technicians mobilisation. However, this start time is 
considered here for completeness. 
In Figure 5-5 the end-impact and cost of the solutions for the P-Town event 
identified by the NSGA II (Pareto front), the Heuristic (Pareto front and dominated 
solutions) and the ‘No intervention’ case are compared. In Figure 5-5 it is 
observed: 




 The Pareto front identified by the heuristic approximates the NSGA II 
Pareto front well, as the maximum discrepancy (i.e. error) of end-impact 
between a NSGA II and a heuristic solution with similar costs (e.g. Solution 
7 of heuristic compared to Solution 16 of NSGA II) is equal to 9%. It is 
noticed that the error in the P-Town case-study is higher than the error in 
the C-Town (i.e. 4%). However it is deemed low considering the significant 
limitation of the fixed start time for the present complex real-life network. 
 The method also identified the ‘jump’ from a solution with high end-impact 
(i.e. Solution 1) to a solution with much lower end-impact (i.e. Solution 2) 
with minimum cost increase. Solutions like these (i.e. Solution 2) are likely 
to be selected by decision-makers. It is also observed that Solution 2 
seems identical to the solution proposed by NSGA II (i.e. Solution 5). 
 Similarly to the C-Town case-study, the Pareto optimal front identified by 
the heuristic is less dense than the Pareto front proposed by the NSGA II. 
Hence, only 7 (non-dominated) near-optimal solutions are proposed by the 
heuristic compared to the 20 solutions proposed by the NSGA II. However 
as mentioned earlier this is not deemed as a significant drawback of the 
optimisation method, because the front coverage is good and, also, in near 
real-time, in a control room there is limited time available to check a large 
number of optimal solutions. 
 NSGA II was conducted here (with search space equal to 210 x 2310=4 x 
1016) and took approximately 2 days to be completed, while the 
optimisation process (i.e. online selection of population and heuristic) took 
approximately 1 hour (see sub-section 4.3.4). Hence, the time that the 
proposed heuristic optimisation was completed here is much less than the 
NSGA II. 
 





Figure 5-5: End-impact vs cost of the solutions for the P-Town event identified 
by NSGA II (Pareto front) and the Heuristic (Pareto front and dominated 
solutions) 
 
In Table 5-4 the solutions identified by the heuristic and NSGA II (conducted here) 
with similar cost and end-impact are compared. This is done in order to point out 
the difference in interventions and/or start times that causes these small end-
impact discrepancies. Most of the discrepancies regard the start time of 
interventions, which is due to the fact that NSGA II optimised for different start 
times (unlike the heuristic method where a fixed start time was considered). 
In Table 5-4, as far as the first comparison is concerned, it is observed that the 
NSGA II Solution 2 obtains the same cost with the heuristic’s Solution 1, but with 
(slightly) lower end-impact (as anticipated). NSGA II solution 2 identified a single 
ASV to implement (i.e. ASV6) similarly to the heuristic’s solution 1, but for a later 
start time. Similarly to the first comparison, in the second comparison the NSGA 
II solution 5 obtains a lower end-impact than the heuristic’s solution for the same 
cost. Comparison 3 to comparison 6 present heuristic solutions with higher end-
impact than the NSGA II solutions, but with lower cost. Hence, in comparison 3 
to comparison 6 the NSGA II solutions are not better than the heuristic’s solutions. 




For example, in comparison 3, the NSGA II solution 11 obtains end-impact equal 
to 4.5%. Although NSGA II’s end-impact is lower than the end-impact of the 
heuristic’s solution 4 (i.e. 4.95%), the cost of the NSGA II solution is higher (i.e. 
£111.44 > £110.04). Additionally, it is observed that in comparison 3 and 4 the 
heuristic solutions were obtained for less number of interventions. In comparison 
5 and 6 the number of proposed interventions by the heuristic is the same as the 
one proposed by the NSGA II. 
From the above observations, it is concluded that in the heuristic solutions the 
number of proposed interventions does not overcome the number of interventions 
identified by the NSGA II (in many cases the number proposed by the heuristic is 
smaller). This might be an advantage for utilities in case of limited resources 
during the response decision-making. 
 
Table 5-4: Comparison of solutions with similar costs and slightly different end-
impact between heuristic and NSGA II for the P-Town event 
 Comparison 1 Comparison 2 
Optimisation 
method 
Heuristic NSGA II Heuristic NSGA II 
Solution 
name 
Solution 1 Solution 2 Solution 2 Solution 5 
Cost (£) 16.12 16.12 55.02 55.02 
End-impact 
(%) 














 Comparison 3 Comparison 4 
Optimisation 
method 
Heuristic NSGA II Heuristic NSGA II 






Solution 4 Solution 11 Solution 7 Solution 16 
Cost (£) 110.04 111.44 239 240.4 
End-impact 
(%) 





















 Comparison 5 Comparison 6 
Optimisation 
method 
Heuristic NSGA II Heuristic NSGA II 
Solution 
name 
Solution 9 Solution 17 Solution 10 Solution 20 
Cost (£) 279.3 280.7 367.96 369.36 
End-impact 
(%) 


































This chapter presented the validation of the heuristic-based method for near 
optimal response to water network failures in near real-time. The validation was 
carried out by comparing the method’s solutions with the solutions of the more 
advanced/accurate (but also time-consuming) NSGA II method. The method was 
validated on two case studies. The first case study considered here was the 
simple, real-life network of C-Town and the second one was the complex, real-
life network of P-Town. For the C-Town case study, the heuristic solutions were 
also compared with the results of a past study, i.e. the Mahmoud et al. (2018), 
where conventional optimisation techniques (e.g. optimisation method and 
objective functions) were used. A sensitivity analysis was also conducted in order 
to investigate the robustness of the method to the start time of interventions. 
In section 5.2, the optimisation method was applied step by step for the C-Town 
case study. After the identification of the solutions obtained with the heuristics 
method, the NSGA II was conducted for the same optimisation problem, but 
considering the start time of interventions as decision variable. The solutions 
obtained with the optimisation method were compared then with the NSGA II 
solutions as well as with the solutions obtained by Mahmoud et al. (2018) (where 
more conventional optimisation techniques have been used). In sub-section 
5.2.1, different start time scenarios were tested and compared in order to 
investigate the sensitivity/robustness of the method to the start time of 
interventions. In section 5.3, the optimisation method’s solutions were compared 
with the NSGA II solutions for the P-Town case study. Based on the above 
analyses the following key findings were obtained: 
 The heuristics based method is able to identify near optimal response 
solutions in an effective (i.e. accurate) and efficient (i.e. computationally 
fast) manner. The effectiveness is confirmed by running the full, NSGA II 
based optimisation runs and comparing the resulting Pareto fronts which 
match well. The computational efficiency achieved enables its application 
in near real-time for larger, more complex WDS. 
 The Pareto optimal front identified by the heuristics method has a good 
coverage, but it is less dense than the corresponding front obtained by the 
NSGA II. This, however is not deemed as a significant drawback, because 




all solutions are proposed by the heuristics method in near real-time and 
are near-optimal. Furthermore, the set of solutions identified represents 
well the trade-off between the impact reduction and associated costs of 
responses. Therefore, the solutions identified provide a good starting point 
for consideration by control room operators who have a final say anyway.  
 When compared to the solutions obtained by Mahmoud et al. (2018), the 
heuristics method managed to improve the quality of some of solutions 
(e.g. reduced the volume of undelivered water) despite the fact that its 
impact reduction is driven by other criteria as well. It also managed to 
reduce the time required for the identification of the final response plan to 
15mins (for the simple network of C-Town). 
 The potential drawback of the method is its inability to optimise for the start 
time of interventions which therefore needs to be set by the control room 
operator. Having said this, as demonstrated in both case studies, the 
solutions generated by the heuristics method are robust enough, i.e. rather 












6 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
6.1 Summary 
6.1.1 Thesis Summary 
The water industry in the UK and abroad has a pressing need to better manage 
interruptions to water supply caused by various failures such as pipe bursts, 
equipment failures or WTW shutdowns. One way of doing this is by making use 
of the increasingly available real-time sensor data collected in WDSs, as well as 
by using hydraulic models in real-time. Currently, real-time sensor data and real-
time hydraulic modelling are not used much in a water utility’s control room, 
especially when it comes to identifying a suitable strategy to respond to failure 
events in near real-time. 
The aim of this project was to develop, validate and demonstrate a new response 
methodology to support decisions made by control room operators when dealing 
with various failure events in a WDS. As an integral part of this work, an interactive 
decision-support tool called IRPT was developed in order to support/guide 
operators in identifying effective response solutions in near real-time (i.e. usually 
required up to 1 hour after the event detection/localisation). The tool was used in 
this thesis to test and validate the response methodology. 
The response methodology proposed in this thesis consists of the following main 
steps: Step 1) initial impact assessment, Step 2) identification of the isolation 
plan, Step 3) manual identification of a response solution proposed by an 
operator, Step 4) automatic identification of a response solution generated using 
optimisation, and Step 5) identification of the response solution to be 
implemented in the field. These five steps do not need to be necessarily carried 
out in a sequential manner as presented here. An integral part of the response 
methodology is the development of a novel, heuristic-based, optimisation method 
for near optimal response to failures in WDSs in near real-time. The response 
problem was formulated as a two-objective optimisation problem with objectives 
being the minimisation of failure impacts and related operational costs. The 




heuristic-based method was used to solve this problem. For the first objective 
(i.e. impact assessment), a impact assessment method was developed, using 
realistic impact indicators and bearing in mind the UK water industry practice, as 
well as previous relevant literature (e.g. Bicik et al. 2009). The considered impact 
indicators cover different aspects of the event, such as water supply interruption, 
low pressure impact and discolouration risk increase impact. Furthermore, a 
consistent framework for end-impact assessment (i.e. same impact metrics 
calculated for every proposed response solution) was implemented in order to 
facilitate easy comparison between different response solutions.  
The IRPT is developed in the MATLAB environment and links to EPANET2 for 
the execution of hydraulic simulations and to QGIS for the visualisation of the 
impact indicators on a map. In each of the five methodological steps, there is the 
first stage where the information is inputted into the tool by the operator (not 
hydraulic expertise is required). Then in the second stage the hydraulic 
simulations are conducted by calling the EPANET2 functions and the end-
impact/cost is calculated. Finally in the third stage the impact indicators are 
visualised on a map. 
In chapter 4 the response methodology was demonstrated and validated on a 
semi-real case study. Comparison between the ‘Current practice response’ (i.e. 
solution based on the current response practice of the utility) and the ‘New 
methodology response’ (i.e. solution identified after interaction with the IRPT) 
showed that the IRPT enabled operators identify a response solution with much 
lower values in all impact indicators (especially in DRI) and cost.  
The heuristic-based method was validated on two case studies in chapter 5. The 
validation was carried out by comparing the method’s solutions with the solutions 
of the more advanced/accurate (but also time-consuming) NSGA II method. The 
first case study considered was the simple, real-life network of C-Town and the 
second one was the complex, real-life network of P-Town. For the C-Town case 
study, the heuristic solutions were also compared with the results of a past study, 
i.e. the Mahmoud et al. (2018), where conventional optimisation techniques (e.g. 
optimisation method and objective functions) were used. A sensitivity analysis 
was also conducted in order to investigate the robustness of the method to the 
start time of interventions. 





6.1.2 Summary of Thesis Contributions 
The main contributions (i.e. novelties) of the work presented in this thesis are as 
follows:  
 A structured yet flexible and interactive response methodology supporting 
and guiding the operator throughout the entire response process, from 
detection and localisation of a failure event to implementation of the 
identified response solution in the field. The methodology supports the 
operator in making effective response decisions in near real-time by 
interacting with the IRPT (e.g. via ‘what-if’ scenarios) whilst allowing the 
operator to have a final say. 
 A methodology that enables provision of automatically generated 
recommendations (i.e. near optimal response interventions) via a new 
heuristic optimisation algorithm enabling the operator to make better 
informed decisions. 
 A impact assessment methodology that makes use of multiple impact 
indicators covering both water quantity and quality related aspects of the 
impact of different response solutions (including ‘do nothing’) on water 
distribution system performance following the failure event. 
 Application and modelling of realistic operational interventions, in terms of 
availability of different types of interventions, start times for interventions’ 
implementation, duration of interventions’ implementation, all with 
associated operational cost models. 
 
6.2 Conclusions 
The main thesis conclusions are as follows: 
 The response methodology works well, as demonstrated on the semi-real 
case study. The results obtained showed that the tool enabled operators 
to identify a more effective response solution (i.e. reduced end-impact and 
cost) compared to the solution based on the current response practice. 




This is because the tool allowed operators to compare alternative 
response strategies (i.e. manually created by the operator and 
automatically generated by the IRPT through optimisation). This 
comparison was facilitated by the consistent impact assessment (i.e. same 
metrics assessed for each solution) used in the tool, as well as by the 
comprehensible impact metrics (i.e. well-known metrics in utilities), impact 
coverage (shown in maps) and cost of different solutions (shown in 
graphs). 
 The response solution was identified by the tool within 1 hour after the 
event detection/localisation (i.e. in near real-time under the assumption 
that no unpredictable event has occurred on site). This was accomplished 
in a complex, real-life network, hence increasing the potential of water 
utilities making use of the tool in real-life. 
 The heuristic-based optimisation method, as demonstrated on the two 
case studies, was able to identify near optimal response solutions in an 
effective (i.e. accurate) and efficient (i.e. computationally fast) manner. The 
effectiveness was confirmed by running the full, NSGA II based 
optimisation runs and comparing the resulting Pareto fronts which 
matched well. Hence, the computational efficiency of the optimisation 
method enables its application in near real-time for larger, more complex 
WDS. 
 The Pareto optimal front identified by the heuristics method had a good 
coverage, but it was less dense than the corresponding front obtained by 
the NSGA II. This, however, is not deemed as a significant drawback, 
because all solutions proposed by the heuristics method are near-optimal 
and the set of solutions identified represents well the trade-off between the 
impact reduction and associated costs of responses. Therefore, the 
solutions identified provide a good starting point for consideration by 
control room operators who have a final say anyway.  
 When compared to the solutions obtained in published literature, the 
heuristic-method managed to improve the quality of some of solutions (e.g. 
reduced the volume of undelivered water) despite the fact that its impact 
reduction is driven by other criteria as well. It also managed to reduce the 




time required for the identification of the final response plan to 15mins (for 
the simple network of C-Town). 
 The potential drawback of the heuristic-based method is its inability to 
optimise for the start time of interventions which therefore needs to be set 
by the control room operator. Having said this, as demonstrated in both 
case studies, the solutions generated by the heuristics method are robust 
enough, i.e. rather insensitive to this start time.  
 The tool presented here (i.e. the IRPT) includes only the step of response 
methodology and not the rest of steps of the event management process, 
i.e. the detection and localisation. Detection and localisation are not the 
focus of this study, because they have been extensively studied in the past 
(see chapter of Literature Review). However, including them in the IRPT 
would create an integrate event management tool for utilities. This would 
enable them to react in an even faster way, because the 
detection/localisation details (e.g. event type, exact location, event 
magnitude, etc.) would be automatically entered in the tool database (and 
not manually as done in this thesis). 
 
6.3 Anticipated outcomes and benefits  
The new technology developed in this thesis is anticipated to allow United Utilities 
and other water companies in the UK and abroad to further improve their service 
which, in turn, will result in improved quality of life in cities, improved preservation 
of natural resources, better protection of the environment and improved 
sustainability.  
The following key benefits are envisaged for the sponsoring organisation and 
other stakeholders: 
 Improved customer service and reduced customer complaints and 
regulatory fines associated with the impacts of WDS events. 
 Reduced operational and maintenance costs via improved awareness and 
handling of events. 




 New technology giving United Utilities the cutting edge on the UK and 
worldwide water engineering markets. 
 Wider application of the technology, e.g. in wastewater networks, and 
associated benefits. 
 Encouraging and speeding up the cultural change in the water sector 
required for the implementation of smart water technologies. This is 
associated with the need of water utilities nowadays to go one step further 
and adopt new technologies for the benefit of the environment (e.g. less 
water lost due to bursts), the society (e.g. less complaints and 
safer/uninterrupted water supply) and the utility (e.g. less fines due to 
incompliance to regulators). The cultural change can be achieved through 
investing in research of new technologies and the education of employees. 
 
6.4 Future research 
This section suggests possible directions of further research to extend and 
improve the work presented in this thesis. The proposed recommendations for 
future investigation are given separately in different sections, based on the 
different constituents of the response methodology. 
 
6.4.1 Response methodology framework 
An integral part of the proposed response methodology and interactive tool is the 
visualisation/presentation of the identified response plan to the control room 
operators (i.e. the third stage of the response methodology at every step, see 
chapter 3). Currently in this thesis, the identified response plan is visualised 
through maps (showing selected impact aspects of a response plan, e.g. Figure 
4-3) and graphs (showing pressure timelines, pressure vs cost curves and Pareto 
fronts of near-optimal solutions, e.g. Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4). Furthermore, 
when several response solutions are proposed, these are visualised through a 
single window to facilitate easy comparison (e.g. Figure 4-5). At the moment, the 
user inputs in the tool the impact aspect to visualise on the map and a desired 
node for which the pressure timeline is presented. Hence the visualisation of (one 




or more) response solution(s) to the operators could be improved in the following 
way: 
 The maps could be interactive, allowing operators select for example on 
the map the impact aspect to view or a specific node to view the pressure 
timeline. These interactive maps would enable faster visualisation of 
different response solutions and/or impacts, and hence easier 
comparison. Moreover, 3D visualisation software could be used, enabling 
different impact aspects of one solution or one impact aspect of different 
solutions to be visualised along the different dimensions in a single figure 
(for easier comparison). Finally, when a selected impact aspect of a 
response solution is visualised on the map, the intervention locations could 
also be visualised on the same map. This would be particularly useful 
when operators propose manually ‘what-if’ scenarios. For example, if 
operators wish to reduce impact on a specified area of the network, 
visualisation of interventions location on the map would allow them to 
select the interventions located closer to their desired area (i.e. increasing 
the potential of reducing impact to this area). 
 
6.4.2 Impact assessment 
The impact assessment method proposed in this thesis could be improved with 
the following ways: 
 Consideration of more impact aspects in the calculation of the total, 
aggregated end-impact of a response solution. In the impact assessment 
of this thesis, the impact aspects covered are related to supply interruption, 
low pressure and discolouration risk increase. However, a real-life failure 
event and/or the follow-on interventions might cause additional negative 
impacts, such as environmental impact, 3rd party damage, traffic impact, 
etc. It is stressed that any other impact aspect can be easily incorporated 
in the current impact assessment method if it can be normalised, in order 
to calculate the total, aggregated end-impact. 
 Improvement of the discolouration risk increase (DRI) index. In this work, 
the estimation of DRI index considers only the flow velocity and flow rate. 




The improved DRI index could take into account several other factors that 
affect the accumulation of particles into the pipeline, such as the flow 
direction, the pipe material, etc. 
 
6.4.3 Hydraulic modelling 
The hydraulic modelling used in this thesis could be improved or extended with 
the following ways: 
 Improvement of ASV injection modelling. For the purposes of this thesis, 
the ASV water injection was modelled as injection from water trucks (i.e. 
tanks in the hydraulic model) with total volume equal to 90m3, i.e. equal to 
3 tanks of 30m3 each. The water injection was modelled to take place 
once, i.e. until the water volume of 90m3 has been injected into the 
network. However, in real-life larger volumes of water might be required to 
restore supply at some nodes and/or more than once in the day 
(depending on the time of the day and demand requirements of the node). 
Water injection then could be improved by modelling water injection from 
a number trucks of 30m3 (depending on the demand requirements) at 
different times in the day. 
 Use of alternative pressure-driven model. The pressure-driven model 
currently used in the proposed response methodology is the Paez et al 
(2018), as it has proven to work well on larger networks. It is stressed that 
use of alternative (e.g. more advanced or recent) pressure-driven models 
was not used here, because this is not the focus of this thesis. The focus 
is on the optimisation part of the response methodology. Recent 
advancements on the development of pressure-driven models include the 
EPANET 2.2 released in July 2020. The proposed response methodology 
is generic in a sense that any other pressure driven model can be used 
instead of Paez et al (2018) if preferred.  
 





The heuristic-based optimisation method proposed in this thesis could be 
improved with the following ways: 
 Consideration of the start time of interventions as a decision variable. 
Currently in this thesis, the optimisation problem considers as decision 
variables only the interventions status (i.e. interventions used or not used). 
All of the interventions identified by optimisation are supposed to be 
implemented at a fixed time in the horizon (specified by operators at the 
beginning of simulations). More specifically, the decision variables 
considered are the status of rezoning valves (i.e. open or close), the status 
of overland bypasses (i.e. open or close), the setting of PRVs (i.e. no 
increase, 5% increase, 10% increase, 15% increase, 20% increase, or 
25% increase, all relative to the original PRV setting) and the status of ASV 
valves (i.e. open or close). However, in real-life more than one 
interventions might be selected in a response plan. In such case, each 
intervention should start at a different time in the horizon due to (larger or 
smaller) distance between the different intervention locations. 
Optimisation then should consider the start time of each intervention as a 
decision variable to make the response plan identified by optimisation 
more realistic. 
 Development of a more advanced and automatic process for selection of 
the initial population (i.e. step 1 of the heuristic-based optimisation 
method). Currently, the present optimisation method’s first online step is 
the manual narrowing-down of the initial list of available interventions 
(found in the offline step). This manual process includes: (a) an initial 
impact assessment and identification/visualisation of the affected 
DMAs/nodes and then (b) manual selection of interventions which link to 
affected areas. Although this technique is realistic (i.e. based on 
engineering judgement and experience), it does not automate the process 
followed in the first online step of the present optimisation method. 
Alternative automatic techniques for the selection of initial population 
found in the published literature could be used instead. These techniques 
usually require pre-optimisation hydraulic simulations, such as running the 




optimisation problem with hydraulic analysis only for a number generations 
(via an advanced/accurate optimisation method such as NSGA II) and 
using the optimal solutions as initial population subsequently. However it 
is believed here that such techniques although automatic, they do not 
guarantee faster (i.e. near real-time) identification of optimal solutions, due 
to time-consuming hydraulic runs (especially in large, complex networks). 
 
6.4.5 Validation of the response methodology 
The validation of the proposed response methodology in this thesis could be 
improved with the following way: 
 Further testing and validation of the proposed response methodology on 
additional real-life case studies involving alternative/more complex failure 
events and associated responses. In this thesis, the response 
methodology was demonstrated and validated on a semi-real event, i.e. a 
WTW shutdown (obtained by water utility). Based on the results, it was 
shown that the response methodology works well for such events, as the 
tool enabled operators to identify a more effective response solution 
compared to the solution based on the current response practice. 
However, the response methodology could be validated on alternative 
real-life events, such as equipment failures or major pipe bursts, in order 
to demonstrate its generic nature and the potential to be used by water 
utilities on any type of event. This was not conducted in the present thesis 
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